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NOT AND WE WERE (VIOUSLY TRICKED, PUBLIC REACTIONS COULD BE VERY
CRITICAL AND WE MIGHT FACE SOMETHING LIKE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE.
FOR THIS REASON IT WOULD SEEM VERY DESIRABLE AT LEAST TO TEST OUT
SCOTHE GROUND WITH CHOI COUR TOP SECRET TELEGRAM 496) FIRST, BEFORE
STARTING TO BARGAIN ON THE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF GREY'S
RELEASE.
A.
OF COURSE THERE ARE STRONG HUMANITARIAN REASONS FOR DOING AS
MUCH AS WE CAN TO GET GREY OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT IT SEEMS
DOUBTFUL IN ANY CASE IF TAKING A VERY EARLY INITIATIVE ON HIS
PROBLEM IN ISOLATION WILL NECESSARILY PRODUCE THIS RESULT. I AGREE
WITH PARA 6 (B) OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT IT MIGHT
!
INSTEAD BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND ENCOURAGE THE CHINESE
TO RAISE THEIR BIDS. WE WENT SOME WAY IN OUR STATEMENT OF APRIL
13TH TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR TO THE C P G AND TO GIVE THEM
OPENINGS IF THEY REALLY WANT TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING
HONG KONG ISSUES. THERE IS SOME REASON TO THINK THAT THEY MAY STILL
BE CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM SEMICOLON AT ANY RATE
(426)LI CHOH- CHIH COUR TELEGRAM 440) LEFT HERE ON APRIL 23 ALLEDGELY
A
FOR TALKS IN PEKING AND HAS NOT YET RETURNED TO HONG KONG. THERE
DOES SEEM TO BE A REAL RISK THAT AN EARLY APPROACH ABOUT GREY ON
THE LINES OF PARA 5 OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE COULD CUT
ACROSS OUR OTHER LINES OF CONTACT SEMICOLON AND THAT BY SUGGESTING
WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH
THIS PARTICULAR CASE, WE WOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO A MAJOR WEAKNESS
IN OUR BARGAINING POSITION.
5. OUR FEELING IS THEREFORE THAT FOR THE MOMENT IT WOULD BE BEST
TO CONCENTRATE ON RELATIVELY MINOR MOVES TO ALLEVIATE GREY'S
POSITION SEMICOLON AND NOT TO PRESS AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS FOR
HIS RELEASE UNTIL WE HAVE HAD MORE TIME TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS
A RESPONSE (EITHER THROUGH THE M FA OR OUR OWN LOCAL LINES OF
CONTACT) TO THE OPENINGS PROVIDED IN OUR STATEMENT OF 13TH APRIL.
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