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3. THE GOVERNOR SAW DIFFICULTY IN THE PROPOSAL TO RELEASE PRISONERS TO CHINA ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN AFTER THE DATE WHEN THEIR SENTENCES WOULD HAVE EXPIRED. THIS WOULD BE REGARDED IN HONG KONG MERELY AS DISGUISED RELEASE AND TAKEN AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM THAT CHINESE NORMALLY ONLY LEFT THE COLONY IF THEY WERE IN POSSESSION
OF A RE-ENTRY PERMIT WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO GO BACK FREELY.
HE AGREED THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN HONG KONG SHOULD BE ASKED TO
EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF ISSUING POST-DATED RE-ENTRY PERMITS IN
THE EVENT OF A SOLUTION ON THE ABOVE LINES BECOMING FEASIBLE AT
SOME STAGE.
4. AS REGARDS A GENERAL AMNESTY, THE GOVERNOR THOUGHT THAT THIS
WAS NOT YET ON THE HORIZON, AT ANY RATE IN THE CASE OF MAJOR OFFENDERS (THOSE WHO HAD COMMITTED TRIVIAL OFFENCES WOULD IN ANY CASE BE RELEASED FAIRLY SOON.) THE AMNESTY WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY
THE COMMUNISTS AS COMPLIANCE WITH ONE OF THE FIVE DEMANDS AND WOULD
DO GREAT DAMAGE. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO INJECT
THE IDEA OF AN AMNESTY EVEN INDIRECTLY INTO DISCUSSIONS OF GREY'S
POSSIBLE RELEASE.
5. WE REGARD THE GOVERNOR'S ARGUMENTS AS UNASSA ILABLE THOUGH WE
RECOGNISE THAT OUR INABILITY TO MAKE A CONCESSION OF SUBSTANCE
BLIGHTS ANY PROSPECT OF GREY'S EARLY RELEASE.
$
6. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO KEEP THE MATTER OF VISITS AND RELEASE QUITE SEPARATE. WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO
HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS: AND ON WHETHER YOU THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY ADVANTAGE IN A FURTHER EFFORT AT THIS STAGE TO NEGOTIATE HIS
RELEASE, HINTING TO THE CHINESE THAT THE QUID PRO QUO WOULD BE THE RELEASE TO CHINA (WITHOUT GUARANTEE OF RETURN) OF THE TWO
N.C.N.A. JOURNALISTS AND POSSIBLY THE OTHER JOURNALISTS AND
NEWSPAPER WORKERS ALSO.
Bur
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}