Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 9 June 1967
9
Ro
12
11
1 0252
REGISTRATION
228
אן ב:
IMMEDIATE SECRET No.806
(227)
My telegram No.799.
HWB 1/1
I have the following general comments of the situation as reported in that telegram.
20
I believe that, at the time of drafting this (09 1545), the situation is worse than it has been for a fortnight: although today has been quiet, helped by heavy rain, at the hard-core, militant, level of union leadership, we are faced with a deliberate challenge to Government's authority. Attacks appear to be concentrating on Government Departments and British owned firms including utilities: and to be being pressed in some cases
to the point of violence.
30 On the other hand, the only overt support for these actions seems to be coming from the left-wing press and posters in hard-core C.P.G. premises. Some covert supporting economic action may be being taken and intimidation of various kinds is of course a feature of the whole campaign.
40 It is also the case that the Communists, although strong enough in the areas in which they are causing (or can cause) trouble to enable a small number of them to intimidate the remaining workers, who lack the courage to oppose them, nevertheless control a limited (although very important) range of concerns only. At present, they are disrupting two or three undertakings at one time; and they show signs of attempting gradually to increase the number in which they foment simultaneous stoppages. Our riposte at present is to deal with these outbreaks as they occur, and use the opportunity each gives us to try to get rid of the worst trouble makers in each case.
5. It remains to be seen whether our countermeasures achieve sufficient success to weaken the communist ability to cause stoppages at will, and to separate the militants from their more half-hearted and reluctant adherents. The chances of this may be improved, if, as seems to be the case, there is inadequate central direction in the communists tactics and a degree of spontaneity in the outbreaks. Assuming reasonable success on our part, the likely result would be another lull; probably while the local leadership consolidated its control and built up a more formidable attack on a more solidly organised basis.
6. But if we are unsuccessful in our immediate tactics, the probability is that the stoppages will increase in violence, frequency and duration until there is a general stoppage. At ST this point, or when we see it clearly developing, we may have to
/pull
MEXT
227 2281
PARO
SECRET