-
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2051
SECRET
SECRET
RLCLIVED IN
CUIVES No. 63 COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
860
TOP COP
R
- 3 OCT 1968 3 OCTOBER 1968
нивор
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 2051 DE 3ÅD OCTOBER REPEATED PEKING.
85
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 906 : GREY.
WHAT HAS BEEN SAID OF HSUER IS THAT HE QUOTE IS NOT THE PRICE
FOR GREY UNQUOTE AND THAT IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED PREFERABLE TO
RELEASE GREY FOR NOTHING RATHER THAN RISK EMBARRASSMENT WITH LOCAL
COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS BY AGREEING TO SUCH A BARGAIN. THIS RINGS
TRUE, AND THE CHINESE DIFFICULTY IS CLEARLY NO LESS IF HSUEH WERE
RELEASED UNILATERALLY IN THE HOPE OF GREY'S RELEASE SHORTLY
THEREAFTER: THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO THE SAME BARGAIN AND THE
EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE CHINESE WOULD BE EQUALLY OR NEARLY AS GREAT.
ON THIS BASIS, ONE HALF OF THE ARGUMENT IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF PEKING
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE FALLS TO THE GROUND.
2. IT IS NOT CREDIBLE TO ME THAT HSUEH'S RELEASE UNILATERALLY
WOULD PUT SO MUCH PRESSURE ON THE CHINESE AS TO OVERCOME THEIR
DIFFICULTY WITH THEIR LOCAL SUPPORTERS AND CAUSE THEM TO RELEASE
GREY IN SPITE OF IT. EVEN IF THIS REMAINING ARGUMENT WERE TO BE
THOUGHT JUST POSSIBLY VALID, IT WOULD STILL BE RASH TO ACT ON
THIS ASSUMPTION SINCE THE EFFECTS OF PUTTING THE CHINESE INTO SO
DIFFICULT A POSITION MIGHT WELL ADVERSELY PREJUDICE GREY'S
CHANCES.
3. THE ADVICE WE WERE GIVEN WAS NOT TO BARGAIN WITH HSUEH, WHICH
MUST INCLUDE NOT IMPLYING AN ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN WITH HIM BY RELEASING
HIM UNILATERALLY. I CANNOT SEE HOW WE CAN JUSTIFY NOT FOLLOWING
THE BEST ADVICE WE HAVE EMANATING FROM THE OTHER SIDE SO LONG AS
THE BALANCE OF PROBABILITY IS THAT IT IS REASONABLY AUTHENTIC.
CIT IS TO BE REMARKED INCIDENTALLY, THAT IF WE DO ACT WITHOUT
SOLID REASON AGAINST THIS ADVICE, THE CHANNEL WILL CERTAINLY BE
CLOSED TO US THEREAFTER).
SECRET
857
I REMAIN-