"to make the Eritish bend" (paragraph 2) was, as far as is known, never discussed or examined in detail from a theoretical viewpoint; it was merely something which started in the heat of the moment and which was widely supported in communist
circles because, inter alia, of the praise given to the use of viclence by the communist press.
This praise, together with information from more delicate sources, proved beyond any shadow of doubt that this type of violence had the blessing of many of the local communist leaders. The only reason that it stopped was because China instructed that it do so when she began to realise the full economic implications of the violent phases of confrontation. The criticism of violence by the local communist hierarchy came only after these instructions had been received; no attempt was made to consult the masses to ascertain their wishes. The point made by H0 (paragraph 3 of Mr. LI's report) that Feking policy was not to criticise the actions of local leaders but rather to summon them back is probably largely correct though reliable reports have indicated criticism by Peking of the acts of local people, if not of the people themselves.
3.
The pasting of slogans (paragraph 3) was stopped in Hong Kong because of action by the security forces; in Macau, posters are still occasionally used by the communists. While it is agreed that the ccamunists did not want violence to develop at the Cheung Sha Wan playground the leaders were aware of the attempts by their supporters to propagate MAO. It is somewhat exaggerated to claim that every (communist) organisation wanted to have a part in it". In fact members of very few, about 6, communist organisations were involved and then on a rather limited and ad hoc basis. The allegation, mentioned in paragraph 5 of Mr. LI's report, that the Cheung Sha Wan incident was partly the work of "Taiwan Agente" was a piece of propaganda floating around communist organisations. There is no basis to the story, unless one accepts the broader communist interpretation that all persons not communists are members of the "CHIANG clique".
The lead in to paragraph 4 is somewhat strange:
"Violence is not Chairman MAO's policy", Certainly MAO's works do not support
this hypothesis. The forecast that "an endless series of quarrels, contests and
fights, will become part of the life of Hong Kong
...
because of China's interest
in Hong Kong" is a fascinating conjecture. However, it is not clear if Mr. HO
means that these quarrels, contests, etc. will take place within local communist
organisations or between the communist organisation and the Hong Kong Government.
If the latter, then presumably this indicates constant and possible intensified pressure on Government by the co.munists. However, they must realise themselves
that this type of eniging and pressure runs the constant risk of overstepping the mark and forcing Government to take action; this would not, presumably, meet with
the approval of their masters in Feking, at any rate while in their present frame
of mind. No-one would dispute O's statement that China is capable of taking over
Hong Kong, at any time, by a variety of methods.
SECRET