SECRET
(105
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 1698
SECRET.
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
20 MAY 1967
ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1698 OF 20 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO HONG KONG AND ROUTINE TO PEKING AND POLAD SINGAPORE.
MIPT: KOWLOON DISTURBANCES.
AS MINOR PERSONAL COMMENTS ON THE J.1.C. SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OF 18 MAY, DONALD SAID THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE PROSPECT OF HARDSHIP FOR, OR ALIENATION OF, THEIR OWN SUPPORTERS IN HONG KONG WOULD DETER THE CHINESE FROM CUTTING OFF SUPPLIES OF FOOD AND WATER, IF THE SIT- UATION OTHERWISE DEVELOPED TO THAT DEGREE (PARA 9). HE ALSO COMM- ENTED THAT THE ASSESSMENT NOTABLY UNDERSTATED THE DIFFERENCES IN IMPORTANCE AND EFFICIENCY BETWEEN HONG KONG AND MACAO: NO DOUBT OUT OF MODESTY (PARA 6). HE STRONGLY ENDORSED THE ARGUMENT THAT APPEASMENT WOULD RESULT ONLY IN INCREASED DEMANDS, FINALLY, HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED AN ASSESSMENT FROM THE JAPANESE CONSUL-GENERAL IN HONG KONG WHICH, THOUGH DIFFUSE AND AM- BIGUOUS, CLEARLY ASSUME THAT CHINESE OBJECTIVES WERE LIMITED, AND TENDED TO SEE THEM AS A COMBINATION OF SEVERING THE AMERICAN CONN- ECTION AND CURTAILING NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES. DONALD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD AT FIRST DISCOUNTED THE SECOND POINT, AND STILL FOUND THE JAPANESE REASONING TO IT QUITE UNCONVINCING. BUT HE HAD ALSO SINCE RECALLED THAT IT WAS A FEATURE OF THE MACAO CRISIS AND HAD ENTERED INTO HSI EH'S SPEECH ON 18 MAY: AND IN THE PRESENT CONFUSED STATE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IT MIGHT BE A MORE SENSITIVE POINT WITH THE CHINESE THAN WE TENDED TO SUPPOSE. AT ANY RATE HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD KNOW OF THIS JAPANESE VIEW IF WE HAD NOT RECEIVED IT DIRECT. 2. DONALD WENT ON TO WONDER (ON A PERSONAL BASIS, AND MENTIONING THAT HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOT INCLINED TO SET MUCH STORE BY THIS POSSIBILITY AT PRESENT) WHETHER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION MIGHT BE
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SECRET
SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.)
TELEGRAM NO.
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