CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEL TE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 63
22 January 1968
266
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 63 of 22 January. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
20 Your telegram No. 76: Grey.
Following for Permanent Under Secretary of State.
I agree with your summary of my views in your paragraph 1. I also agree with your conclusion in first sentence of your paragraph 5 that best hope is to work for an exchange of NCNA prisoners in Hong Kong for Grey. If this or any other manoeuvre is to have any chance of success, however, we must have time particularly in view of Governor's reservations on an early act of clemency. We must also as far as possible avoid publicity which has the effect of increasing pressure for retaliatory measures. I appreciate that this apparent inactivity may not be easy to defend if public pressure mounts, but there may be no alternative.
2. On reflection I agree that a Parliamentary statement hinting at possibility of action against NCNA London would be better avoided.
3. I agree with your paragraph 2 that Chinese are unlikely to be much influenced by threat of non-renewal of residents' permits. I was not suggesting that this was ever likely to achieve such a major object as Grey's release. It was suggested as a method of adding to pressure for improving conditions and access. Release or major improvements would have to depend on Hong Kong.
40 A threat in private to close NCNA in London unless Chinese accept an exchange of Grey for Hseuh P'ing (your paragraph 5) has considerable risks. It is possible that Chinese attitude would stiffen under threat. We would, therefore, be compelled to implement threat with consequent escalation, probable ill-effect on this Mission and no compensating benefits for Grey. We should also take into account that Chinese may P.N.G. staff and declare them deprived of immunity but refuse to allow them to leave as with Dutch Chargé d'Affaires in 1966.
5.
Nevertheless it is possible that this move may do the trick or at leas compel Chinese to state their terms for an exchange more clearly. Something would depend on terms in which threat was phrased i.e. it should not be an ultimatum with a time limit but a clear indication that unless a swap were arranged it would be impossible for us to allow time-expired NCNA staff to remain indefinitely in the country. If it were decided to act this way I should also wish to promote parallel démarche here to avoid dangers of misreporting from Chinese office in London.
16. My
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