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Moreover, I think the argument neglects fact that militants in Hong Kong have suffered opon defent in their policy of violence and Sino December 1967 under G.P.G control. Concessions now several months after the abandonment of violence should strengthen the hand of those responsible fo December directive against violence. Conversely, refusal of any
conciliatory gestures may only weaken these moderates by allowing militants to argue that there is nothing to lose by a resumption of tough line in Hong Kong. Our experience so far e.g. the Border Agreement, visits to Grey, lifting of movement restrictions in London last November (even to more limited extent lifting of exit visas requirement in April) suggests that carefully judged concessions do bring certain dividends. There is little doubt for example the release of news workers in Hong Kong would bring release of Grey.
5. The key question therefore is (b), whether we can afford relevant concessions. This will always be a difficult decision and timing will be one factor. I would not, for example, advocate any earlier release of prisoners until we have had time to see effects of diplomatic and publicity campaign
(see paragraph 7, below) but I hope we shall examine possibilities of an earlier release of some prisoners, say at the end of 1968, most carefully. We ought to ask whether release at that time, after some (almost two thirds) of convicted prisoners have served their full terms, and a year after violence was renounced, would very much injure prestige of Hong Kong Government.
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We must also reflect that refusal of any substantial concessions may well mean prolongation of the present bad relations, with their effects, for a number of years. The Chinese may let matter drop before 1974 but that is date all confrontation prisoners will be released and therefore our terminal date. Grey could expect to remain in confinement at least until September 1969 perhaps longer until all news workers have been released. The above assumes that there will be no new deterioration and no arrests in meantime, which will be always more likely while confrontation persists. 7. As regards diplomatic and publicity campaign we must certainly give this all the backing we can but we should not be too hopeful that it will solve the problem of itself. The means at our disposal are limited and in present circumstances Chinese are probably even less sensitive than usual to this kind of attack. The situation of this mission might be improved thereby but other sectors, e.g. Grey, trade relations etc. are unlikely to derive benefit unless there is some gesture in Hong Kong.
Foreign Office pass Priority long Kong.
[Repeated as requested
]
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0. F.E.D.
C.O. H.K. Department.
F.0. News Department.
Consular Department.
I.P.D.
I.R.D.
Defence Department. C.0. News Department.
Defence Department. DIS. M.O.D.
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