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consistent with security or other vital interests, of any
action in Hong Kong likely to provoke the Chinese, feed their
distrust of our intentions, or make it more difficult for them
to appear to be taking a soft line with us. I wish to
emphasise the importance of this, because there has been some
suggestion recently that what we must aim at is not a return
to pre-confrontation co-existence, but something more, namely
the attainment of a position of greater strength in the
colony, which would improve our defences against the next
communist attack. This seons to me a dangerously unrealistic
course which disregards the hard facts of our situation in
Hong Kong, quite apart from jeopardising any chance of
improving Sino-British relations. The main condition for
our continued control of Hong Kong is no longer our own
strength, which nowadays will always be minute in relation
to the Chinese forces arrayed against it, but Peking's tacit
agreement, largely for economic reasons, to co-exist. If,
by seeking to increase our own strength at all costs, we makc
it less worthwhile for Peking to maintain their co-existence,
we do ourselves more harm than good Moreover, if we show
that the only cffect of Peking exercising control and
restraint over the local communists is that we not only
fail to nove towards a settlement, but even adopt tougher measures, then we provide a clinching argument for
extremists, whon we may be sure exist, whether in Peking, Canton or Hong Kong.
The line wo have taken hitherto, that
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/we will