4.
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(a) It is possible that concerted diplomatic pressure might stiffen Chinese at any rate in the short term.
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(b) Interview of 4 June can be interpreted in several ways, e.g. as show of Chinese displeasure over "Enterprise" rather than complete change of course. It would be unwise to leap
to conclusions and there may be something to be said for continuing with our present low posture at least for a short time.
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Nevertheless I think that considerations in paragraph 2 above are overriding. Diplomatic pressure would on balance help rather than injure uo. As regards 3(b) above, a diplomatic campaign could be called off if visas to senior staff were granted and in any event I doubt if expressions of concern to Chinese could do any real harm.. You will recall that when Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires was detained here in 1966 representations were made to Chinese by several Western Governments and this may in fact have hastened his release.
Even if your reply finally gets visas normalised their treatment of us has been monstrous.,
5.
We should try for representations in as many countries with Chinese missions as possible. In addition to Western countries, who are likely to be cooperative, we should try the Commonwealth (Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Zambia and Kenya) African and Asian countries generally. Africans may be particularly important in view of current Chinese interest there.
6.
Représentations should be to Chinese in capitals concerned rather than here in Peking. They are likely to be clearer and stronger if done in that way. I am afraid that many colleagues in Peking are lacking in spirit and solidarity.
7.
I recommend that we should instruct our representatives in Capitals concerned to seek the diplomatic support of Governments to which they are accredited, asking them to summon the Chinese Representative and convey to him expression of concern at situation for our Mission here, in particular the failure to grant exit visas to staff and attempting to get political preconditions for release. This treatment violates diplomatic practice, thereby raising questions for all countries with representation in Peking.
8.
We should try to keep representations to the narrow point of interference with free movement of diplomatic agents. Although there is splendid material available from last year about our treatment it brings in Hong Kong too quickly. Moreover, although it should be pointed out that we have been effectively detained since last August, it will be necessary to concentrate on the period since April when there have been no restrictions on Chinese movement to and from London.
9. The above representations, based on breach of diplomatic usage, would necessarily be confined to detention of staff of this Mission. We could not bring in the cases of other British subjects held in China without raising other issues, e.g. espionage or Hong Kong, thereby blurring the case. Moreover, while we can expect other Gövernments to exert themselves on behalf of diplomatic practice, which affects their own missions in Peking, we cannot hope to engage them on behalf of British subjects generally.
10. I would not (repeat not) recommend that we make further protests to the Chinese before launching this exercise. Such action would merely raise the temperature.
11.
We shall also need to forearm other Governments concerned against the probable immediate Chinese response e.g. references to-
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