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6. I recognize that these proposals are open to considerable objections :
7.
8.
(a) To discriminate again in favour of N.C.N.A. prisoner
raises obvious difficulties for Government of Hong Kong.
(b) Further approach by us might be read [? grp. omitted]
Chinese as a sign of weakness and encourage them to insist on a higher price e.g. release in Hong Kong of other newspapers employees and possibly other confront- ation prisoners. On the other hand they have sometimes responded favourably on the limited occasions when we have made conciliatory moves.
(c) The Chinese might refuse to treat on Grey in isolation
from other Hong Kong issues. This seems to have been their [grp. unčec.] coolness in response to our proposals of 7 February on visas. We might therefore find that we were initiating further discussions on Hong Kong at a time when we would prefer to leave it to the Chinese to make the next move.
As against this there are the following considerations :
(a) Our concern about Grey's well-being.
It seems highly
likely that until the two N.C.N.A. men are contacted Grey will remain in custody. Unless we make some move the earliest date he might expect to be released would be September 1969 (earliest date by which both N. C.N.A. men would be free allowing for normal remission).
(b) It is just possible that the Chinese who may find publicity
on Grey embarrassing particularly the new wave which will presumably follow the news of my visit would be prepared to deal with his case in isolation from other Hong Kong issues.
(c) Even if they insisted on bringing in other issues, in the end they might regard the release of the two N.C.N.A. men as providing them with "victory" that they need to sign off in Hong Kong, accepting the release to China of the other prisoners in whom they are interested.
This leads on to the question of a larger act of clemency affecting other confrontation prisoners, as discussed first in your telegram No. 2047 to Hong Kong and Hong Kong telegram No.1501 of 1967 and more recently in correspondence ending with Hong Kong telegram No. 92 of 19 January. I should be glad to have your views and those of the Governor on whether the prospects of such a step are now any brighter and what our longer term plans are for dealing with confrontation prisoners. Even if we are fortunate enough to return to normal movement for staff of this office and for bank staffs in Shanghai we cannot expect to get back to anything like normal relations with the Chinese until the issues of prisoners is dealt with and this is bound to affect the whole range of issues, in particular the treatment of British subjects in detention in China,
19. I should
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