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presence of Hsieh alone precludes any use of the London chann (your telegram No.939). Both Hopson and I will have to deal with his type also, in greater numbers and under even less favourable conditions.
7。
The difficulty with my channels is that contact is so far only through intermediaries (direct contact has been refused) and at the moment there is no subject for discussion which is likely to be very productive. Moreover whilst the hotheads apparently remain largely in control of the local apparatus, contact with the soberer faction offers little that is useful. Nevertheless, we will of course continue to do our best.
8. Your paragraph 5. The short answer is that in the face of an all-out confrontation we probably could not last very long. If we are able to rely on the loyalty of the Police and the confidence of the general public, we might be able to cope for a month or two although by then the factors mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram No.600 would begin to operate. I do not think that the risk of China cutting off all our water and food supplies should be overestimated since the major effect of doing so would be to injure the interests of the Chinese population here generally, including the Left- wing's own supporters, Even if Chinese water supplies were cut off now, we calculate that it should be still possible to ensure a four-hour supply daily until the period when the rains would normally be expected. So far as food supplies are concerned, we now have abnormally large rice stocks and are not dependent on China for a large proportion of our supply. We should be very badly hit if Chinese supplies of meat and vegetables were reduced; but my understanding is that without too long a gap it might be possible to organise alternative supplies from Japan (though we would almost certainly need financial help from H.M.G. to pay for it). I am looking further into the details and will be telegraphing shortly about this.
9. Another effective Chinese threat might be directed against our normal air and shipping routes. But there is a sea channel into Hong Kong from the East which does not pass through claimed Chinese territorial waters; and an attempt to harass shipping passing that way or to interfere with aircraft flying over the Chinese islands in the Pearl River would seem to carry very substantial risks of involving China in an armed conflict, which at present she can hardly want.
1:00 It is obviously difficult to forecast precisely how long Hong Kong could survive an all-out confrontation. Clearly, fatigue on the part of the Police and the Government generally would be a major factor. But on the other hand it would also affect the Left-wing, unless they were able at an early stage to secure some resounding success.
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The problems of withdrawal, as you say, would be immense without Chinese co-operation after negotiation; and it would present almost insoluble difficulties if we attempted to make a headlong flight, behind a strong screen of force with no regard for the consequences to our international reputation and obligations. Many Governments have major interests here which they would hardly be happy to see us jettison on their behalf. In addition, we should be faced with terrible problems concerning the security of those Chinese and Eurasians who have been seen to throw in their lot with us, especially those in the public services and above all, the Police force whose support would be more necessary than ever in the period preceding a withdrawal. Any plan for which was not based on strength and which envisaged
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