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reasons given in paragraph 9 above, it would be unrealistic
to expect that external pressures c.g. by diplomacy, publicity
or economic measures (if we can find any) will of themselves
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restore Sino/British relations to a normal level.
The Argument for Earlier Release of Some Prisoners.
This
15. The alternative course is that, while we should of course,
keep up external pressure on the Chinese authorities to behave
better, we should accept the need for moves on our part in
Hong Kong that might lead to an end to confrontation.
will always be a delicate matter and the likely cost in Hong
Kong terms would have to be carefully weighed; but we should be
actively exploring the possibilitics. The release of the
fifty detainees now hold under emergency legislation scons
the obvious first step and in view of the encouraging
reaction (or lack of it) from the communist press in Hong Kong
to the releases already effected, I hope it may be possible to
push ahead with that as fast as possible. I think, however,
that careful consideration should also be given to the
possibility of arranging carlier release of prisoners convicted
in the courts; for example those not convicted of serious
violence and those in sectors of particular interest to the
Chinese, such as newspaper workers. I am aware that this
idea of an amnesty was considered premature when it was
nooted some months ago. Nevertheless, more than a year
has elapsed now since the confrontation campaign began
and more than six months since violence ended. Has not the
time come to take another careful look at the cmnesty idea,
and make sure that we are not, in rojecting this out of hand,
denying
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