342)
yher/Cat.A
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE PEKING ΤΟ FOREIGN OFFICE
elno. 179
CONFIDENTIAL
11 March 1968
34.9
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63
12 MAR 1963
HWB3/2
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 179 of 11 March. Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington, POLAD Singapore.
My telegram No. 174 and immediately following telegram: Sino/British Relations.
५
As regards visas this is a bad set back and we must now dig in for phase 2. As regards Sino British relations generally there are features which may not (repeat not) be quite so black as they look at first sight. The fact that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Lo called me (for the first time in over six months) shows that the Chinese regard their statement as important, Lo referred to your letter of 2 September and statement is nearest thing to a reply that we have got so far. Our proposals of 7 February were said to have been "noted"; they were not (repeat not) rejected; and Chinese were prepared to put forward their views, though discussions could not be "fruitful" if Hong Kong were brushed aside. On Hong Kong we were asked not (repeat not) to accept Chinese demands but to "reply" to them. Finally Chinese do not intend to publish their statement. These are hopeful features and indicate that there may be considerable room for manoeuvre. One, though not necessarily the only one, interpretation of issue of visas to Finch and two wives is that it is a sign to us that they are not completely intransigent.
2.
In
It.
It is I think necessary to ask ourselves whether the Chinese proposals of 24 January were genuine and whether if we had accepted them they would unwarrantably have made reciprocal gestures. the course of discussion Lo confirmed that Kao had made these proposals, though he alleged (quite falsely) that he had at the same time pointed out that Hong Kong was the crux of our problem. seems probable that they meant what they said at the time and that if we had settled quickly we would have got at least some people out even if not a complete thaw. Our attempt to bargain and reference to Hong Kong via Grey probably threw question back into the melting pot. Lo therefore changed record which is not first time Chinese have done this. Whether if we now just went ahead and took all action requested by Kao on 24 January including the issue of NCNA visas we would now get full reciprocal treatment seems doubtful.
In any
case it hardly seems practical politics in the present circumstances.
る。
The central question now is what are Chinese objectives?
There can be broadly two theories:
(a) They are bent on achieving a Macao-like situation in Hong Kong by maintaining pressure on this Mission and British subjects in China and will not settle for less;
(b) That they will settle for much less but cannot close the book and return to normal relations without some reference on our part to Hong Kong and their demands which would allow them to claim a "victory" or at least preserve face.
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C
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CONFIDENTIAL
1952 +3579364
14.0 On a priori