SECRET
202
Cypher/Cat A
FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Teno. 325
SECRET
11 December 1967
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 325 of 11 December, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington, POLAD Singapore
87)
Your telegram No. 2500 to Hong Kong: Measures to assist Mission in Peking.
88
You will since have seen Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 and 1)my telegram No. 322 in which I recommended evasive action in
Wen Hui Pao case. As assessment of damages is due to take place on 14 December action will have to be taken very soon.
2. I have stressed in my telegrams that as seen from here measures against Chinese press in Hong Kong are most sensitive issue here. I may be wrong but I believe action in suppressing violence e.g. [? gp omitted] on schools is more readily under- stood here. We have reason to think Chinese leaders dislike schools being used for this purpose though they feel it incumbent to protest against raids and to exploit them as useful propaganda theme. Action against press has always been a particularly sore spot and has resulted in counter case here e.g. detention of Gray and burning of this mission. The latest Chinese protest contains warning that further counter case may be taken if we press Wen Hui Al [sic] case to conclusion.
3. In paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 322 I argue that there is another reason to place action against Chinese press in a different category. According to Mr. Hsueh, Wen Hui Pao has "never incited people to make bombs". I should be grateful if Hong Kong would confirm whether this is broadly true. If it is not I should be grateful to receive by telegram some inflammatory examples, which would have to be recent to be relevant to present situation. In any case Hsueh's remarks may be relevant to the future. If the Chinese leaders wish to disengage to some extent and go over to "peaceful struggle" they will need their main organs Wen Hui Pao and Ta Kung Pao to propagandise line and reassert control. If this is true it would not (repeat not) be in our interests to interfere with them too much at present.
4. I therefore feel obliged to revert to my strong recommendation that we whould take some evasive action in Wen Hui Pao case. If it is too much to get Olivier to withdraw I hope as a minimum it would be possible to find some way of postponing assessement of damage.
5. We have just been summoned to the Consular Department this afternoon to discuss visas. I hesitate to forecast what this will bring but if it is a Christmas present then I think that arguments for stalling on Wen Hui Pao will be even stronger.
/6. I am
LAST
REF.
DEXT
f I
187
SECRET