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on in Britain if within, say, the next two months there is
no improvement for the bankers in Shanghai.
11.
The crux of the matter is what we should do about N.C.N.A.
I see three possibilities:
(e). To grant entry visas for N.C.N.A. and hope that
this will improve the chances of arranging the
exchange for Mr. Grev.
This course has the warm support of Sir Donald
Hopson. The Chinese have stated quito categorically
that Mr. Grey is not "a visa case" (Peking telogram
no. 72) and we have known over since he was arrested
that his case was tied to Hong Kong and not to
N.C.N.A. in London. The best prospect for Mr. Groy's
release is an exchange with either one or both the
N.C.N.A. prisoners in Hong Kong. We have already
dropped a hint to the Chinese that this would be
possible. Nevertheless there is no doubt that we
would be running the risk of serious criticism both
in Parliament and the press if we agreed to return
to normal conditions for the diplomatic staffs in
Poking and London while having to admit that we had
been unable to obtain any satisfaction about Mr. Grey.
The General Manager of Reuters told me informally
last night that he thought it would be indefcnsible
in the eyes of the press to allow further N.C.N.A.
journalists into this country while Mr. Grey was
still hold incommunicado.
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