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over the situation in Hong Kong. But such action
is likely to provoke rɛtxitxry retaliatory
action by the Chinese Government. The Chinese could
cut off water and food supplies but the major effect
of doing so would be to injure the interests of
the Hong Kong Chinese population generally, including
their pro-Communist supporters. Even if these
supplies were cut off, Hong Kong could manage by
strict rationing and alternative supplies of food from
Japan at extra cost.
15. A long drawn out confrontation could sap the
morale of the Chinese and continuous widespread
disturbances could lead to fatigue on the part of the
police. But it would also affect the pro-Communists
unless they were able at an early stage to secure some
resounding success.
16. The alternative to firm action is likely to be
further humiliation and a gradual loss of control
over the situation in Hong Kong. We would only be
able to remain there on sufferance and we would have
to carry out the instructions of Peking and remove from
Hong Kong any organisations or interests which the
Chinese Government considered hostile or unfriendly.
Many Chinese and others who had thrown in their lot
with us, especially those in the public services and
the police, would be at risk.
17.
Conclusion.
a) The risk of an all-out confrontation with
China should be accepted.
(b) The known pro-Communist leaders of the
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present