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SECRET
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COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE
DEPT.
HONG KONG AND
WEST INDIAN "C"
TITLE:
"HONG KONG: POLITICAL AFFAIRS - INTERNAL:
KOWLOON DisturbancES :
MAY 1967.
REFER TO
DEPT.
DATE DEPT.
NAME
REFER TO
NAME
REFER TO
DATE DEPT.
DATE
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NAME
1926
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HWB 5.12 HONG KONG : ECONOMIC AFFAIRS-INTERNAL:
LABOUR FORCE : Disputes.
111
En clair
PRESS
COM
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
25 MARCH
7
FROM HONG KONG (British Information Services)
D. 22 May, 1967.
R.
22 11
03552
1967
Hong Kong Standard on its front page this morning covers yesterday's
events in central district with a story headlined; "Little Force, from
action wine day for peace and order".
Standard.
It was the battle of downtown, central, said
The police won.
The paper added: "their superably co-ordinated action nipped in the bud
every effort by the mob to break loose from their box after police had
manoeuvred them into it.
They sealed off three major accesses.
To the east at
Arsenal Street. To the west at Jubilee Street near the vehicular ferry
pier. And the roads to the Albert Road levels.
In the limited perimeter enclosed, police kept the twisting turning
writhing tired frustrated mobs in check. And there, platoon after
platoon of supremely disciplined men in khaki, dealt with each emergency
in text book fashion".
In addition the papers editorial said: "Not only is there an ever
present danger of eruption into lethal violence, but also it is evident
that a failure to take effective counter-measures is likely to encourage
wilder
and more lawless activities".
The official announcement that further disorderly gatherings will
not be permitted is, therefore, to be fully supported by the public.
Distribution - H.K. W.I.D. 'C'
- I.G.D.
J.I.G. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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H
- D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare - Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson Mr. Foggon
Hong Kong Government
Treasury
Office
Export Credits
-
Mr. Boxall
Mr. D. Hawkins!
Guarantee Department
LPST
MS.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 63
{F 23ACK 170/
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
00 HUPDL
DE
HUNSF
0
221040Z
FM
ASOL.M
NO. 461
TO OO ASOLHY
AVCLLU
GR
280
BT
54522
Peking.
545
22/5
:
54522
37522
xx.
17
sent
the
P.S.
(12)
An Rodgen P/us/s. La Salle
Mu de la Rish
Tä Hel FED.
ADDSD TO FO TELNO 545 OF 22/5 RF1 GOVERNOR HONGKONG.
M.I.F.T. VICE MINISTER LO KUEI-PO IN AN ORAL STATEMENT SAID
a SEAD
4 New All.
(TD (2)
UKWID (ST)).
THAT EVER SINCE THE CHINESE GOVT STATEMENT OF 15 MAY THE BRITISH
AUTHORITIES IN HONGKONG HAD CONTINUED TO DEPLOY LARGE NUNDERS OF
POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE RESIDENTS OF HONGKONG AND COMMIT FASCIST
ATROCITIES. 600 TO 700 ARRESTS HAD TAKEN PLACE INCLUDING OLD MEN
AND CHILDREN. THIS SUPPRESSION WAS STILL SPREADING
. IT MUST CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND THE BRITISH GOVT KUST MAKE A
SPEEDY REPLY TO THE FIVE POINTS OF THE CHINESE GOVT.
2..WHEN YOU SUMMONED SHEN PING THE CHINESE CHARGE ON 19
MAY YOU ADOPTED AN ARROGANT IMPERIALIST ATTITUDE AND SLANDERED
THE CHINESE MASSES. HE PROTESTED AT THIS,
3.. LO FINALLY SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THESE ACTIONS THE 1954 AGREEMENT
WHEREBY WE MAINTAINED AN OFFICER IN SHANGHAI HAD LOST ITS ORIGINAL
MEANING, THE CHINESE GOVT THEREFORE ANNULLED IT AND DEILANDED THAT
MR HEWITT SHOULD LEAVE SHANGHAI WITHIN 48 HOURS
4.. I REPLIED THAT I TOOK NOTE OF HIS STATEMENT, I ONCE AGAIN
STRENUOUSLY DENIED THAT THE HONGKONG GOVT WAS OPPRESSING THE PEOPLE
OF HONGKONG. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF FASCIST ATROCITIES,
THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER IN THE FACE OF ILLEGAL
DEMONSTRATIONS, THE POLICE HAD ACTED WITH GREAT RESTRAINT.
5.. LO KUEI PO INTERJECTED THAT MY QUOTE QUIBBLING UNQUOTE WAS
NOT WORTHY OF REFUTATION. HE HAD SUMMONED ME TO TRANSMIT A PROTEST
AND INFORM MẸ OF A DECISION, HE THEN STARTED TO WALK OUT
AS HE LEFT I EXPRESSED THE STRONGEST PROTEST AT THE UNILATERAL
A BROGATION OF THE 1954 AGRECHENT AND ASKED WHETHER HEWITT NIGHT
DE WITHDRAWN TO PEKING.
SECRET
113.
Cypher/Cat A
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
. Telno. 539 22 May 1967
SECRET
·
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 539 of 22 May Repeated for
information to Hong Kong Washington and PULAD Singapore.
1106
Washington telegram No. 1698, paragraph 2.
There has been I think there may be something in this. another puzzling
event or rather non-event over the weekend. Our Soviet colleagues report
that obvious preparations for demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy
were being made on 19/20 lay. Loudspeaker systems were installed in
neighbouring streets, slogans painted, etc. But nothing really happened
and the loudspeakers were later taken away.
2. There was also the forcible occupation of the Foreign Ministry by
rebels from the Foreign Languages Institute on 13 May. Ch'en Yi is still
under attack and some of my colleagues believe he is no longer directing
foreign affairs except in a purely formal capacity, though we have no
real evidence of this.
3.
In a speech at the end of April (being reported by Bag) Chou En-lai is
reported to have said that he supported the Foreign Ministry
Revolutionary Liaison Station which repre- sented 60 per cent of the
staff. He also stated that he was "in charge" of the Foreign Affairs
Department as well as those of Finance and Agriculture.
4. It is not therefore surprising if the Foreign Ministry seems at sixes
and sevens. The fact that their statement on Hong Kong of 15 May was not
in the form of a Note, and the "demands" were open-ended may imply a
compromise between hotheads who insisted in full support for the Hong
Kong Left-Wing and the cooler heads who were reluctant to commit the
Chinese Govern- ment too far. Hsieh Fu-chih's relatively cautious speech
of 18 May would also be consistent with this.
Foreign Office pass Priority Washington 227 and Hong Kong 371
Mr. Hopson
Sent 0700Z/22 May Received 09352/22 May [Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.D.
PPPPP
S.E.A.D.
C.O. F.E. & P.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D. J.I.R.D. News Dept.
SENT TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 99).
D.T.D.
D.I.S. M.O.D.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63|
23APK 1701
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AS COMMONWEALTH_OFFICE (D.T.D.)
"SECRET
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P
107
!
CC.
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher D. 22 May, 1967.
FLASH SECRET
No. 662.
R.
22
1100Z
8
23
MAY
(114)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 63
2 3 Ark 196/
HWAY/17
Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated " POLAD Singapore No. 115.
"Peking No. 248. "Washington No. 129.
14
My telegram No. 641.
(s. of S. please pass FLASH to Singapore and Peking and PRIORITY to
Washington).
Hong Kong Disturbances.
77B
Over the past two days the situation has deteriorated. There has been
an increase in the number of violent incidents, particularly in the
central area of Hong Kong; and known pro-communist elements have been
involved in many of these. An important feature has been the continuous
broadcasting from the Bank of China (which has not opened for business
today) of incitements to violence against Government and Europeans
generally, including such slogans as "kill Trench", "police turn your
weapons (i.e. against your officers)" The pro-Communist press is giving
full and approving accounts of violent action by demonstrators and
calling for their extension. There have been token strikes today by the
bus companies and taxis.
•
2. The key to the situation here is the maintenance of public confidence
and especially police morale. The police have stood up very well to the
harassments of the last few days, but there are two adverse factors in
the situation: (a)
(a) fatigue which is now beginning to tell on them; and (b) the
constant barrage of Communist propaganda directed specifically to the
subversion and intimidation of the rank and file. We believe that
Communist tactics over the next few days will be to create incidents in
several places at once, so as to extend the police while maintaining the
propaganda barrage. Public morale is still holding surprising well, but
there is increasing interference with daily life; and there are signs
that unless we are seen to take effective action to control the
situation, instead of simply acting to block individual communist
initiatives, public confidence will slip. A landslide could quickly
follow.
274
DA
SECRET
116 118
SECRET
3. We have considered various new measures to deal with the situation.
These include:-
(1) picking up and if possible deporting, and
failing that detaining, a selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known leaders
of the present campaign;
(11)
(111)
action to neutralize several of the buildings from which the campaign is
being directed, notably (1) the Bank of China and (11) the
communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union Head Quarters and the
Workers' Club. This might be achieved by declaring 24 hour curfewn in
areas around the buildings, or possibly declaring them closed areas
under the Public order Ordinance (Cap. 245);
action against the principal communist nowspaper "Wen Wei Po" the
official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting
police to disaffection;
(iv) bring commando ship BULWARK on a visit to
Hong Kong
4. Each of foregoing actions would entail certain amount of risk of
escalation, and possible complications with Peking. We face a dilemma,
in that:-
(a) we obviously wish so far as possible to avoid
(b)
action which could lead to more C.P.G. involvement (and there is some
evidence C.P.G. themselves wish to
avoid this); but
holding the situation here requires that Government should retain the
initiative.
Since (b) is imperative, we must be prepared to face some risk under
(a). On this basis pros and cons of various courses in paragraph 3
above, as we see them are as follows:
Course (1)
5. The disruption of leadership would be a distinct and positive gain,
at least in the short term. It would be seen by our friends here as firm
action. But since it is unlikely that China would accept persons
concerned as deportees, the probability is that they would have to be
detained indefinitely in Hong Kong. This would provide local communists
and Peking with a standing grievance, and would inevitably lead to
creation of a further "demand".
Course (11)
6. This would seriously hamper the communist leadership in their control
and development of anti-Government operations. For a while they would be
bottled up in their existing Headquarters, cut off from outside
contacts. At very least
/it
SECRET
47
SECRET
it would disrupt their communications (e.g. Government could pick up all
their couriers). And they might well eventually have to move to other
premises where it would be easier for Government to keep them under
closer surveillance. Further advantage is that it would enable us to
isolate Bank of China without taking direct action against the building
which could involve us with the C.P.G.. As an immediate measure I have
deployed loudspeakers blaring forth cheerful Chinese tunes to drown the
But this is inflammatory broadcasts coming from the Bank. not sufficient
in itself, since the Bank building remains one of the principal rallying
points for demonstrations; and anyhow we know it is one of the main
communist control points.
Course (iii)
7. The worrying thing about not taking action against the worst offender
among the communist press is that it is daily in flagrant breach of the
law, and if we continue to ignore
But
it would this it may well be taken as sign of weakness. obviously be
regarded by Peking as a provocation (see Peking telegram No. 483 of 15
May). Furthermore there are 9 other communist newspapers here which
could all continue the campaign unless similar action were taken against
them.
Course (iv)
B
It would take three and a half days for BULWARK to reach Hong Kong. Her
presence here, with a commando aboard, would undoubtedly strengthen
public and police morale, and both Commissioner of Police and CBF are
strongly in favour. Her arrival here might be represented by Peking as
sabre- rattling, although they could have no legitimate grounds for
doing 80. It would not of course be publicised here as a reinforcement,
but simply as a routine visit. Practice here
is not to publicise visits of H.M. ships in advance.
9. Recommendations.
My advisers and I have discussed these courses with CBF,
Galsworthy and Bolland, and we all agree in recommending course (ii) and
course (iv) at this stage.
10. I am holding a meeting of my Executive Council tomorrow (Tuesday)
morning, and I intend to seek their views on courses (1), (ii) and
(iii), but on a contingency planning basis only. However, I would hope
that I may have urgently your approval for courses (ii) and (iv) and
would welcome your early comments on the other two courses.
Galsworthy will be telegraphing separately about useful
discussions held this morning on labour matters,
11.
(Passed as requested with advance copies to
Foreign office F.E. Dept.)
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D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawking
Mr. C.P. Rawlings.
SECRET
"
%
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
(115)
Cypher
D.
22 May, 1967.
th
R. 22
1400Z
MAY
1567
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
No. 663.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES 2.63
23AM...
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
"Peking No. 249.
Repeated
鸭
1+
"P.A. Singapore No. 116.
"Washington No. 130. (Please pass PRIORITY
to all).
HWA'li
My telegram No. 656.
108
Statue Square was again the main centre for disorder, but there
were also disturbances in Kowloon and farther east on Hong Kong Island.
The first main incident was at 1100 hours when a crowd tried to force
its way up to Government House. Over 100 people were arrested. At about
the same time a crowd of 600-700 outside the South Kowloon Magistracy,
consisting mainly of school children became unruly and had to be
dispersed with tear gas. Demonstrators on the Hong Kong side reformed in
Statue Square and at the foot of Garden Road, then moved in procession
around the central area of the city singing and shouting. Their main aim
was to provoke the police. they were encouraged and directed by the loud
speaker in the Bank of China.
2.
In this
At 12.30 as the lunch time traffic was building to its peak, bus
drivers in the area of the Star Ferry and its approach roads on the Hong
Kong side abandoned their vehicles completely blocking the roads.
Shortly after on the Kowloon side a group of bus company employees
attacked the police at the bus/ferry terminus. At the same time, a crowd
in the Causeway Bay area on the island speedily grew to over 1,000 when
reinforced by school children and had to be dispersed with tear gas.
3. The situation was obviously deteriorating and the Commissioner of
Police asked for a curfew in Hong Kong. At 15.15 hours I declared a
curfew to cover the urban areas on the north of Hong Kong Island from
18.30 to 05.00 hours.
4. During the afternoon, demonstrators remained in the Statue Square but
made no major offensive moves. The drowning of the Bank of China's
loudspeaker by an even louder machine playing music from the roof of a
nearby Government building possibly helped. By 16.30 hours the situation
was quiet and crowds, mainly from offices in the central district, were
dispersing towards their homes as best they could, conscious of the
impending curfew and hampered by the dearth of public transport. It is
hoped that the curfew will enable the police to rest some of its men. At
the same time it may discourage
the onlookers who throughout the day complicated the problem of
/crowd
108
SECRET
120 124
пара
SECRET
crowd control.
Up to time of despatch although some minor incidents have taken place,
the curfew is effective.
5. At 1700 hours today 148 persons had been arrested, four policemen and
a number, not yet known, of rioters injured. This includes one man who
was shot after assisting in throwing petrol over the members of a small
police patrol.
condition is described as fair.
H18
Details of arrests and sentences to date are:-
Arrested
727,
convicted
403,
remanded
90,
awaiting trial
193,
acquitted
24,
released without
charge
17.
6. Unions are obviously taking a more direct part in support of
demonstrators. The action of the bus drivers in blocking the main roads
at a peak period is one example. There have been reports of go-slow
tactics and disruption of work at a major Government workshop. The use
of children to swell crowds on a large scale is a new tactic and one
which it is difficult to counter. It would appear that the local
communist leadership has appreciated that a comparatively small number
of demonstrators can, with the unwitting aid of onlookers, tie up large
numbers of police and cause a dis-proportionate disruption of the city's
life. There is no sign of activities of this sort abating.
(Passed as requested)
(Also passed to D.S.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare,
Wilson and Bolland)
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