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3. The local Communists seem to have misjudged the temper of the general public in Hong Kong, which has shown itself strongly opposed to the imposition of a Maeao-type situation on Hong Kong, and, with Government encouragement, has been surprisingly out-spoken in its support for Goverment's measures to frustrate Communist pressures and maintain law and order. There is evidence that the Communists (both local and mainland) have been taken aback by the strngth of public opposition. After their earlier demonstrations in Kowloon had incurred much public odium because hoolganism was encouraged and took over, they switched to the Macao pattern of endeavouring to humiliate the Governor within Government House. When this failed, they resorted to fomenting disorders in the central district of Victoria, encouraged by venomous inflammatory loudspeakers, principally from the Peking-owned Bank of China. In the face of firm police action and public disapprobation, these tactics ceased on Tuesday 23 May, which appears to have been a day of reappraisal by the Communists. Today 24 May the emphasis is on a number of stoppages (unrelated to any industrial dispute) in the bus and tram services. So far this action has been reasonably orderly; but there is evidence of strong feeling amongst several Communist unions that more violent
methods should be used in order to create incidents which can be exploited.
40 On the other hand there are indications of some disillusionment and disagreement in the local Communist leadership; some are reported to be feeling that they have to some extent blundered by exposing themselves too early, by misjudging public reaction, and by underestimating the efficacy of Government's response.
5. If however Communists decide to press their campaign vigorously, their most likely tactics seem to be:-
(a) Engineering stoppages in public utilities, Government
Departments, etc., accompanied by intimidation on a considerable scale.
(b) Provoking the police by fresh and more violent
riotous demonstrations using women and children as a screen (as in Macaoj
(c) Maintaining a general atmosphere of tension, e.g. by use of loudspeakers, poster and press campaigns, intimidation by telephone and letter, spreading rumours, and propagandist Red Guard style demonstrations on the frontier.
(a)
(e)
Attempting by all available means to subvert and intimi- date the police, and over-stretch their resources. Assaulting exposed Europeans and well-disposed Chinese, The kind of situation envisaged in paragraph 5 above, if it were vigorously sustained over a period of, say, two to four weeks could lead to the exhaustion of the police and of the troops, who in these circumstances would of necessity have been called in (they have not been yet). Before this point was reached, over-extension of the security forces would require them to be used in smaller numbers at each incident; they would then have to use greater force to restore the situation; this would cause mounting casualties and loss of life, and hence a vicious spiral of exacerbation.
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