thro
the Bank of China channel referred
to in a previous Top Secret Telegram (on which
I have submitted separately).
He doubts
whether we should use the talks between the
Political Adviser and NCNA about prison visits
for this purpose. He also suggests that
these approaches be coupled with harder
publicity about the position of our Mission
and Mr. Grey.
6. Sir Donald Hopson agrees (Peking telegram No. 223) that we should follow up the incident
along the lines proposed by the Governor, but
in view of the attitude of the Chinese as
evidenced in their protest of 8 March he
considers that our approach should be confined in
the first instance to the Bank of China
channel. He is doubtful about the wisdom of
any publicity at this stage,
ARGUMENT
7.
Deportation of left wing prisoners to
Chine if successful might be an important way of meeting Chinese grievances in Hong Kong and
at the same time securing the release of
Mr. Grey. We should certainly not lose the
opportunity to emphasise to the Chinese that
this was a serious attempt to make progress, But we share Sir D. Hopson's doubts about taking simultaneous action on a number of fronts. If we pursue the matter through formal channels (i.e. in Peking and London) we can expect the Chinese to take up the hard
Shown in
propaganda line of our most recent formal
exchanges with them. By handling the matter informally through the Bank of China channel
we make it possible for the Chinese to
/ consider
Elagt (285)