PART IV
THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE DISTURBANCES
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arrived in barracks in Kowloon before 3 a.m. and were partially deployed in support of the police from 3.15 a.m. Further troops arrived in Kowloon from the New Territories during the early hours of the morning.
279. The Hong Kong Regiment, a volunteer force which includes reconnaisance squadrons and other units trained in internal security duties and integrated with the regular forces in this role, can be called out in case of emergency by a proc- lamation of the Governor under the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force Ordinance. On this occasion, the Commanding Officer was notified at 1.15 a.m. on April 7th that embodiment of the Hong Kong Regiment was likely and at 3.15 a.m. the regiment was called out. However they played no part in the events of the first night of rioting.
April 7/8th
280. During April 7th arrangements were made for the immediate deployment of troops to police stations as soon as information was received of crowds gathering and for other units to remain in barracks on standby. The Hong Kong Regiment, 95% of the members of which had reported for duty before 5 p.m., and the Queen's Own Buffs were deployed to Police Stations in accordance with this plan and at 11 p.m. a number of troops were already employed on cordon point duties.
281. Thereafter, a number of regular and volunteer units were committed to assisting the police and in one incident a platoon of 'B' Company, The 1/2 Gurkha Rifles had bottles thrown at them, when sent to disperse a crowd at Bute Street telephone exchange.
April 8/9th and April 9/10th
282. Similar arrangements were made on these nights for deployment of troops on curfew duties and other tasks in support of the police and for adequate reserves to be held on standby. The Hong Kong Regiment was disembodied at midnight on April 11th when the threat of further disturbances had vanished.
Comment
283. The Regular Forces. It is evident that the standing arrangements for calling on military assistance worked well and we believe that the deployment of military forces gave substantial relief to the regular police and contributed markedly to the quelling of disorder within a reasonable period of time and without requiring the use of undue force. We also think that the presence of troops on the streets had a sobering effect on the crowds and contributed to the maintenance of public con- fidence in the Government's ability to restore order.
284. The main question which exercised our minds in relation to the use of troops was whether the Police Commanders were justified in deciding not to call
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