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kkipag sehatan, VOR CONDIT
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formula on Hong Kong and the informal approach referred to above
would seem to provide us with a means of doing so that is less
risky than most. The trouble is that any atatement that satis-
fied the Chinese seems bound from that very fact to be such as
to compromise our position. It is clear from Lo's reparke and
from the informal approach that prisoners are a key issue. The
Governor has always been prepared to deport (or "release to
China") considerable numbers of communiet prisoners, but under-
standably he is very reluctant to release them in Hong Kong.
The Chinese, however, have always challenged our right to deport
to China and when a test was carried out with two communist
film stars last week, the Chinese refused to accept them and
formally protested to our Mission in Peking, It is too early
to say what the Chinese hope to achieve from us in Hong Kong
in the immediate future. It seems unlikely that they can
seriously expect us to accept a "Macao-type" situation (i.e.
a situation in which, while we hold nominal control, our
actions are in fact dictated by the Chinese Government through
various local communist organisations). But they may hope to
push us some way towards such a situation by insisting that we
release considerable numbers of prisoners and in the process
recognise a special status for various Chinese official and
semi-official organs in Hong Kong. For the present we must
await the Governor's assessment based on a further probe of
the Chinese position.
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/Restrictions
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