interests there, took me up passionately and declared that we were no
longer dealing with the China of even five years ago,
Now that the cultural revolution was in full It looks swing the new
China would no longer bow to threats. therefore es if the Chinese
Government are "putting politics in command" and may have decided to
accept any necessary economic damage.
3.
The test will be in Hong Kong itself and in the way the Left Wing play
it there. I should be surprised if a door is not left open for some kind
of compromise, though it is difficult to see any sign of this at
present.
4. I presume it will be your intention to issue an official statement in
London and Hong Kong commenting on the Chinese statement If so, though
it will clearly be important to refute the Chinese charges, I hope it
will be possible to phrase this in such a way as to avoid provoking the
Chinese Government unnecessarily and thus making a compromise (if one is
indeed still possible) even more difficult. As seen from here the object
should be to bring the temperature down while standing firm on basic
principles.
5.
It is probable that we shall get some unpleasant
I have taken necessary
demonstrations against this office. precautions. We may be in for a very
long haul.
6.
Record of my interview which contained no other points of real interest
will be in a following telegram.
Foreign Office pass Flash to Hong Kong 336 and Friority to Washington
253.
Mr. Hopson
Sent Recd.
04202/15 May 1967
05512/15 May 1967
[Repeated as requested]
F.E.D.
SSSSS
TELEGRAM NO. -913 CONFIDENTIAL,
FO/CO/ENSORFORERUNG AS COMMONWEALTH GETA (SORIES SENT
7
[...
REF.
JEA
WO
B
3/
22
(33)
En Clair
IMMEDIATE No.608
INWARD TELEGRAM
-
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 15th May 1967 R. 15th
0538Z
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
it
Peking No.222
" POLAD Singapore No.90
The Left-wing papers this morning (15th May) give pride of place on
their front pages to a statement issued by an unidentified spokesman of
the "Hong Kong and Kowloon All- Industries Anti-Hong Kong British
Persecution Struggle Committee". It repeated the allegation that the
police action amounted to planned and premeditated action against the
Left-wing and had been undertaken in pursuance of U.S. imperialism's war
policy and aggressive policy. It concludes with the exhortation: "All of
us compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon must swiftly make all
preparations to meet the new battle in an organised and planned way".
Nuch space too is devoted to the N.C.N.A. (H.K.) statement (the text of
which will be available to you). There is nothing new in it. Minimal
space is given to the Reuter report of the Nham Dan commentary on events
in Hong Kong. The Wen Wei Pao editorial, entitled "Patriotism is no
crime - it is right to oppose violence." It concludes: "We now warn you
not to prosecute our compatriots. You must immediately accept all the
just demands put forward by the Federation of Trade Unions. You must
immediately and unconditionally set free our patriotic compatriots,
punish the culprits and admit your guilt and apologiar to our
compatriots. Otherwise you will eat the bitter fruits", The Ta Kung Pao
editorial, entitled "Expose a new plot by the Hong Kong British" is a
lengthy "refutation" of the statements in the local non-Left-wing press
attributed to a senior Government personality.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. Resident Clerk as advance copy)
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-
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tr
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Ref.
LEN
kr.
-
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D.I.O.
J.I.R.
Mr. de la Mare Mr. Denson Mr. Wilson Mr. Foggon Mr. Boxall
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63)
15 M:07
HWAY/A
·
En Clair
34
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Information Office)
D. 15th May 1967 R. 15th
اتر
1232Z.
}
RECC JANCIMI
muarh.
Hong Kong Governor's statement for information.
This
Most members of the public will already be aware from their
newspapers or from broadcasting services that a protest has been handed
to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking regarding the events in Hong
Kong over the last few days. statement describes police action as
"persecution" and "suppression" and speaks of "hostile measures against
China in Hong Kong"
Many people, I have no doubt, will be anxious to know what
answer this Government is going to make to these statements. They may be
disappointed when all we can say is that this protest has been made to
the Representative of Her Majesty'a Government in Peking and that an
answer must therefore come from Her Majesty's Government in London. Yet
this is the position and nothing at all would be gained by making
observations from here.
However there is no reason why I should not recall the assurances which
we have already given to the public about the maintenance of peace and
order.
These include the assurance from the Commissioner of Labour that the
police do not and will not involve themselves in labour disputes but
will only enforce the law when it is: broken. They also include the
assurance given on the same day that the policy of the Government is now
as always to maintain the law as impartially and as fairly as possible
for the benefit of all; that there has been no change in this policy or
in the Government's policy of not taking sides in industrial disputes.
I make no apology for repeating these assurances although they
are not a comment upon the protest note to which I have referred. I
repeat them because I am sure that the preservation of peace and order
is the dearest wish of almost everyone in our community.
Distribution - H.K. W.I.D. "C"
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· I.G.D.
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Copies also sent to:-
Cabinet Office Foreign Office
14
11
11
11
-
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Denson:
Mr. Wilson
D.I.O., J.I.R.
*
ti
-
Mr. Föggon
Hong Kong
Government Office
-
Hr. Boxall
RIF
LIN
ва
B
COPY FOR REGISTRATION
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
15:
MAY
#1 12
10
B
Cypher
D. 15th May, 1967.
R. 15th
1000Z
FLASH SECRET
No. 609.
א!
35
APCL
5.63
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
It
ELT
Peking No. 223
**
POIAD Singapore No.91
(Please pas8 FLASH to both)
My telegram No. 607. 21
Hong Kong.
HOW IT
The position on the ground at 1400 hours today 15th May remained quiet.
There are no indications of unusual occurrences in the frontier area.
2.
But it is clear that as a result of the Chinese H.F.A. 's statement we
are now very near indeed to facing the choices mentioned in paragraph 4
of my telegram No. 600. The demands leave little leeway for negotiation.
We cannot offer apologies or compensation or even provide effective
'guarantees against the occurrence of similar incidents without
accepting a situation in which the left-wing here are above the law.
Some of those arrested have already been sentenced and though acts of
clemency might be Justifiable in certain cases, they certainly would not
be in all. Again while the disposal of the 20 original offenders is
still within the jurisdiction of the courts and some might be bound
over, this cannot of course be guaranteed.
За
It may well be worth attempting during the next 48 hours (if the
court hearings are adjourned) to discover whether behind the demands
there is really any scope for negotiation. We are pursuing our efforts
in this direction, but it seems unlikely that any thing usefull will
result.
4.
if the left-wing stick firmly by the four demands, we must face
the fact that any further attempt to seek a compromise would in the
middle-term at any rate mean an abdicatier of our position here. Hong
Kong would almost at once cease to be attractive to investment;
the problem of maintaining any control or authority over left-wing
activities would intensify; and H.M.G. would not only be discredited but
saddled with an increasing economic burden. In my view this position
would only be tolerable if our aim was to buy time in order to negotiate
an orderly withdrawal (even if the Chinese allowed us to achieve that).
SECRET
↓
27
750 PARD вово 26-54
SECRET
5.
The alterative policy, of taking a firm but reasonable line in
resistance to the demands, of course carries major risks i.e. of renewed
violence, probably on an increased scale, which in the long run we might
find ourselves unable to control; and finally of physical intervention
by the C.P.G. on the other hand, there is just a chance that if we took
a very firm line, offering no provocation but explaining our policy
clearly to the C.P.G. there might be some prospect of inducing a change
of Chinese attitude. It remains hard to believe that at the present time
the C.P.G. could really welcome the prospect of a military clash in Hong
Kong or indeed of having to take Hong Kong over, thus losing its
economic and other advantages.
бо
A possible line of action might now be to explain our position clearly
and in forthright terms to the C.P.G., preferably in London. Our reply
might start by stating our refusal to accept the Chinese allegations of
"atrocities" (there is plenty of evidence that the police acted with
great restraint throughout) and saying that the action that was taken in
no way aimed either at the workers or the left-wing whose activities in
Hong Kong have always been permitted provided that they remained within
the law. The intention of the Hong Kong Government is, and remains,
solely to uphold the law, which is published and accessible to all and
equally applicable to all members of the community. The C.P.G. must
realise that unless the law is upheld and public order maintained the
interests of all the population of Hong Kong will suffer. H.M.G. are
therefore unable to understand the arguments in the statements of the
M.F.A.
70
A reply in these reasonable, though firm, terms would for the moment
preclude drastic action against the left-wing of the sort suggested in
paragraph 4 of my telegram No.600, since this would be going further
than the maintenance of the existing law. But at the moment it seems
that a seizure by us of the initiative along those lines would in the
immediate future destroy any slim chances there may be of reaching a
reasonable solution; and though preparations for such action are being
made they should not in my view be put into operation except as a last
resort in the event of a further breach of the law by the left.
8.
It now seems essential that I should know as soon as possible
whether Ministers would wish me to seek a compromise along the lines of
the four demands; or whether they would favour a firmer line as in
paragraph 6. In any case, there is no longer any possibility of treating
this as a labour dispute, and hence a visit by Foggon would not in my
view serve a useful purpose. On the other hand, so soon as Ministers
have reached a decision on the point in paragraph 7 above, it would be
most helpful if a senior official could come out here immediately to
give me the fullest possible picture of what is in their minds.
(Passed as requested)
SECRET
/Distribution
SECRET
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Copies also sent to:-
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tt
"
tt
D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. Denson Mr. de la Mare Mr. Wilson
- Mr. Foggon
SECRET
SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
Sent 15th May 1967. 1915Z
INMEDIATE
SECRET
No.919
36
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated
"Peking (IMMEDIATE)
It
POLAD Singapore (PRIORITY)
35
Your telegram No.609.
Peking Statement.
We think that Peking will probably be prepared to engage in a prolonged
war of nerves. It is on this assumption we have been considering how to
handle the Peking statement preparatory to submitting to Ministers.
2.
There appear to be four alternatives:
(a) for Hopson to return the statement because
it is offensive;
(b)
to ignore it;
LAST
REF.
(c) to refute it in detail;
(d) to issue a statement of our own explaining what has happened and the
policy we intend to pursue.
3. We cannot see that there is anything to be gained by returning it: to
slam the door in this way would only aggravate the situation.
4. We cannot altogether ignore it because we imagine public opinion in
Hong Kong will expect some response and be concerned to know what
attitude we intend to adopt and that any uncertainty about this could
very seriously affect local confidence and morale.
5. To refute it in detail would be to play Peking's game and lay us open
to a further round of polemical exchanges which might cause Peking to
adopt a more rigid position and to raise
their demands.
6. We therefore think that for the reasons given in paragraph 4 above
you should make a short statement along the following lines (which might
include an indication that it was approved by H.M.G.): outlining the
recent events, noting their origin in an industrial dispute, explaining
the means available for settling such disputes and confirming our
intention of firmly -but-fairly maintaining law and order. By this means
we would /hope
95
१५:
SECRET
DAR
SECRET
hope to avoid polemics and any reference to the unacceptable demands in
Peking's statement, which would be bound to arise were we to try to
explain the position directly to the Chinese Government either here or
in Peking (paragraph 6 of your telegram under reference).
7 Grateful for your views on this assessment and, unless you see
objection to the course suggested, please telegraph urgently a draft
statement for consideration by Ministers.
go
As we were about to despatch this telegram we received your Press
telegram giving text of your statement today. Grateful to know reasons
why you made this statement now. It does not invalidate the views
expressed above though it may complicate the drafting of the statement.
We would still like to have your comments and a draft statement.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Peking and POLAD Singapore)
Distribution H.K.
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Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
12
Mr. Wils on
"
Mr. Denson
A
Mr. Foggon
SECRET
XXXXX XXX
YPHER
SECRET
1
26
NIPS.
19152 문
Sertat
cyphu. R.X.
SCEIVED
1 6 WAY 1967
15/5
HONG KONG (Immediate)
मर 380
1919.
(Timmschele)
し
Repeated PIKING POLAD SINGAPORE (Rusly)
PEKING
POLAD SINGAPORE
HK.W.D. 1.G.D.
JIC EXTL. Departmental.
Copes to:
Cabinet Of "ice
D.1.0. (J.I.R.\
XXXXX
F.0.
Your telegram No. 609: Peking Statement.
We think that Peking will probably be prepared
to engage in a prolonged war of nerves. It is on
this accumption we have been considering how to handle
the Peking statement preparatory to submitting to
Ministers.
2. There appear to be four alternatives:
901 16/5
1030
Mr. de la Mare
3.
(a) for Hopson to return the statement because it
(b)
is offensive;
to ignore it;
(c) to refute it in detail;
(a) to issue a statement of our own explaining
what has happened and the policy we intend to
pursue.
We cannot see that there is anything to be gained
by returning it: to slam the door in this way would
Mr. Bolland
Kr: Wilson
Nr: Denson
Mr. Foggon
only aggravate the situation.
SECRET
/4.
:
H
140གཅིར.
might Kashaya mclnche an nichċcation
thau' it was aff-reved
by H.M.G.):
Grateful to know
remom why you wonde Chri statement- Acow.
4.
le cannot altogether ignore it because we
imagine public opinion in Hong Kong will expect
some response and be concerned to know what
and that any
attitude we intend to adopt
Any uncertainty
about this could very seriously affect local
confidence and morale.
5.
To refute it in detail would be to play Pekmils their game and lay us
open to a further round
of polemical exchanges which might cause Peking
to adopt a more rigid position and to raise their
demands.
6.
Therefore
Nevertheless, We think that for the reasons
given in paragraph 4 above you should make
a short statement along the following lines
outlining the recent events, noting their origin
in an industrial dispute, explaining the means
available for settling such disputes and
confining our intention of firmly but fairly
maintaining law and order. By this means we
can hope to avoid polemics and any reference to
the unacceptable demands in Peking's statement,
which would be bound to arise were we to try to
explain the position directly to the Chinese
Government either here or in Peking (Para. 6 of
your telegram under reference).
Would
7. Grateful for your views on this assessrent
and, unless you see objection to the course
suggested, please telegraph urgently a draft
statement for consideration by Ministera.
S. As
wes were about to despatch This Telegram we
Press telegram received
your Giving liest of your statement today. It does
not invahdate the news expressed though it complicate the drotting of
the statement.
wat we would still like to have your
mey
above
a
clreift-
Comments and statement.
Classed is DSAO for lekig
Polad List
15/5-Sugerpos
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
COPY FOR REGISTRATION
FOREIGN OFFICE
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE PEKING
ΤΟ
Telno 482
15 May 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 482 of 15 May, Repeated for
information to ong Kong, Singapore and Washington.
(30) 31
32
My telegrams Nos. 478, 479 and 480: M.F.A. Statement.
After Lo Kuel-po (who was calm and composed) had finished reading
text, in answer to my enquiry he confirmed that he was handing me a copy
of a statement rather than delivering a Note. had pointed out that there
were a number of passages in the text which I would have regarded as
unacceptable in a Note.
I
2. I emphasized that the Hong Kong Government consistently adopted a
just and impartial attitude towards labour disputes but had an
inescapable duty to maintain law and order. Failure of demonstrators and
those committing acts of violence to disperse when warned to do so by
the Hong Kong Police had led to further disorders, arrests and injuries
which have clearly made the solution of the labour dispute more
difficult.
3. I stressed that the accusation that the incidents had been pre-
I
meditated by the Hong Kong Government was entirely groundless. also
rejected the charge that the United States Authorities were in any way
involved and that Hong Kong was being used as an American base.
4. Pointing out that I was speaking on a personal basis, I suggested
that for the disorders to continue would be bad for the people of Hong
Kong and its economy, and harmful to both Chinese and British interests.
It was therefore hoped that the CPG would exercise a restraining and
moderating influence on their friends in Hong Kong, which would bring
about a restoration of an atmosphere of calm.
5
5. It was quite wrong to suggest, as in the Chinese statement. that the
British Government regarded the Chinese as "opponents". The British
Government and the Hong Kong Authorities wished to co- operate amiably
with the CPG in settling matters of mutual interest but had of course no
interest in Chinese internal affairs.
6. Lo's reply covered the same ground as the M.F.A. statement and
emphasized that the Chinese people of today could not be bullied as they
could "ten or more" years ago, that the incidents had been planned and
organised by the Hong Kon, Government and that the situation was
deteriorating.
7. I again stressed that there was no question of premeditation by
It was not for me to comment directly on the Hong Kong Government. the
"so-called demands" in the Chinese statement, but speaking personally
they seemed to me to be unreasonable and unrealistic.
/I therefore
LAST
ACF.
92
T
CONFIDENTIAL
ver" out"
L
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No. 482 to Foreign Office
2
I therefore hoped that the Chinese Government would reflect very
carefully before committing itself to a course which could only have the
ill effects which I had already described. Those arrested in Hong Kong
would be dealt with in accordance with the due processes of law. The
Hong Kong Government could not intervene. Those who were found to be
innocent would be released. We did not use Fascist methods. Britain had
spent seven years fighting Fascism.
8. A representative of the West European Departent of the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened at this point to say that Lo
Kuei-po had given "an all round and correct answer" to the statement I
had made but wished in particular to emphasize that my remarks regarding
the mutual interests of China and Britain in Hong Kong not only
distorted the facts but were the language of imperialism. The China of
the cultural revolution could not be subjected to threats. I replied
that there was no question of threatening China.
Foreign Office pass Immediate to Hong Kong 338 and Priority
Washington 254.
Mr. Hopson
Sent 0700 15 Kay
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.