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14. The key to American action lies in the kind of settlement they are able to achieve in Vietnam. If it is one which enables them to withdraw their forces, will they take the opportunity to pull them out of Thailand also, relying on economic aid from the West and Japan to strengthen indigenous resistance to Chinese domination?
15. America's allies can only speculate as to where she will judge her interests lie and as to how far she might want to disengage, at least militarily, from developments in Asia. The extent of her present engagement is noted where appropriate in the sections that follow.
Soviet Union
16. Short of armed conflict, Sino-Soviet relations could hardly be worse. Polemics, initiated mostly by the Chinese, are at a consistently high level and the Czechoslovakia crisis provoked a particularly vicious outburst from Peking.
17. Stemming from the ideological split at the end of the 1950s, the dispute now embraces the historical national antagonisms of the two countries. It is reflected in competition for the allegiance of the Communist Parties of the world, in competition for influence in South and South East Asia in particular and in tension over the long Sino-Soviet border. How is this dispute likely to develop over the next decade? A rapprochement seems improbable; China is likely to be relatively so weak as not to give Russia sufficient incentive to mend the fences unless she calculated that it was precisely Chinese weakness which offered the best prospects of increasing Soviet influence in the country and that it would be too late to wait until China was stronger; but Russia, even in the face of extreme 'revisionism' in Eastern Europe, is unlikely to become sufficiently 'reactionary' for a full accommodation with China to be feasible; the deep gap between their philosophies of revolution will probably remain unbridgeable. A limited accommodation, however, might result on the initiative of a post-Mao leadership, seeking, for instance, an expansion of external trade and renewed Soviet military and economic aid. Russia might welcome the opportunity to secure the long land frontier but she might be even more wary than Western countries or Japan about giving aid to a China which she cannot control and whose development will present a greater threat to Russian interests.
18. The eruption of the border dispute into armed conflict is possible but unlikely in the '70s; the Russians will continue to stir up trouble in Sinkiang by inciting minority strife, but are unlikely to provoke major armed clashes. They know the Chinese can do the same thing among tribes in the Soviet Union and will not wish matters to get out of control.
19. In certain circumstances, Sino-Soviet relations are likely to have a considerable effect on the West. For instance, a movement towards rapprochement, an unlikely contingency, would probably cause alarm in both Japan and India, restraining any desire in the former to loosen ties with the United States and leading the latter to make greater defence aid demands on the West. Alternatively, if Sino- Russian estrangement continues as China grows stronger, both Russia and the United States might be compelled to reconsider their military dispositions in Europe. In general, possible Chinese attitudes are likely to continue to be a 'back door' factor in Russian assessment of policy towards Europe and the United States. But to what extent? The certainty of Chinese denunciation and the possibility of disapproval from much of the Communist movement did not deter Russia from invading Czechoslovakia in mid-August.
20. We can expect to see continued vigorous Sino-Soviet competition in the sub-continent. Sino-Indian relations are referred to in a later section but their rapid deterioration led directly to a marked increase in Soviet attention to, and
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