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SECRET
COPY FOR DECISTRATION
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 16th May 1967 R. 16th
If
0522Z
MAY REST
LAST
DEF.
RAF.
37
лад
FLASH
SECRET No.612
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
26
4253948
19
#t
Peking No.224
"POLAD Singapore No.93 (Please pass IMMEDIATE to Peking
PRIORITY to Singapore)
Your telegram No.919.3b)
Peking Statement.
I made the statement referred to in your paragraph 8 because there was great public pressure and need for some explanation of the situation. To have refused or delayed comment could have had a most damaging effect on local confidence and morale.
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At a meeting of my Executive Council this morning the point was made with unanimous support that the reaction of the ordinary citizens of Hong Kong to Left-wing pressure (and this after all is going to be crucial during the next few weeks) would depend on their judgment of how H.M.G. in London would react to that pressure, and whether H.M.G. also was fully determined that law and order be maintained. I am sure that if, as your telegram under reference appears to suggest, H.M.G. were to avoid making any statement or reply to the Chinese protest, it would be suspected here that their attitude to the Chinese demands was equivocal and Hong Kong was being left to sink or swim on its own. The invariable practice in the past has been for replies to Chinese Notes of protest to be made in London or Peking, not Hong Kong. For me to make a second statement on the lines you suggest in paragraph 6 would not be accepted here as a proper substitute for a firm statement of views by H.M.G. and I do not advise it.
る。 I entirely agree with your objections to alternatives (a) (b) and (c) of your paragraph 2 and I would hope therefore that Ministers would agree to the making of a firm official statement in London, to include the admirable points made by Hopson to Vice-Minister in Peking (his telegram No.482). But I feel that it is equally important that an oral exposition of H.M.G.'s views should be given concurrently to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London. It seems to me essential to try by every means we can to get the Chinese Government (repeat Government) to understand our essentially reasonable position. If the discussion with the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires were used to ram home the same points, it need not be barrenly polemical and it might be possible to avoid detailed discussion of the "demands". Only by the maintenance of personal contacts of this kind does it seem likely that an eventual solution may emerge.
SECRET
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