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Peking (because of the calibre of Chinese representation here there would be no point in our attempting this in London). But, as you know, such a dialogue would introduce several large complications, and for the time being at any rate we still think that the best hope of getting the message through to the Chinese lies in your using your local channels.
5. It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability of Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. short of armed intervention, i.e. widespread disorders in the Colony coupled with the cutting off of Hong Kong's water and food supplies from the mainland, and your assessment of the effect on the morale of the Hong Kong Chinese if this situation lasted for some time. Could you organise alternative supplies of food, and what assistance would you need in this respect?
6. If, in your opinion, it would not be possible for Hong Kong to survive for long in the kind of situation foreseen in paragraph 5 above, once it became clear that the C.P.G. intended to go for all-out confrontation of this kind this might well be the point at which we should have to consider withdrawal from Hong Kong. This whole concept presents huge problems which must clearly relate to the point in time at which withdrawal became inevitable. No doubt you too will have given some thought to this, and we should in due course welcome your views generally on this range of problems.
7. Your assessment of the points in paragraphs 5 and 6 will be of greatest value to me in discussing this whole problem with my colleagues.
8. Finally, I should like you to know how much we admire the way you have handled this very difficult situation. Our thoughts are very much with you and your advisers in these anxious days.
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