(c) could.
might be to try to send an unofficial emissary to
Peking with some standing in the case of Mr.
Grey,
say to the Chinese that he knew that the
Government of Hong Kong was ready for an act of
clemency in respect of Hsueh and Lo, but that he
naturally wanted to be satisfied that this would
result in the release of Mr. Grey. Mr. Gerald
Long himself would seem the obvious candidate.
This would at any rate help to meet criticisms of
inactivity on our part. But in my view it would
probably leave the situation as blurred as before.
Moreover, the Chinese might well try to manoeuvre
our emissary into a broadening of the discussions;
and this could well be embarrassing for the
Governor and ourselves.
13.
Accordingly, I think that any preliminary
action would be best taken by our Mission in
Peking. They might be instructed to say to the
Chinese that the Governor had in mind to release
Hsueh and Lo asia contribution to a return to
normal in Hong Kong, but he naturally wished to
be sure that this would lead to the release of
Mr. Grey; had the Chinese any observations to
make. As I indicated above, I think it unlikely
that the Chinese would give any firm guarantee.
At best they might use a form of words which
would indicate that they were prepared to con-
sider releasing Mr. Grey. At worst, they might
launch into a tirade indicating that without
some much more substantial move on our part
towards meeting their "demands" in respect of
all Communist prisoners, there was no point in
our raising the question of Mr. Grey. But in
either case we should have a firmer basis for
a judgment on whether we would be justified in
taking the act of faith of releasing Hsueh and Lo.
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