Cypher/Cat A
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1693.
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno. 671 18 July, 1968.
SECRET
нилор
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 671 of
18 July. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
G70Hong Kong telegram No. 884: British Policy towards China.
I think it might assist to set out the benefits we could
I use expect to follow from an ending of "confrontation". confrontation here to mean the specially bad relations obtaining since May 1967. Basic Chinese hostility, attempts to undermine our position and gain adherents will, as Governor says remain as permanent features, but they do not amount to confrontation within terms of this debate.
2. The benefits we could expect are:
(a) better treatment generally of British subjects in China, including the release of Grey;
(b) normal treatment, in particular over visas, for this mission;
(c) improved, opportunities for our export trade and reasonable safety' for British businessmen visiting this country;
(a) reduced tension on Hong Kong Border and a better
political atmosphere in Hong Kong.
We could not of course expect Sino-British relations to be good and Chinese hostility would remain but it would not be expressed in the forms it has taken over the past year. Within these limits the scope for improvement is considerable. 3. It should, I think, be our object to achieve this
On Chinese improvement if we can do.so without excessive cost. side, as para 6, of telegram under reference points out, there is no doubt but that Chinese would like to get off the hook if
Our they knew how to do so without too much loss of face. object therefore should be, to facilitate this disengagement by showing that we are willing to draw a line across the book and by offering the makings of the face-saving victory they will require.
4. The difficult questions arise when we consider the sort of concessions we might be prepared to make in hope of achieving this. It is axiomatic that we should avoid, whenever we can, acts likely to appear provocative to the Chinese or to make their climb-down more difficult. But the nub of the problem is the convicted prisoners and key concession would be the release of some at least before conclusion of their terms. There are two questions to ask about concessions:
(a) Will they do any good? and
(b) Can we afford them?
On (a), it is possible to argue, as, telegram under reference does in para 3, that concessions will clearly strengthen the militants on the Chinese side by allowing them to argue that pressure brings dividends. This, however, is strictly an argument against any concession, e.g. release of For detainees, which I think centre of Governor's position. example the telegram states in paragraph 6 that concessions might do some good but that they would have to be very large ones and paragraph 4 allows that minor concessions are supervening this, by cutting ground from under militants' feet.
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/Moreover, I think
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