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PART IV THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE DISTURBANCES
for military support at an earlier stage. In this connection, we noted that the military authorities were informed at 6 p.m. on 6th April that troops exercising in the New Territories need not be called into Kowloon in readiness. We were told that this decision was taken in the absence of any information that large scale disorders were likely to occur and was influenced by the fact that the troops were engaged in a long prearranged exercise. We agree that a case was not made out for cancelling the exercise and calling in troops before the outbreak of disturbances, in view of the steps already taken to warn the military and of the consequent probability that their assistance could be obtained at reasonably short notice should the situation deteriorate rapidly. We are influenced in so thinking by the sub- sequently demonstrated ability of the police companies to contain the situation. As in the case of the curfew, it is possible with the aid of hindsight to speculate that an earlier deployment of troops and police on the streets of Kowloon on the night of April 7th might have deterred potential trouble-makers and prevented the renewed outbreak of disturbances. But, in the light of the precautions taken and in the absence of positive indications of further disorders, we have no criticism of the decisions made in respect of the use of regular military forces.
285. The Volunteers. It is clear that, although they were not called upon to play a very active part during the April disturbances, the Hong Kong Regiment personnel were of considerable assistance to the police and regular forces, which shows the validity of the decision made some time ago to reorganize the Hong Kong Regiment for an internal security role.
286. The Commissioner of Police confirmed to us that the Regiment could perform a valuable role in an internal security situation, particularly in view of the local knowledge of the personnel and the ability of many of them to act as inter- preters and guides. In these circumstances we feel that more use might be made of their services and we suggest for consideration that the mobilization of the Hong Kong Regiment might be advanced to coincide with the mobilization of the Auxiliary Police (i.e. at the formation of D.E.F.). This move might enable a better coverage of street patrols to be maintained after regular police have been withdrawn to form riot suppression companies.
Auxiliary Defence Units
287. We also had evidence of the parts played by the Auxiliary Police and the Auxiliary Air Force.
The Auxiliary Police. We note that the usual close liaison between the regular and the auxiliary force was maintained on this occasion as evidenced by the fact that the Auxiliary Police Staff Officer attended the CP's meeting at noon on 6th April and the Force was alerted and placed on standby from 8 p.m. Mobili- zation of the Auxiliary Police was ordered at 11 p.m. and the CP explained to us that the transformation of the Police Force into full emergency structure is
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