real improvement. They would be strongly contested and provide
undesirable opportunities for political propaganda. In the event of a
conviction, they would be likely to go to appeal. In this connection you
will recall the generally unsatisfactory outcome of the prosecution of
the Ta Kung Pao in 1952 (our savingram No.1337 of 19 August 1952
refers). The situation might also arise when on instituting proceedings
or following a conviction it might be necessary to apply to the court
for the suspension or suppression of the newspaper under section 4 of
The Control of Publications Consolidation Ordinance (Cap.268).
5. It seems inevitable that any attempt to prosecute or suppress these
left-wing papers would result in formal protests from Peking, even
though there is no evidence at present to
/suggest
SECRET
опе
SECRET
suggest that the C.P.G. has changed its policy towards Hong Kong or
desires to "rock the boat". On the other hand, I am likely to be under
increasing pressure from responsible local opinion and from the
right-wing press to do something positive to preserve public confidence
and to support the Police.
6. I am reluctant to take overt action against the left- wing press, if
it can avoided, since it would involve a direct confrontation from which
retreat on either side would be very difficult. Equally, there are
limits to what can be tolerated without risk of an irretrievable loss of
public confidence and abdication of authority on Macao lines.
7. Although I do not wish to suggest that an early decision is
necessary, this problem is one which may very well have to be faced at
some time and I should be grateful for your general views and those of
Peking.
(Passed as requested)
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Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Denson
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Foggon
SECRET
Cypher
IMMEDIATE
COPT
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 13th May 1967 R. 13th 情
CONFIDENTIAL
No.599
(17)
11
12152
L
1
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
11
11
Peking No.214
" POLAD Singapore No. 81
Washington No.112
(C.o. please pass IMMEDIATE to all)
My telegram No.594 (not to Washington).
Kowloon Disturbances.
This morning a crowd which eventually reached between 1,000 and 2,000
gathered at the plastic flower factory in San Po Kong. The police moved
in to disperse it and there were a small number of arrests. Subsequently
crowds gathered in four nearby resettlement estates. The police were
attacked, cars set on fire and a block of staff quartera was set on
fire. Some 300 workers have gathered outside the cement works, so far in
an orderly manner. The situation is tense and rumours are beginning to
fly about further action by Left-wing unions. A curfew will be imposed
in the same limited area from 7 p.m. to 4 a..
2. The Left-wing press this morning remains highly critical and biased,
but personal criticism of myself has been avoided. A number of Left-wing
organisations, including the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the
Banks, 'The New China' News Agency and unions have formally expressed
support for the "patriotic compatriots who have suffered suppression"
and protested at the 'premeditated fascist violence' of the British
authorities in Hong Kong etc. The Federation of Trade Unions has
established a Hong Kong and Kowloon All Industries Workers
Anti-Persecution Committee' and called for the establishment of a
similar 'All Circles' committee (as in Macau).
30
A number of Left-wing delegations has attempted to see me to protest
about particular incidents and/or the general situation. They have all
been received by my A.D.C. and have, after argument and chanting of
slogans left letters of protest.
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15 MAY 1967
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20) + (22)
-
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Denson
Mr. Wilson
- Mr. Foggcn
CONFIDENTIAL
Gon
.OR
PANISTRATION
20 33
Cypher
IMMEDIATE SECRET
No.600
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 13th May 1967 R. 13th
"
1230Z
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
11
10
tt
Peking No.215
POLAD Singapore No.82
(S. of S. please pass INMEDIATE
to both)
11
19
My telegram No.599.
Kowloon Disturbances.
Left-wing action outside the industries immediately concerned in
the disputes has so far been confined to mustering moral and financial
support for the arrested workers and the four demands' (my telegram
No.557) throughout Left- wing organisations. But secret sources indicate
that in many Left-wing circles the line is being taken that the dispute
has escalated as a result of deliberate Government action; and that the
Left must therefore prepare for, a further escalation. Plans are being
made to organise the physical defence of Left- wing properties and also
of demonstrations in which children (as in Macao) would play a prominent
part.
(60)
20
We seem at present to be in a stage of psychological warfare in which
the main weapon of the Left has been their sustained press campaign
aimed (so far quite unsuccessfully) at undermining the morale of the
police, as well as at discredit- ing Government and destroying public
confidence in its will and capacity to resist. The coat-trailing attacks
on myself in the Communist press of 12 May (my telegram No.583) may well
have been aimed at placing us in the dilemma of either attacking 'press
freedom' or appearing to be meekly tolerating sedition.
3. Probably the Communists have not yet taken the decision to launch an
all-out Macau-style attack, There are obviously some elements on the
Left who are concerned about the prospect of a head-on confrontation.
Our discussions with Left-wing contacts continue, but they have not so
far yielded any pointers towards an acceptable settlement. As things
stand, we seem likely to be in for a prolonged period of gradually
increasing pressure.
Ho A prolonged crisis, however, would be the worst of all possible
situations for Hong Kong. Morale here would tend to deteriorate rapidly,
capital would depart, and the effects on the economy could be
irreparable. If we are to avoid this
we may before long have to choose between: ~
No.63]
19 MA DU
(a) seeking a solution which would involve the
Hong Kong Government in substantial-loss of face and authority, or
[A T
P
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ด
SECRET
2
SECRET
(b)
ourselves taking the initiative against the Left-wing e.g. by taking
legal action aga
the press, arresting key Left-wing leadeand perhaps deporting them to
China.
But
5. At an Executive Council meeting today there was a substantial body of
opinion (especially among Chinese members) in favour of firm though
careful action against the Left. the choice evidently needs deep
thought. Solution (a) would in effect put us in pawn to the Chinese and
turn Hong Kong into a second Macau; and I would not think it tolerable
unless it were linked with a second decision subsequently to negotiate
our withdrawal as soon as possible. Solution (b) would clearly involve
the risk of an all-out confrontation with the C.P.G.
For the time being I shall of course concentrate on trying to hold the
present situation in Kowloon while seeking to reach some understanding
with the Left that would eliminate the present disorder. But it would be
a great help to me if I could have some indication of your preliminary
thinking on the issues in paragraph 5 above. It may well be that within
the next few days I shall have to advise that a Minister or senior
official should fly out here to discuss the problem in detail; or
alternatively that I should return home for the same purpose.
(Passed as requested)
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J.I.R.
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Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Denson
-
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Foggon
SECRET
Cypher
SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench) HWB 5/12 Sent 13th May, 1967 2240Z
FLASH SECRET No. 910
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated to Feking (Immediate)
POLAD Singapore (Priority).
Following from Galsworthy.
21
20
Your telegram No. 600.
Kowloon Disturbances.
We are most grateful for your admirably prompt and clear reports and
analyses.
2. We entirely agree immediate aim must be as in first sentence your
paragraph 6.
3. Basic issues set out in your paragraph ↳ clearly require, as you say,
very deep thought. We will try to get some preliminary reactions to you
early next week. But I feel sure early personal contact with you would
be of greatest help to Ministers in considering and resolv- ing these
issues. I imagine there may be some risk that either of the alternatives
mentioned in your paragraph 6 (i.e. visit from here or your returning
home) might encourage Left Wing to exert further pressure? Which course
do you think less likely to have this effect? also in this connection
paragraph 5 below.) fit enough yet to face a long air journey?
(See And are you
4. There is one immediate suggestion we should like to put to you. Since
(a) it seems clear that this trouble was not instigated by the C.P.G.
but in origin derived partly at least from essentially management/
labour relations at the plants involved, and
(b)
we at present seem (as you say) to be in stage of psychological warfare
SECRET
LAST
tir.
24
/ we
SECRET
It
we wonder whether it would be possible to get the whole thing back into
character and proportions of a normal trade dispute by arranging for
Foggon to fly out within next day or two? His mission would be to assist
your Labour Commissioner in finding an essentially "labour" solution to
the dispute. would of course be made clear that he was coming out at
your request. It would be seen that you and we here were treating the
affair as essentially a labour rather than a political matter, and this
new element from the outside, and indeed the announcement of it, might
conceivably give the Left Wing a face-saving excuse for turning the
pressure off and generally de-escalating.
5. If you agree there would be advantage in this line of approach, a
possible variant might be for Minister for State to come to Hong Kong
with Foggon as one of her advisers. Mrs. Hart would, I know, be
perfectly willing to consider this if you thought it would be helpful.
But at first sight there would seem to be some difficulty in finding a
plausible reason for a ministerial visit at this stage which would not
(repeat not) be interpreted by the Left in Hong Kong (and perhaps by the
C.P.G.) as a sign of weakness or over-anxiety on our part, or as
implying in any way that H.M.G. was critical of local handling of the
situation.
6. Most grateful for your urgent views on foregoing.
7. Finally, grateful to know whether you think it would be prudent to
postpone impending U.S. naval visits?
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for transmission to Peking and Singapore)
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D.1.0., J.I.R.
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Denson Mr. Wilson Mr. Foggon
| ERSTIDET
PRIORITY MARKINGS
Emergency Immediate Pracky Reply urgently
N
A
Me....... Conting
Mr....
Mr.....
Eile No. HWB. 5/12
*TELEGRAM
DRAFT
*SAVINGRAM
• Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be
inserted before "Savingram."
Addressed
FLASH
(Insert appropriate priority marking)
No.
MP.
SECURITY, ETC., MARKINGS
Top Seoret
Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified Personal Guard
Repeated
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No.
Mr......
Sir...
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
ENCLOSURES
(Savingrams only)
Governer,
Hong nóng.
AKG 380.
SPECIÁL INSTRUCTIONS
IRS
130.
910
(1) Pehmg (Immochiale) (2) Polad Singapore
(Precvity)
¡ 4 MAY 1967
MEDITIM
En clair
Cypher X
(Delete whichever
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SAVINGRAMS ONLY
Your reference
FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH
Despatched. H.K...
H.K. Relings S
Spare
On 13.5.67/13.5.67.
At... 22552 At 42402/ 23$52 Hrs/
Exde Cypher →TP Shopter
File References
SECRET
(Insert appropriate security, etc., marking)
Following from Galsworthy.
Your telephone No. 600.
Kowloon Disturbances.
DISTRIBUTION AND FURTHER ACTION
Dislabution
a copices as
Adr
For H.K. tel. No. 600
RY 1020 15/5
lve
are most grateful
for your admirably frompt and clear
reports and analyses.
Lue entirely agree
unimediate
(Delete whichever, NO PRINTING in
inapplicable)
2.
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13
ANA-
your paragrapple 6.
must be as
as in first sentence
3.
Basie isimes set ant
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File
(Q1541) 49178/8177 2MP 2/61 AT&S. 768
References
paragraph 4. clearly require, as
you say, very deep thought.
love will try
to get some
preliminary reactions to
you early next week. But I feel sure early personal
contact with you
world te
of greatest help to Ministers
mi
considering and resolving
There issues.
be
5 imagine there
may to come risk that either of the
alternatives mentioned
in you
paragraph bale.e. vint from
here on
your returning home)
might encourage Left wing
to exent ofurther pressure?
Which course do
you
Think
less likely to have this effect?
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
(See also in this connection jocuragrape 5 below),
And are you fit enough yet-
to face
4.
There is
Suggestion we
put to you.
long and journey?
Che
immediate
should like to
Since (a) it
Seems clear that this trouble
was not instigated by the C.P.G. but in origin derived partly at least
from eventually
ement / babour relations
manag
PRIORITY MARKINGS
Emergency
Immediate
Priority
Reply urgently required
Nil
File No.......
*TELEGRAM
DRAFT
*SAVINGRAM
* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be
inserted before "Savingram."
Addressed
Mr.......
Mr...
Insert appropriate priority marking|
Mr..
Mr....
Sit........
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
ENCLOSURES
(Savingrams only)
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
MEDIUM
En clair
Code
Cypher
(Delete whichever
is inapplicable)
File References
No.
SECURITY, ETC., MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified Personal Guard
Repeated
{Insert appropriate priority marking)
No.
SAVINGRAMS ONLY
FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH
Your reference
Despatched......
Code
On...........
.19
Cypher OTP Simplex En clair
At.......
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(Insert appropriate security, etc., marking)
at the plant's involved,
We at firent seem
and (E)
(as you say) to be
in a stage of josychological warfare,
lue wonder
Whether it
word d
be
DISTRIBUTION AND FURTHER ACTION
(Delete whichever
PRINT NO PRINTING is inapplicable)
possible to get the whole thing back
into character and
hormal
and proportions of
trade dispute by arranging
for Foggon to fly int
day or two?
to assist your
His
within next
mission
Could be
Labour Commissiones
" labour
Lan essenti
eventially
in funding solution to the dispute
Sir
would of couse be made clear
that he was coming out at your
File References
request.
would be seen
that you and
we
here
were
treating the affair as exentially
malter, and this
political
a
laisen rather than a
new alemant
from the outside,
indeed
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de-escalating.
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and generally
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