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the people would still be allowed to continue to exercise their
right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups or by post.
11. The situation deterriorated further and on the 22nd May the
Governor asked for permission:-
(a)
to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign
is being directed the Bank of China and the communist-
controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q. and the Workers
Club; and
(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to Hong Kong.
Both these requests were approved.
Attacks on our posts in Macau, Peking and Shanghai.
12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British
Consulate in Macau was the target of repeated demonstrations and the
staff have been compelled to vacate their quarters for a hotel.
On the 22nd
13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar demonstrations
were mounted against our offices in Peking and on the 16th May the
office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked.
May the Charge d'Affaires in Peking was informed that the Chinese
Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled and
demanded that the Shanghai office should be dosed within 24 hours.
The apparent parallel with Macao
14.
There is an apparent parallel with events in Macao which
have been widely studied in pro-communist circles in Hong Kong.
There too the crisis began with a local dispute (in that case,
however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands" by
local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the Chinese
authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to appease the local
pro-communists who only stepped up their demands.
Internal and
external pressure was applied, including the implied threat of
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