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PART IV THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE DISTURBANCES
a formal handover is made to the Army either generally by the proclama- tion of martial law or in a particular locality by the officer in command of the police in that area at the time.
(e) Military assistance may be in the form of a military force dealing in- dependently with a given situation at the request of the Police. In this case the military commander will be in sole command. Alternatively, in the case of a larger incident, a joint command may be set up and tasks allotted to the respective forces over which the respective commanders remain in control throughout. At no time do Police Officers give com- mands to troops nor do Army Officers give commands to police unless the military forces have taken over complete command.
275. The fundamental point for our purposes is that the use of military forces in riot suppression in Hong Kong is based on principles which do not connote a situation where the Police have lost control and been obliged to hand over respon sibility and command to the Military.
276. The timing and the way in which military strength is brought to bear does, of course, involve the exercise of careful judgment. Whilst appreciating that the circumstances underlying the riots here in 1956 and in 1966 were very different, it is not without significance that in the latter there was a much earlier use of military forces and an earlier collapse of the riots; but, the enhanced capacity of the police force to deal with riots, the fact that it was so much better prepared for such an eventuality on this occasion and the nature of the riots themselves were, we think, very potent factors in bringing these riots to such a comparatively speedy end.
Military Assistance-April 6/7th
277. The evidence indicated that the military authorities were informed of the situation in Kowloon from the time that DEF companies were formed in the early morning of 6th April and we note that the Chief of Staff attended the CP's conference at midday. Thereafter, in the light of the scanty information available to the police regarding the likelihood of further disturbances on the evening of the 6th, we think that adequate arrangements were made to prepare the military forces for deployment to police stations if necessary.
278. The first step taken was at 2 p.m., when 'A' Company, 1st Bn. The Queen's Own Buffs was put at one hour's notice to return to Kowloon from exercises in the New Territories. Subsequently, after the outbreak of rioting, other troops were ordered to police stations or barracks in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, and the Commanding Officers of The Queen's Own Buffs and the South Wales Borderers arrived shortly before 2 a.m. in Kowloon Police Headquarters and Central Police Station, Hong Kong Island, respectively. The Queen's Own Buffs