TOP SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
057.9
Cypher
Ro
D. 19 May 1967
19
SPECIAL CARE
10
#P
0520Z
19 MAY 1967
FLASH
TOP SECRET No.641
R
Your telegram No. 9440
Grateful if communications which refer to possible
withdrawal from Hong Kong could in future be graded Top Secret.
20
Following are my immediate comments on points raised in
your telegram.
る。 Your paragraph 3. The policy you suggest is probably wise for a few days longer, until we can see which way the cat is going to jump following H.M.G.'s statement. But as a long term policy to be followed in the face of evidence that their demands are to be pressed home, I believe it would be very
dangerous indeed. It is the policy anybody who knows the British would expect us to follow and Left-wing plans will be laid in the expectation that we will behave in this manner. It leaves the initiative entirely to them, and they will be free to wear us out trying, with waning public support, to cover their manoeuvres; until they eventually lead us still trying to avoid provocation when provocation has become irrelevant from one humiliating position after another into a Macao type compromise satisfactory to them,
40 On the other hand, while their resources in compliant followers may be great, resources in top leadership and in the means of direction and control cannot be all that strong. I feel therefore that it is essential, once we know we are really in for a prolonged struggle, to be prepared to act more positively. We must, while following a general course much on the lines you propose, in addition act selectively and with careful deliberation with the object both of seizing the initiative sufficiently to keep the opposing leadership so busy warding us off as to hamper the development of their plans, and of preserving public confidence in our ability to uphold the law which is at present being flagrantly and increasingly breached in a number of dangerous ways.
5. In developing tactics of this kind, which I agree would be a matter of most careful judgment, (the Communist prées, whose present activities are very dangerous indeed can be tackled, if desired, in other ways than by prosecution for sedition e.g. the charge might be sedi tious libel or suborning the police). I would of course consult you in general terms about the measures to be taken, but timing too would be of importance and I would need to have some freedom of action over details.
6. On the question of any dialogue with the Chinese (your paragraph 4), I feel we must try to use every possible channel available to us and I am a little surprised you feel the
/presence
y my
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