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C
1:
a)
(11) bargaining the release of both Hsueh and Lo for the
return of Kr. Grey.
A formal approach by our Mission in Peking to the Chinese
Government on the lines of b)(i) or (ii) above.
The unconditional release of Hsuch and Le immediately.
9. Course d) may well offer the best hope for the early
release of Er. Grey. But it would be very much a gambler's
throw. If it failed not merely would the Governor of Hong
Kong be placed in a very difficult and embarrassing position
(Hong Kong telegram No. 1028), but we should be criticised here
for ineptitude in having rel、 `ed our "hostagen" without having
attempted to obtain any assurance that this would help Mr. Grey.
Moreover, we would have reached the limits of possible action
in bargaining, since the Governor could not be expected to agree
to further acts of clemency. I therefore exclude course d).
10. I see objection to course a). Public criticism of our
alleged insotivity in the matter of Mr. Grey is likely to
sharpen, particularly if the movements of our Mission in Peking
are seen to returnɑto normal. A publicity campaign about
Mr. Grey is unlikely to shame the Chinese into releasing him and
might well result in pressure on us to take some action in Hong
Kong (the link between Er. Grey and Communist prisoners in Hong
Kong is a matter of public knowledge). Criticism of
inactivity on our part might be supportable if we were convinced
that it was the right course. But there is a more serious
objection.
I believe that the release ‘of Naush alone at his
due time would not be enough to induce the Chinese to release
/ Er. Grey
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