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11.
Until we are clearer as to the mainland Chinese intentions, it is obviously essential that we should continue to hold the position in Hong Kong. On the other hand if China is determined to force a Macau- type situation on us or to drive us out of Hong Kong we may be forced to consider withdrawal from the Colony. On the other hand any mention of withdrawal at this stage, if it became known, would have a catastrophic effect on the morale of the Chinese in Hong Kong
It would and could well lead to a landslide in local confidence. enable the Communist Chinese to achieve their objective with comparative
ease.
12. If the situation deteriorates further it will be necessary to contemplate eventual withdrawal. This would be a major policy decision which would not only have grave repercussions on the British image in the world but would of course affect a number of other Governments who have major interests in Hong Kong and particularly the Americans, as any withdrawal by us would be regarded as a victory for the Chinese against the Western forces. however, be desirable to consider the preparation of contingency plans for withdrawal, but this of course must be done in the utmost
secrecy.
It might,
13. As labour conditions in Hong Kong are not as good as they ought to be, the Governor has already been instructed to take steps to work out a timetable to bring the Hong Kong labour legislation more into line with that of the U.K. and to reduce the present working hours for women and young persons. It is also intended to make available to Hong Kong an expert on the drafting of such legislation.
Should
Department is also going to be strengthened.
The Labour
(Sir Arthur Galsworthy has telegraphed to say that he will be sending three telegrams to London later today:
(a) an assessment of the situation
(b) steps taken by the Hong Kong Government to cope with
it, and
(c) future measures.
Copies of these will be sent to the Private Office as soon as they are available.)
Mu24, Hall
My 24,67
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