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Kong for the sake of our ataté ia Jebieg. They have thorofore
shifted their position and are prepared to equate British
officials in Peking with Chinese officiels in London. Having
achieved this not inconeidorable advance, we should not allow
the situation to stognats by being too inflexible. There is
furthermore a new factor. For the first time Vir D. Hopson
has introduced the question of staff morale, pointing out that
although the situation la not yet desperate the strain on those
divided from their families and those who ought to leave China
for medical reasone is beginning to tell. These hardshiya
could be more easily borne if it were necepted by the kission
that eacrifices were necessary and would help Hr. Grey or
othar Eritish subjects; but it is now quite clear that this
la not the case.
9. If our decision was between, on the one hand, giving up
a burgaining counter that might help Kr. Grey and, on the other,
facilitating exit visas for our Hission, it would be a hard one -
but I should continue to reccomend priority for Mr. Gray.
However this is not the case. He must, I think, accept Sir D.
Hopson's contantion that entry permits for N.0.3.A. era value-
lese os a counter in negotiations about Er. Gray. That there-
fore we have to balance is the embarrassment of not well-founded
public criticien that we are weakly making concessions to the
Chinese in order to help our own staff at the exponas of a
British subject, Hr. Grey, against the dəfinite advantage of a
norzalisation of working conditions in Peking, with the prospect
/that
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