CONFIDENTIAL
ment of trouble between India and the internal border tribes (such as the Nagas), encouragement of the pro-Peking Indian Communists, stoking-up the Indo/Pakistan dispute; in general, distracting Indian energies and resources from the major task of internal development.
43. For both India and Pakistan that development is reaching a critical stage; both are reasonably near to achieving agricultural "break-through", making them self- sufficient in food. The use of new food grains and fertilisers has made this a possibility in Pakistan in the next couple of years and in India a few years later. The result of success would be that more foreign exchange could be devoted to industrial development. The long term market in both countries for consumer goods is already well recognised in the Western trading countries; how significant will this market become in the '70s? What scope and reward would there be for more co-ordinated Western aid to the two countries?
44. The repair of the twenty-year Indo/Pakistan quarrel, the outward and visible sign of which is Kashmir, seems as far away as ever. As long as it continues, this diverts resources from development. For Pakistan in particular it will continue to dominate all her external policies: any major disintegration of India would, of course, present Pakistan with an opportunity for action in Kashmir which she would find it difficult to resist.
45. What of the possibility of Indian disintegration? The unifying force of the Congress Party has been greatly weakened and the fragility of an imperial amalgam of 500 million people of different races and tongues is becoming more evident; Nehru's ideal of a modern secular union is becoming more difficult for his successors to maintain. However, the task is by no means hopeless. Both Nehru's successors have shown considerable vigour in combatting communalism. There have also been encouraging signs of a decline in separatism in some non-Hindi speaking areas. The language issue has continued to be a serious divisive factor, but the Language Act of 1967, while not wholly satisfying either the Hindi speakers or the smaller linguistic groups, provided a compromise with a reasonable chance of acceptance. The Armed Forces and the ubiquitous Indian Administrative Service are stabilising factors. They will almost certainly continue to obey the orders of a constitutional government; but if Delhi's control over the country slipped too much, the Armed Forces might well be led gradually to take over responsibility for large areas of the country and perhaps to participate in Government. A disintegrating India would pose the Western countries with the same problem as faces some of them in Nigeria now - for how long should they or, in the face of public opinion, can they, support the unified state (however much such unity suits their own or universal interests) against determined separatist efforts?
46. Assuming, however, a continuing unified India which is stronger (if not strong) economically, what part is she likely to play in Asia or the world generally? Will she be a force for anything, as she was in the past for non-alignment? In the absence of another Nehru, a world role as practised by him seems unlikely. But what of a regional role, a leading partner with Japan and Indonesia in the sort of indigenous Asian economic (or even defence) grouping mooted in earlier sections? India is certainly increasing her interest in countries like Japan and Australia but not meeting with an enthusiastic response. Would continued unity and growing prosperity increase her leadership appeal?
Concluding Questions
47. Conclusions, however tentative, do not seem to be very worthwhile in any survey of Asia over the next ten-fifteen years. The situation is likely to remain very brittle and it probably makes more sense to end with a series of questions, discussion of which may be fruitful.
8
CONFIDENTIAL