Cypher/Cat A
"MEDIATE PEKING
Telno 302
CONFIDENT IAL
443
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 April 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 302 of 15 April. Repeated for information to Hong Kong,
I obtained an interview with Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Lo Kuei-po on 13 April. Following is summary of the interview.
2. I began by reading out our statement. I went on to point out since the prison visits in Hong Kong had been arranged successfully we expected to obtain early access to Grey. I also handed over out- standing Chinese entry visas at the same time, since Chinose had failed to collect them.
3.
In reply Lo Kuet po expressed profound dissatisfaction with arrogant language" and lack of substance in our statement which he said evaded the real issues. This was no help in solving the problems in Sino-British relations. It showed that the British Government was not sincere in its expressed desire to normalise Sino-British relations, furthermore the statement was not a real answer to demands put forward by the Chinese Government on many occasions in the past. Hong Kong was the crux of the present abnormal relations between Britain and China and until this problem was solved it would be difficult fully to normalise relations. Looking at our statement as a whole we had failed to reply to Chinese statement of 8 March.
4. Lo Kuei-po went on to describe our proposal to allow certain prisoners to go to reside in China a disguised form of deportation" The Chinese Government could not agree to this. The Hong kong Authorities must immediately and unconditionally release these compatriots since they were innocent of any crime. They had the right to live normally in Hong Kong or to return to the Motherland.
5. In my reply I pointed out that our statement had taken up most of the questions raised in Lo Kuei-po's statement of 8 March including the issues of Mao study, prisoners and compensation and had made positive suggestions. We wished to continue discussions and woul be interested in having positive suggestions from Chinese side. had demonstrated our goodwill by lifting exit visa requirement by granting Chinese entry visas and by allowing prison visits in Hor Kong.
I also rebutted his accusation that language of our statement
was arrogant.
6. Lo Kuei-po said he had by no means ignored the questions I had referred to, but our statement was not a satisfactory answer to Chinese demand and that the Chinese Government could not accept our proposal on the prisoners. He went on to say that the right to study Mao was a basic one, which all South East Asian citizens should have. The Chinese Government had noted the measures which we had taken on movement of diplomats and on prison visits. As soon as the Chinese Government had received confirmation from Hong Kong that visits haû
taken place, and from London that visa requirement had been lifted the Chinese Government would make its own arrangements in accordance with normal procedures to settle these problems". But these were minor issues. Hong Kong was the crux. If this was evaded t would be difficult for Sino-British relations to be really normalized.
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7. After some exchanges on gifts of rice and clothing and on treatment of prisoners (see my separate telegram) Lo Kuei-po ended by posing three questions :
CONFIDENTI AL
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