PART VI CONCLUSIONS
(i) his emphasis on support for Mrs. ELLIOTT;
(ii) his accent on youth, such as his reference in Radio Hong Kong interviews
to the 'enthusiasm of youth';
(iii) his action in diverting the protests from the written word to public
demonstrations;
(iv) his introduction of placards and slogans painted on jackets etc. as the
badges of the 'movement'; and
(v) his bringing together the young people who subsequently featured
prominently in the demonstrations and riots.
(c) The spreading effect of the 'hunger strike'
425. SO was primarily a passive character, and although he turned the tide of opposition to price increases from one of petitions and newspaper articles to one of public demonstrations in the form of a hunger strike, with its evocation of Indian and Vietnamese prototypes, it was mostly through the more active personalities of LO Kei and RAGGENSACK that the opposition developed in intensity and moved on to the streets. It seems that SO himself was opposed to the intensi- fication of active demonstrations in the form of marching and riots, but he supported by words and actions an increase in passive demonstrations and public speeches by sending AU YEUNG and LAM to Kowloon and inviting passers-by to join his demonstration in Hong Kong.
(d) The demonstration march
426. The evidence suggests that the leadership of the youthful opposition changed immediately after SO's arrest at 4 p.m. on 5th April and that although 'hunger strikes' and signature gathering, following SO's pattern, were continued by certain supporters, the main stream of protest under the leadership of LO Kei and RAGGENSACK turned towards bringing the issue more forcefully before the public. The change of direction and emphasis in the demonstration, which led to the sub- sequent escalation of events, seems to have come from the nature of these irresponsible, ill-balanced youths, from the increase in excitement after SO's arrest, and from the public support and the interest which they derived through the unaccustomed press publicity and the concern shown by some public figures. There was also, in all probability, a youthful emulation of the precedents and pattern of demonstrations so familiar in other countries.
(e) The repetition of demonstrations and the outbreak of violence
427. The evidence regarding the so-called 'peaceful demonstration' on the night of April 5/6th indicates that it constituted some threat to law and order even before the incidents outside Tsim Sha Tsui Police Station in the early morning and it is relevant to note here that the original leaders had apparently either left or
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