if conditions of movement for our Mission
return to normal. The Governor would no doubt
argue that such criticism would be no justifica-
tion whatsoever for doing anything which we
becognised to be prejudicial to the stability
of Hong Kong and therefore to our national
interests; but it is a factor which we
cannot disregard.
12. However, even if the Governor were to
agree that an act of clemency was now feasible,
he would certainly argue that we must be sure
that it would result in the release of Mr. Grey
if he is going to be able to defend and explain
his action in Hong Kong. This is a very real
difficulty. I am sure that if our Mission in
Peking were to attempt formally to bargain the
release of Hsueh and Lo against the release of
Mr. Grey, the Chinese would be quite unwilling
to give any undertaking - even if they were în
fact prepared to release Mr. Grey. This would
seem to argue that we should probe Chinese
intentions through other channels. But such
other channels as we might have are unsatisfac-
tory.
The Governor will argue rightly, in
my view that it would add quite unacceptably
to the standing of NCNA in Hong Kong to attempt
to use them as an agency for negotiating the
release of members of their own staff, and that
this could lead to all sorts of pressures for
similar local negotiations on behalf of other
categories of prisoner. The covert channels
which the Hong Kong Government have been trying
to use have not so far proved very satisfactory,
and are not suitable for any operation which we
wish to yerld early resul ts. A possibility
/ might