Cypher
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
GON TOR MASTUSTRATION
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 13th May 1967 R. 13th
12
1230Z
No.600
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
1?
11
Peking No.215
POLAD Singapore No.82
(S. of S. please pass IMMEDIATE
to both)
20
9
(60.
19
My telegram No.599.
Kowloon Disturbances.
Left-wing action outside the industries immediately concerned in the disputes has so far been confined to mustering moral and financial support for the arrested workers and the four demands' (my telegram No.557) throughout Left- wing organisations. But secret sources indicate that in many Left-wing circles the line is being taken that the dispute has
escalated as a result of deliberate Government action; and that the Left must therefore prepare for, a further escalation. Plans are being made to organise the physical defence of Left- wing properties and also of demonstrations in which children (as in Macao) would play a prominent part.
20
We seem at present to be in a stage of psychological warfare in which the main weapon of the Left has been their sustained press campaign aimed (so far quite unsuccessfully) at undermining the morale of the police, as well as at discredit- ing Government and destroying public confidence in its will and capacity to resist. The coat-trailing attacks on myself in the Communist press of 12 May (my telegram No.583) may well have been aimed at placing us in the dilemma of either attacking 'press freedom' or appearing to be meekly tolerating sedition.
30 Probably the Communists have not yet taken the decision to launch an all-out Macau-style attack. There are obviously some elements on the Left who are concerned about the prospect of a head-on confrontation. Our discussions with Left-wing contacts continue, but they have not so far yielded any pointers towards an acceptable settlement. As things stand, we seem likely to be in for a prolonged period of gradually increasing pressure.
40 A prolonged crisis, however, would be the worst of all possible situations for Hong Kong. Morale here would tend to deteriorate rapidly, capital would depart, and the effects on the economy could be irreparable. If we are to avoid this situ
we may before long have to choose between: –
10 1967
No.63
(a) seeking a solution which would involve the
Hong Kong Government in substantial-loss of face and authority, or
SECRET
LAST
R°F.
2
From PAR