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4
the action should not have been taken without prior consultation,
and that the use of emergency legislation at all was
questionable.
He finally asked for a ruling on what H.H.G.'s
policy on detainees was,
Such evidence as there was indicated
Flag G(53) 5. In Hong Kong telegram No. 2038 the Governor replied
/ stating his view that the use of detainees as' barganing
counters could be dangerous, that the extent of the security risk involved in releasing a particular person could only be
judged in Hong Kong, and that there was no real evidence that
the release of detainees had a beneficial effect on Sino-
British relations.
rather that if the Chinese wished to improve relations they
did so in their own way irrespective of our treatment of
detainees or prisoners. The Governor has answered Mr. Cradock's
case effectively. There is room for argument about the effect on security of particular releases but as indicated by the
explanation of why it was thought necessary to continue the
detention of the detainee referred to in paragraph 4 above there are often special considerations which are not apparent from here or Peking. The Governor would also no doubt argue
that if as a result of releasing dangerous trouble-makers the situation once again began to deteriorate gravely, the authorities would be obliged to take suppressive measures which could only cause a sovere set back to Sino-British relations.
In the circumstances, the lesser evil might be to hold on to certain detainees longer.
6.
As regards Mr. Cradock's points (b) and (c) they have some
/ validity.
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