Cypher/Cat A
SECRET
IMMEDIATE B.H.C. SINGAPORE TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 23 8 January, 1968
SECRET
R. 318
244
COPY NO: This sad. jo
on valutions with Cama file.
ANG
12.1.68.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.23 of 8 January, Repeated for information to Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, POLAD Singapore, Bangkok, Tokyo (for Foreign Secretary) and Washington.
My immediately preceding telegram.
Following for Prime Minister from Commonwealth Secretary.
Defence Cuts.
At resumed meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Razak said that after giving serious consideration to our proposals he wished me to convey to you the Malaysian Government's grave concern at their very serious implications not only for Malaysia and Singapore but for the whole region. Broadly their views were as follows:-
2.
(I) Malaysia had always regarded us as a staunch friend and ally: they depended on us and had no treaty with anyone else, even Australia or New Zealand. Our departure would leave them defenceless, and they had a deep sense of being seriously let down.
(II) There was a Communist threat on the Northern border and, potentially, in Indonesia.
(III) In 1963 they had agreed to the establishment of Malaysia on the clear understanding that we would work with them and assist them with defence and economic development since it was recognized that Sabah and Sarawak would be liabilities to them. They would never have taken these territories on without these assurances. Had they not agreed to take them on we should now still be left with responsibility for Sabah and Sarawak as for Brunei. They understood our economic difficulties but they faced these as well. Our devaluation had cost them money: they had accepted this as they thought Britain was their friend. They now felt very deeply let down particularly over the formation of the Malaysian federation.
(V) [sic] The decision, which appeared firm, to withdraw in three years left very little time. They would have to make appropriate adjustments and take measures to look after their own interests, and they thought it fair to say that some of them would affect us. If we had to survive they had to survive too.
I said I had been aware of the difficulties our decisions would create for them. We had made every effort during recent years to avoid these decisions in deference to our Commonwealth partners' wishes. It might possibly have been better if we had taken them earlier.
If we were now accused of letting them down it was because we had bent over backwards to help them by limiting our earlier cuts to a greater degree than our economy could sustain. We could not be both economically strong and maintain the present sophisticated military deployment outside Europe
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12 JAN 1958 HIWA 3/2