surely have little to gain and much to lose
S
(in terms of the internal politice struggle) if
they do so.
3.
~
Our view is that we should respond cautiously Towards to any apparent feelers in an endeavour to reach
feeler understandings on matters in which the CPG shows
special interest. In doing so we must avoid a
situation in which we will have tied our hands in
an area where we could exert pressure, e.g., the
Communist press, while leaving CPG free to exploit
other aspects of confrontation. But since any
understandings we may reach are likely to be of a
very loose and informal nature this danger may
perhaps be discounted
4. If general talks with the Chinese on Hong
Kong are seen to be a possibility we agree that
there are arguments for holding them elsewhere
than in Hong Kong or Peking. But we do not
think that contacts on specific points could be
usefully pursued except in Hong Kong or Peking,
since it is usually necessary for such
"negotiations" to cover in some depth practical
details of the problem under discussion.
5. We agree with Hopson that the Chinese, if they
wish to disengage, will find it necessary to
demonstrate some kind of "victory". At some
stage it may be useful to help them find a face
saving formula but we tink that this stage has
not yet come. When it does, the Chinese will
probably
but we shoned
want.
• bibe pretty
Sure that it would to achieve,
the desired result for In
any
care
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