SECRET
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sentence, recognises) smaller United States vessels would in any case still visit.
5.
Paragraph 5, fourth sentence. The returns we could expect would be in terms of less bad Sino-British relations and the chances of better treatment for British subjects here. We cannot neglect this element in the equation.
6.
I should have thought many Hong Kong residents would welcome measures likely to lead to restoration of better relations with the mainland. The border Agreement of November 1967 was generally welcomed for this reason,
7. Paragraph 7. The point here is that though our actions in relation to visits may not have changed over past 3 or 4 years, the Chinese and Hong Kong scene has changed fundamentally. Confrontations grps omitted] of British subjects, detentions of a Diplomatic Mission have intervened, and as a result of the cultural revolution we have a more militant attitude on the part of the Chinese leaders, whose internal dissensions no doubt inhibit even "moderates" from appearing to take a soft line on issues of this kind. We cannot go on as if nothing had changed.
8. On the question of pressure by the Chinese, to present the issue as one whether we should surrender or not is, I suggest, to over-simplify the matter. We and Hong Kong_must live with the Chinese. Hong Kong's survival in the end depends on Chinese tolerance. We and other British subjects in China are virtually in their hands. It is only realistic in this situation to avoid upsetting the Chinese more than we really need to. Such slight improvements as have taken place in relations since last August have come about because we have settled with them on a number of issues, e.g. the border last November, the lifting of movement restrictions on Chinese officials in London last November, and the lifting of entry and exit visa restrictions in April. Inevitably these all involve concessions to the Chinese; but they also produced benefits. If our only criterion is to avoid [two grps undec] to giving anything away to the Chinese, then the prospects for improvement in our relations are very poor indeed.
9.
To sum up,
(a)
I submit the following are basic points:
it is incontestable that the current level of United States naval visits has done harm to our relations and the position of this Mission. Continuation of this level of visits is likely to cause further harm and will certainly prevent any improvement in relations;
(b) the proposed reduction in United States naval visits
would not vitally affect Hong Kong's security or economy, or Anglo-United States relations;
(c)
(a)
if we are to improve Sino-British relations, which is our stated object, we must take account of Chinese susceptibilities;
taking account of these susceptibilities is not (repeat not) always to be regarded as a sell-out or an invitation to blackmail but as a normal adaptation to the Chinese attitudes at a time when relations are particularly strained and we specially need an avoidance of friction.
SECRETA
/Foreign Office