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Guards in support, advanced towards the village which they reached at
3.30 p.m. As the army units approached, the attacking crowds fell back;
although desultory firing continued, the Gurkhas did not open fire nor
did they suffer any casualties. The Police were relieved and the post
was taken over by the army. A curfew was imposed with effect from 4.30
p.m. and there were no further incidents. The total Police casualties
were five dead and 11 injured.

106. These events attracted wide publicity in the world press and a
number of alarmist reports were put out. It was an extremely serious
affair but it was not a planned invasion of the Colony. Units of the
local Chinese militia took part in the attack (though not in uniform)
but no member of the regular Chinese army was involved. The avail- able
evidence suggests that the attack was organized and executed by local
villagers in the border area, that it was probably not even co-
ordinated with the activities of the urban communists in Hong Kong and
that it was certainly not planned or even approved by the authori- ties
in Canton or Peking.

107. On the following day the Peking Government lodged a strong protest
with the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking referring to 'serious armed
provocation by the British' and alleging that the Chinese frontier
guards had only fired in self-defence. A simultaneous protest was
delivered by the Chargé d'Affaires. Neither was accepted.

108. After 8th July the border area remained unsettled, and the army
took over from the Police the responsibility for patrolling the area.
There were no further major attacks but there were a succession of
provocative demonstrations and minor incidents. For a long period stones
were thrown almost daily at army patrols in Lo Wu, Man Kam To and Sha
Tau Kok as well as at the immigration office at Lo Wu. Much of it was
done by children; on 20th July a boy swam across the river at Man Kam To
to stone the Police post, to the loud applause of the militia watching
from the Chinese side.

109. A number of incidents arose from the display of posters in British
territory. It is not an offence to display portraits of Chairman

33

Mao Tse Tung or extracts from his teachings, and farmers and others
crossing into British Territory have taken full advantage of this im-
munity. It is an offence to display inflammatory posters but, as in the
urban areas, their removal was most strongly resented by the com-
munists. It was through this cause that a tense situation developed on
5th August when a group of coolies surrounded the police post at Man Kam
To and demanded that any posters put up should be allowed to remain. The
District Officer was called in to negotiate and after a dis- cussion
lasting for almost an hour the matter was settled. A Chinese military
contingent armed with rifles and a machine gun and a Gurkha platoon
supported by armoured cars faced each other across the frontier during
the incident. Barbed wire defences were erected to protect the police
post, which was right beside the bridge crossing into China.

110. Trouble flared up again on 10th August, and armed troops were
again deployed on either side of the border at Man Kam To. On this
occasion one of the coolies deliberately staged an 'accident' by
colliding with the new barbed wire barricades and feigning injury. He
was carried off with a great show of concern and the occasion was used
to complain again about the removal of posters as well as to demand an
admission of guilt for the accident. The District Officer was once more
called in to negotiate and the discussions continued until well after
nightfall. Under cover of darkness, a large group of coolies forced
their way past the wire barriers, entered the police post and surrounded
and threatened its occupants, including the District Officer, the
Commanding Officer of the Gurkha Battalion, some police officers and
some Gurkha soldiers; the latter were disarmed and their weapons taken
across into China. Other soldiers, outside the encircling ring of C.T.
coolies, were prevented from opening fire because of the danger to their
own men held in the police posts and, particularly, the Europeans whose
lives were being threatened. Chinese border troops showed signs of
intervening in support of the coolies. In the end, to resolve a
difficult situation, the District Officer agreed to sign a paper, under
duress, accepting the demands about posters and admitting re-
sponsibility for the 'accident' to the coolie. The party in the police
post was freed and the arms returned from C.T.

111. After this incident the border gate at the Man Kam To was
closed by the British authorities for some days and the Police post,
which was shown to be dangerously exposed, was demolished and re-sited
further back in British Territory.

34

112. There was a further incident on 11th August. A group of farmers
from Chinese Territory, who had climbed through the border fence to till
their fields on British Territory and had behaved peacefully. asked to
be allowed to return through the border gate at Lo Fong which had been
kept locked because of the incident at Man Kam To the previous day. This
was agreed but the small police and military party which had gone
forward to open the gate, was savagely and without warning attacked by
the farmers as they went past; an inspector was badly injured. The
farmers were driven off by tear gas and baton shells during which action
two machine gun bursts were fired from Chinese Territory into a field on
the British side.

113. Towards the end of the month some of the tension at Lo Wu was eased
and, possibly because of the imminence of the much publicized Canton
Fair, the attitude of the Chinese officials became almost cordial.

114. This relaxation did not, however, last. On 29th September two
police constables, who were off duty, inadvertently crossed the border
at Man Kam To and were detained. Another constable, also off duty, was
forcibly dragged across the border at Sha Tau Kok on 7th October, though
he was released the next day after his mother had crossed into China to
make a personal appeal. A week later a Senior Police Inspec- tor who was
trying to placate a group of villagers near the Man Kam To bridge was
seized by them and hustled over the border. After this incident the
border at Man Kam To was again closed and remained closed for some weeks
in spite of protests from the Chinese side. During this time, tension
remained high on the border and there were clashes at both Lo Wu and Man
Kam To during which on two occa- sions automatic fire was directed over
the heads of our security forces from Chinese soil: it is believed that
militia rather than regular P.L.A. forces were responsible. The
Inspector later escaped, after being de- tained for 36 days and made his
way back to Hong Kong. The two constables were released after prolonged
and difficult discussions between British and Chinese border officials
at the end of November.

115. Between that date and the end of the year there were no further
incidents and, apart from a few isolated cases of stone-throwing, the
border remained quiet. The Police and military remained jointly
responsible for maintaining order in the closed area along the border.

35

CHAPTER 9

FURTHER DISORDERS AND GOVERNMENT

COUNTER-MEASURES

116. The events of 8th July at Sha Tau Kok and the protest made from
Peking were widely reported in the communist press in Hong Kong, which
claimed that they were proof of armed support for con- frontation by the
Peking Government. With this encouragement the views of the communist
extremists could not be denied and a wave of violence followed. For the
next four days, from 9th to 12th July, there were widespread incidents
in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island in which Police were attacked, public
transport vehicles damaged and set on fire and their drivers assaulted,
and public buildings damaged. It was widely rumoured that the communists
were offering a reward of $20,000 for killing a Police Officer and
$3,000 for killing a transport worker.

117. The main centres of the disorders were communist department stores,
schools and trade union offices which offered a convenient assembly
point for the rioters and a base for attack or retreat. The tactics used
were the same in many incidents: a demonstration was staged, sometimes
by school-children, and as the Police arrived to in- vestigate a gang of
men emerged from their base to attack them. A typical incident occurred
on 9th July outside the Fukien Middle School at Queen's Road West. At 5
p.m. that day a group of children came out of the school and caused a
traffic hold-up. When the Police approached they retreated into the
school. Half an hour later they emerged again and began demonstrating,
under the directions of a teacher. The Police again intervened and they
were first assailed by bottles thrown from the school and other adjacent
buildings and were then attacked by a gang of men armed with knives,
iron bars and cargo hooks. One constable was killed and two others were
injured, one seriously. Two of the attackers were killed and one injured
by Police counteraction.

118. There were incidents on every day during this period in the
vicinity of the Wah Fung Company's shop at North Point, which was
believed to harbour as many as 200 communist trouble-makers at one time.
On the 9th July a riotous crowd attacked trams and buses and set fire to
a mini-bus. On the night of the 10th, buses and trams were again
attacked, some windows in the State Theatre were broken and an attempt
was made to set fire to the tram-controller's office. The

36

Police cordoned off the area but it was three hours before the rioters
could be subdued. On the 11th the pattern was repeated. Fires were
started and public transport damaged. Police in the vicinity of the shop
were attacked and bottles and quick-lime were thrown at them. At 10.35
p.m. the shop itself caught fire; although tear gas shells had been
fired into the shop, it was believed that the fire was caused by an
elec- trical fault. Some damage was caused to the ground and mezzanine
floors but this did not prevent the occupants from making further
attacks on the Police the next morning.

119. There was serious rioting in Wan Chai, mainly in the vicinity of
Johnston Road. On the night of the 9th a mob attacked and set on fire
the Wan Chai Kai Fong premises at O'Brien Road, causing serious damage.
This crowd was dispersed but later another mob, which was stoning the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank office in Johnston Road, was engaged by the
Police. After tear gas shells had failed to disperse them the Police,
after due warning, fired two rounds of carbine killing one rioter and
injuring another.

120. The following evening crowds again gathered in the same area. They
broke into the Violet Peel Clinic and attempted to set it on fire.
Bottles were thrown at the Police, some containing acid, and rubbish
fires were started in the streets. During an attack on a tram, which was
set on fire, a man was fatally stabbed. It was at first thought that he
was the tram driver but he was later identified as an odd-job worker
with a history of mental illness; he had been heard to shout, 'Death to
the red dogs'.

121. The Violet Peel Clinic was again attacked on 11th July and a bomb
was thrown at a Police vehicle, fortunately causing no damage. A curfew
was imposed on the area from 10.30 p.m, and this effectively reduced the
crowds to 'hard-core' communists. They continued how- ever to throw
stones and bottles at the Police and they caused further damage to the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Building and to the Chartered Bank office in
Fleming Road. The Police fired tear gas shells and rounds from carbine
and greener guns at the communist New China Products shop in Johnston
Road which effectively stopped the barrage of missiles from this
building.

122. In Kowloon the disorders were mostly confined to attacks on public
and private vehicles. On the 9th July a bus was set on fire and
completely destroyed at Lung Cheung Road. On the 10th a mob stopped a
bus at the junction of Nathan Road and Salisbury Road

37

and assaulted the driver as well as a soldier in uniform who was
pass- ing at the time. On the 11th a bus driver was hit on the head by a
missile thrown at him; and a packet containing inflammatory literature
-and three live snakes was thrown into the cab of another bus.

123. On the following day there was sporadic rioting during which
buses, taxis and private cars were overturned or set on fire. The Post
Office at Un Chau Street was damaged by fire but other buildings were
not attacked. The Police used gas, baton shells and greener guns and
carbines to disperse the crowds; two rioters were killed.

124. During these four days one policeman and seven rioters were
killed and over 60 people were injured. Extensive damage was caused to
buildings and other property, to public transport vehicles and to
Government and private cars. Curfews were imposed on the northern area
of Hong Kong Island on the nights of 11th and 12th July and in Kowloon
on the night of 12th July. It was perhaps the most vicious rioting that
had taken place since confrontation began and it reflects great credit
on bus and tram drivers that they kept going in spite of the constant
attacks to which they were subjected.

125. On 12th July the acting Colonial Secretary announced in the
Legislative Council that the Government was determined to grasp and
maintain the initiative. Up to this point the various phases of the com-
munist attack had been contained but the Government forces had been on
the defensive. The Police had been under a severe strain and public
morale had suffered from the constant pressure, both physical and
psychological, to which it had been subjected. The announcement that
Government intended to counter-attack and the vigorous measures that
were immediately put in hand had a tonic effect on both the Police and
the general public.

126. On the night of the 12th a strong Police party, backed up by the
army, made simultaneous raids on the premises of the Motor Transport
General Workers Union at Wan Chai and at North Point. No resistance was
offered at either place. A number of persons found on the premises were
detained for questioning and many home-made weapons, including 80
spears, were found as well as stocks of inflam- matory documents.

127. A second raid, which was mounted in the early hours of the 14th
July against the Kowloon Dock Amalgamated Workers Union and

38

the Hung Hom Workers Children's School, both at Bulkeley Street in
Kowloon, met with fierce resistance. The Police had to cut their way
through iron grilles with oxyacetylene burners while under constant
attack from stones and bottles, fire bombs and acid. The operation
lasted for three hours and the premises yielded a further quantity of
weapons and inflammatory literature, as well as two carboys of acid. One
person was shot dead while throwing bottles from the roof and two others
were seriously injured in the action. The Police sustained minor
injuries. 81 persons, including several who were wanted for previous
offences, were arrested.

128. Further raids continued almost daily on communist premises and on
other places known or suspected to be used for activities con- nected
with confrontation. After the initial raids there was little or no
opposition to the Police but in many cases they had to break through
iron grilles, steel doors and other formidable physical obstacles. On
18th July the Bank of China building was seen to have an anti-
helicopter defence system erected on the roof, although up to this time
helicopters had only been used for observation, crowd control and com-
munications flights.

129. Helicopters were however, used offensively in the raids that took
place on 4th August. These were against Kiu Koon Mansions, which houses
the Wah Fung stores, and another communist centre, the New Metropole
Building, on opposite sides of King's Road. These are both multi-storey
buildings. While one detachment of the raiding party gained entry at
ground level another, which included members of the army as well as the
Police, was dropped on the roof of the buildings from Royal Navy
helicopters. This was probably the first time that an operation of this
type had been mounted against a multi-storey build- ing and it was
eminently successful. There was no human resistance but there were booby
traps and other physical obstacles to be over- come. 26 persons found on
the premises were arrested and a quantity of weapons, posters and other
documents was seized. In the New Metropole Building an unregistered but
well-equipped miniature hos- pital was found. There was no indication
that it had been used.

130. These raids had considerable effect on communist morale. Apart from
the loss of weapons, explosives and propaganda literature seized by the
Police, they now realized that the premises of their unions and other
centres were no longer safe for meetings. Communist leaders

39

were driven underground and they were no longer able to co-ordinate and
direct the activities of their supporters.

131. However, the results were not immediately apparent and there
was intermittent rioting until the beginning of August. In Kowloon
vehicles were again attacked and damaged and the Police were obliged to
open fire on several occasions to disperse hostile crowds. One rioter
was killed on 14th July in Reclamation Street. On Hong Kong Island the
Johnston Road area continued to be unsettled and there were a succession
of incidents in which fires were started, buildings were stoned and
buses and trams attacked. On 17th July a fire was started at the Ying
King Restaurant and the Police fired one round from a greener gun to
disperse a hostile crowd that had collected, killing one man and
wounding two others.

132. There was also rioting in Tsuen Wan in the New Territories. On the
15th July a crowd attacked a party of detectives who had arrested a
group of men putting up posters, and two detectives were stabbed. Police
reinforcements were called up but hostile crowds built up in Chung On
Street and Texaco Road and the Police had to open fire with greener guns
and carbines to disperse them. Two rioters were killed and four
policemen were injured, one seriously.

133. On 26th July a communist-organized 'Procession for
Patriots' formed up at Nelson Street in Kowloon but quickly deteriorated
into a riot. The Police again opened fire to disperse the crowd and one
man was killed. For about an hour mobs roamed the streets in the
vicinity stoning buses, taxis and private cars. Two taxis were
overturned and set on fire.

134. This proved to be the last major incident of its kind and the
tactics of confrontation, under the pressure of the Police raids, then
turned to a new phase.

135. On 28th July, Emergency Regulations were brought into force which
allowed the detention, on the Colonial Secretary's warrant, of person
who stimulated and encouraged acts of violence and lawlessness but did
not take part in these acts. Such people had been immune from any action
under the normal law. The numbers arrested over the following months
totalled only 52, but the existence of the regulations served to
discourage some of the instigators and to drive others under- ground.

40

CHAPTER 10

BOMB ATTACKS

136. From the end of July, when the effects of the constant Police raids
on communist centres began to make itself felt, communist en- thusiasm
for the cause of confrontation steadily deteriorated; soon only the
'hard-core' were left to continue the struggle. Money was running out;
in October a fund was set up to meet the continuing commitment of
'strike pay' for those who were dismissed after the stoppages of June,
and there were reports of compulsory levies on businessmen with
communist interests. There was little hope of assistance from China by
way of direct intervention.

137. In August a communist newspaper published a list of prom- inent
members of the community who were said to be marked for assassination,
Bombs placed in rolled up magazines were delivered through the post to
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and to Jardine Matheson & Company, but
they roused suspicion, were investigated and rendered harmless. A senior
Government servant was sent a live bullet through the post. However, the
only victim of this terrorism was a popular Chinese commentator on
Commercial Radio who had spe- cialized in ridiculing the communist
efforts. On 15th August he and his cousin were attacked in a well-laid
ambush. His car was stopped by what appeared to be labourers engaged in
road repairs, the pair were dragged out of their car, drenched with
petrol and set alight. They both died later in hospital.

138. Attacks were also made against individual policemen, mainly with
the purpose of stealing their firearms. On 3rd September a Pro-
bationary Inspector was stabbed and seriously injured; on 6th November a
constable at Yuen Long was over-powered by three men and had his
revolver stolen. On 28th November a Police constable on duty at Berwick
Street was attacked and killed by three men. On 9th December another
constable was killed at Kam Tin in the New Territories.

139. There were also further street demonstrations, which occa- sionally
erupted into violence; but the main communist efforts until the end of
the year were engaged in bomb attacks. This weapon was first used
against the Police in mid July in the form of 'fish bombs' (that is
crude explosive devices used, illegally, by fishermen) and from selected
targets it gradually spread to the quite indiscriminate planting

41

of bombs in busy thoroughfares or in public places. The 'bombs'
varied in composition. The majority of them were fakes, that is quite
harmless but suspicious looking bundles often with such messages on them
as 'Compatriots do not touch!' In other cases they were filled with gun-
powder extracted from fireworks to produce a substantial report but
little damage. In other cases again they were charged with gelignite or
other powerful explosive and were often fitted with a timing device or
other sophisticated method of detonation, with lethal effect. There was
no way of distinguishing one from another and every suspect object had
to be treated with the greatest caution. During such operations the
surrounding area had to be kept clear, so that in addition to the poten-
tial danger there were often frustrating delays to traffic and
pedestrians while these objects were rendered harmless.

140. In August the use of explosives was put under closer
supervi- sion by the Government and in September emergency regulations
were made prohibiting the possession or discharge of fireworks. Dealers
and members of the public were called upon to surrender the stocks that
they had in hand; 130 tons of fireworks were handed in but the bombs
continued. In August two explosive stores were broken into in successive
raids and 743 sticks of gelignite as well as other explosives were
stolen. It is not known whether the communists were responsible but it
was clear that they could command a sufficient quantity of explosives
for their campaign.

141. Their cowardly attacks did their cause little good. The
Police were put under considerable strain. But the main purpose, to
undermine the morale of the people, was not achieved. The bombs were
generally accepted as an additional hazard of life by the public which
continued to go about its normal business in spite of inconvenience and
danger. The communists themselves affected to claim that deaths caused
by these bombs were not intended and that they were not responsible for
all the bombs that were planted. These excuses carried little weight
with the public and the deaths of two young children by the explosion of
a bomb on 20th August roused intense popular feeling against those
responsible. There were demands for the death penalty to be introduced
for all who took part in these attacks.

142. A disquieting feature of this phase was the growing employ- ment of
school-children to carry on the work of confrontation-pre- sumably to
fill the ranks depleted by the retreat of their elders. Most of these
children were recruited from the comparatively few communist

42

dominated schools in the Colony; by their willingness, even eager- ness,
to take part in these activities and by their arrogant behaviour and
contempt for authority, they have shown that they have been thoroughly
indoctrinated. Children, both boys and girls, have been arrested and
convicted for possession of real or simulated bombs, for possession of
inflammatory posters and pamphlets, for taking part in subversive
demonstrations, in short, for all offences that arose from con-
frontation. At least one boy was seriously injured by the explosion of a
bomb that he was carrying. The total number of children in primary and
secondary classes of communist schools in the Colony amounts to no more
than about 18,000, that is less than 2% of the total school population,
and there was a significant drop in their enrolment after May. However
their pupils, imbued with the spirit of militant com- munism, have given
an impression of strength far beyond their actual numbers by their
street demonstrations and their noisy outbursts in the courts.

143. In many cases school premises were used as centres for con-
frontation and Police raids on them uncovered stocks of inflammatory
literature as well as home-made weapons and explosives. The com- munist
Chung Wah Middle School was closed by the Government on 28th November
after a youth was seriously injured by an explosion in the school after
normal working hours apparently while manufacturing explosive for bombs.
This closure evoked a protest from the Peking Government on the grounds
that it was an attempt to prohibit the teaching of Chairman Mao's
thoughts.

144. Throughout this period there were demonstrations, in which small
groups of communists, often carrying banners inscribed with 'protests'
or inflammatory messages, gathered together to sing and chant slogans.
Usually these groups dispersed before the Police arrived on the scene,
almost always leaving behind them a cluster of bombs, both real and
simulated. On other occasions the demonstration was used as an ambush
and bombs were thrown at the Police party that was sent to deal with it.
There was little mob disorder as such but there were a few incidents in
which crowds refused to disperse and the Police had to use tear gas or
to open fire.

145. On 1st October a crowd gathered at the water front at Con- naught
Road to watch an illegal display of fireworks from a communist river
boat in the harbour. They refused to disperse and jeered and threw
bottles at the Police. Tear gas was used, but it had little effect, and
the

43

Police opened fire. One man was killed and 79 men and 7 women were
arrested.

146. On 8th November a Police party in Lai Chi Kok Road arrested
two men whom they saw placing a suspected bomb on the road. They were
surrounded by a hostile crowd and a second bomb was thrown from the
crowd which exploded and set off the first bomb as well. All eight of
the Police party were injured in the explosion, one of the men arrested
was killed and 34 bystanders were injured, one of whom died later in
hospital. The other man who had been arrested tried to snatch a
policeman's revolver and was shot dead on the spot.

147. In November two bombs were set in the drive of the house occupied
by one of the magistrates dealing with confrontation cases, One of the
bombs exploded, damaging the magistrate's car, but fortunately causing
no personal injury. This incident reflected the attempts that were made
to overawe the courts. Since confrontation began the com- munists took
the line that their activities were 'patriotic' and not criminal. They
held protest demonstrations outside the courts where cases were heard,
and on more than one occasion the Police had to use force to disperse
the disorderly crowds that resulted. Inside the courts many of the
accused, with their supporters, expressed their contempt for authority
by refusing to stand when the magistrate or judge entered, by shouting
insults and by chanting slogans. The behaviour of school- children
brought before the courts was particularly arrogant and pro- vocative.
They loudly claimed that they had committed no offence and they openly
abused their parents if they offered to pay their fines or to sign bonds
for their good behaviour.

148. These tactics were dealt with firmly and the authority of
the courts was maintained. Where necessary the court-room was cleared of
spectators and the contempt displayed by the accused was properly
punished. Between May and the end of December nearly 2,000 persons were
convicted of offences arising from confrontation.

149. Bomb attacks continued intermittently until December. The
visit to the Colony in October of the Minister of State for Common-
wealth Affairs, Lord Shepherd, was the signal for increased activity in
bomb planting and at the end of the month some attempts were made to
disrupt Hong Kong Week by this means. The exhibition had been set up to
display for overseas buyers the quality of textiles and other goods
produced in Hong Kong. The communist press claimed, quite

44

erroneously, that it was designed to rival the Canton Fair, which had
been postponed for a month because of the unsettled conditions in that
city and was then due to start on 15th November. They attempted a
counter-display of goods from the Mainland, as much to improve the
dwindling sales in their department stores as to draw attention away
from Hong Kong Week. But they had little success in their campaign and,
despite a noticeable increase in explosions during the period, the
various events planned for the Week duly took place, with considerable
success. The Silver Jubilee exhibition of the Chinese Manufacturers
Association, which opened on 5th December, attracted no bombs and was
also well attended.

150. From about the middle of December the number of true bombs
noticeably dwindled and there were none at all after Christmas Day. The
available evidence suggested that this violent phase had come to an end.
Since it began, 8,352 suspected bombs had been reported and checked by
explosive experts. 1,420 proved to be genuine: Police and Services bomb
disposal teams dealt with 1,167 and there were 253 un- controlled
explosions. These caused the death of 16 people; two police- men; an
army sergeant investigating a suspected bomb at Lion Rock; an officer of
the Fire Brigade who was killed while off duty; eight mem- bers of the
public; and four who died from the premature explosion of bombs that
they were carrying themselves. 340 people were injured by bombs, of whom
74 were policemen and 28 were members of the Armed Forces or other
security units.

CHAPTER 11

THE WATER SHORTAGE

151. There are no sizeable rivers in Hong Kong and the Colony is mainly
dependent for its water supply on inwater collected in its reservoirs.
At the beginning of 1967 the total combined storage capacity of these
reservoirs was 16,800 million gallons. An additional project, involving
the construction of a dam across an arm of the sea at Plover Cove in the
New Territories, had progressed to the stage that the main dam was
closed. By early summer most of the sea water had been pumped out and
the reservoir was ready to receive fresh water from the summer rains. In
1960 an agreement was made with China for the supply of 5,000 million
gallons of water a year to the Colony from the Shum Chun reservoir,
which lies a few miles to the north of the border

45

of Hong Kong. In 1964 a fresh agreement was negotiated by which the
Colony received and paid for a minimum of 15,000 million gallons of
water a year brought from the East River through a series of dams,
pumping stations and channels. The supply period for this water begins
on the 1st October each year, which is the start of the normal dry
season, and ends on 30th June, and the water is paid for at the rate of
$1.06 for a thousand gallons.

152. The rainfall in the last half of 1966 was well below average and,
at a meeting with representatives of the People's Council of Kwangtung
Province in November of that year, the Hong Kong Govern- ment's
representatives made a formal request under Clause 1.5 of the Agreement
for an additional 1,800 million gallons of water during the current
supply period. The Government representatives enquired whether
additional water could be drawn if it should be needed in July, August
and September (that is the three months not included in the normal
supply period) and understood that there would be no difficulty pro-
vided due notice was given. The dry spell continued into 1967 and as a
precautionary measure the hours of supply within the Colony were reduced
from 24 to 16 a day after the Lunar New Year, that is in February 1967.
The start of the usual rainy season, in May, brought little rain and on
the 1st June, when the total water in storage had dropped to 3,000
million gallons, the hours of supply were further reduced to 8 a day.

153. By the 25th of June the total supply due from China, including the
additional 1,800 million gallons, had been drawn and a request for a
further additional supply remained unanswered. Rainfall continued to be
below average and on the 29th June the supply was reduced to four hours
every other day.

154. On the 11th July, with nearly half the rainy season past, the total
storage stood at 3,277 million gallons and the supply period was reduced
to four hours every fourth day. Such essential users as hospitals and
power stations continued to get an unlimited supply. The special needs
of industry were met by a four hour daily supply, while the crowded
squatter areas and resettlement estates, where there were generally less
facilities for storing water, were given a supply of four hours a day
and four hours on alternate days respectively. By these restrictions the
daily rate of consumption in the Colony was reduced to 60 million
gallons a day, that is half the daily consumption with an

46

unlimited supply, but even at this rate there was little more than 50
days supply in hand and the position was critical.

155. Additional pumps were installed in the few local sources of water,
with only a marginal improvement of the situation. The possi- bility was
considered of importing water from overseas but the prospect was not
encouraging. It was no longer practical to bring water by tanker from
the Pearl River near Canton, as had been done during the previous
drought in 1963, and the use of alternative sources did not appear to be
feasible because of their distance from Hong Kong, and because of the
scarcity of shipping. Further cuts in the supply periods were considered
but it was physically impossible to reduce materially the existing
exiguous ration.

156. It was a hot summer and there were many people who were more
preoccupied with the water shortage than with the rioting that took
place in July. For those living in squatter areas and the poorer
tenements without a piped water supply it meant standing for long hours
in the queues at the public standpipes. Those who were not fortunate
enough to have salt water flushing mains installed in their homes had to
eke out their allowance of fresh water to flush their lavatories. It was
a sordid time for everybody: it is hardly necessary to add that no
exceptions were made in the rationing scheme and that the restrictions
applied to everybody from the Governor downwards.

157. The communist press made the most of the opportunity to attack the
Government. It claimed that the restrictions were not neces- sary and
that this was yet another example of persecution of the masses. It
hinted that there were no restrictions in the Peak areas, which are
mainly occupied by the more well-to-do Europeans. But these insinua-
tions carried little weight and with their usual resilience the people
of Hong Kong cheerfully accepted the discomfort and inconvenience of the
situation.

158. The long awaited relief came with some smart showers in mid July
which resolved the immediate crisis but were not sufficient to allow any
improvement in the supply periods. In August there was heavy rain and
for a week, from the 22nd to the 29th, a full 24 hour supply was given.
The period then reverted to four hours a day which was maintained until
the 6th of September. Further rain brought the storage level up to
16,000 million gallons and with some reservoirs overflowing a 24 hour
supply was reintroduced. It was not at that stage known

47

whether the supply from China would be reintroduced on 1st October and
as a precautionary measure the supply was again cut to four hours a day
from the 26th of September. In fact the Chinese authorities resumed the
supply on the due date.

159. With Chinese water, nearly 16,000 million gallons in the
old reservoirs and access to the partially saline water of Plover Cove
Reservoir, it was possible to revert to 24 hours supply, and this was
continued till the end of the year. The water delivered to consumers had
a salty taste and the communist press again seized the opportunity, to
proclaim that it was injurious to health and that this 'adulteration'
must stop. This campaign had some effect although the water did not in
fact exceed a salinity of 900 parts per million, that is it is within
the limit of 990 p.p.m. recommended by the World Health Organiza- tion,
and the proportions were carefully controlled by Government chemists to
ensure that this limit was not exceeded. Salinity at Plover Cove which
was 1,250 p.p.m. on October 1st had risen to 1,625 p.p.m. by the end of
December and was expected to increase steadily through- out the dry
season. However, a substantial reduction was expected with the onset of
the 1968 rains and as a result the salt content of the water delivered
to the public would be well below the W.H.O. limit.

CHAPTER 12

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

160. In accordance with its tradition of liberalism and free
speech Hong Kong has a press that represents almost all shades of
opinion. But whereas from the start of confrontation the communist
newspapers at once slavishly followed the party line, the remainder,
which included a number of vigorous and by no means sycophantic
publications, pre- served their independence. They have continued to
criticize the Govern ment when they thought criticism was justified but
none of them at any time expressed any agreement with the objects and
method of the communists confrontation in spite of the volume of
propaganda they produced.

161. In May the communists had under their control all the
machinery required for a full-scale propaganda campaign. Their three
newspapers, the Ta Kung Pao, the Wen Wai Pao and the New Evening Post,
were well established and had a good circulation; and they were

48

backed up by about six other papers which not only followed their lead
but at times ran to excesses of wild invention of their own. They had
ample printing facilities for other propaganda material and the men and
the equipment for newsreel production.

162. They also enjoyed considerable encouragement and assistance from
the local office of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) which is owned
and directed by the Peking Government. This agency was largely
responsible for directing the propaganda campaign in the Colony as could
be seen from the identical reports of incidents that regularly appeared
in communist newspapers, all attributed to the agency's reporters. It
was also responsible for producing distorted accounts of the events in
Hong Kong for the consumption of the authorities in Peking. Its
highly-coloured and wildly exaggerated reports undoubtedly played a
large part in inflaming opinion in China against the Government of the
Colony.

163. In their campaign the communists employed every theme and every
weapon, from deliberate distortion of facts and falsification of
photographs to the spreading of rumours and the fabrication of non.
existent incidents. Rumours put about by them ranged from the possible
but untruc-rice shortages, power or water stoppages-to the wildly
improbable as for example the stories which appeared in minor com-
munist newspapers, complete with photographs and maps, of Chinese
gunboats approaching the Colony. Communist reporters and photog- raphers
were present at every incident to produce their version of events; and
in many cases demonstrations were organized solely for publicity
purposes. During the phase of street demonstrations in May communist
newspapers produced special editions which were distributed free to the
crowds and which were designed to incite them to further violence. The
same presses produced leaflets and booklets giving lurid accounts of
Police 'brutality',

164. To a large extent these activities were countered by the presence
and factual reports of the independent press in the Colony, local tele-
vision and commercial wireless companies and particularly by the wide
coverage given to events by the world press whose leading corre-
spondents and photographers were in Hong Kong. To those in Hong Kong
some of the reports published overseas may have seemed to lean towards
the sensational but they effectively gave the lie to the com- munist
distortions. Rumours, by their very nature, are more difficult to

49

combat but effective use was made of the local wireless transmissions to
make known as quickly as possible what was really happening. On one
occasion a threatened stoppage of work by employees of a transport
company was averted by the continuous broadcast of the true facts of the
situation, on which the men had been seriously misled. It was not
possible to dispel all rumours, but whenever a rumour could be factually
disproved it was dealt with promptly and quickly disposed of.

165. In the campaign of rumour-mongering, considerable use of
loudspeakers mounted on communist owned buildings from which were
broadcast threats and abuse against the authorities and encouragement to
their supporters. The loudest and best known of these was at the Bank of
China, the focal point for the disorders at the end of May. To meet this
attack the Government set up its own loudspeakers on adjacent buildings
whose combined output made the communist tirade unintelligible. The
Government programme chosen consisted of selec- tions from Cantonese
opera and the resulting din made the area of Statue Square almost
uninhabitable for the three days that the contest lasted. In the end the
communists gave in and their loudspeakers were not used again.
Broadcasts continued intermittently from other build- ings, while
communist river boats arriving in the Colony with goods from China,
added their contribution while they were in port. These broadcasts
tended to attract crowds and led on several occasions to clashes with
the Police. There was a further addition to the communist propaganda
armoury on 24th June when the Macau broadcasting sta- tion, Radio Villa
Verde, passed completely into communist control and was used to direct
more propaganda at Hong Kong.

166. The third medium of propaganda was posters. These appeared
from the start of confrontation and continued sporadically throughout,
reaching their height at the end of May and the beginning of June.
Posters and slogans appeared everywhere, both ashore and afloat. They
were pasted or written on every available wall, on ships in the harbour,
and on the trains arriving at Lo Wu from China. Slogans were painted on
the pavements and on the sides of cattle, while on one occasion a couple
of unfortunate dogs were hung about with communist placards. These
demonstrations had none of the sublety of the newspaper cam- paign, the
message mostly consisting of simple, and crude slogans. But the
cumulative effect of such objurgations as 'Blood for Blood', and 'Death
to the Running Dogs' was considerable. They were reinforced

50

on occasions by straw effigies hung on traffic lights or other
convenient places and purporting to represent the Governor and other
leading members of the community. To discourage removal, these effigies
were often decorated with bombs, real and simulated.

167. Many of the leaders of confrontation were drawn from news- paper
and film-making circles and newspapermen in particular appear to have
enjoyed the special favour of the Peking Government. Com- munist
reporters were actively engaged in support of confrontation and in
subversive actions which went far beyond what could be accepted as their
proper duties. But when they were arrested for these activities there
was a sharp reaction. In July the Peking Government protested to Her
Majesty's Government over the arrest of an employee of the New China
News Agency, who was later convicted of unlawful assembly. The protest
was rejected and in retaliation Reuter's representative at Peking was
put under house arrest; he was still under arrest and denied all
visitors at the end of December. In August other communist reporters
were arrested for criminal activities. Later in the month three minor
communist newspapers which had been particularly virulent in their
attacks on Government were suppressed; five people concerned in edit-
ing, publishing and printing them were prosecuted for sedition (one
editor evaded arrest) and the papers were suspended for six months. This
evoked a further protest from the Peking Government which demanded, on
20th August, that within 48 hours the editors concerned and all
communist reporters arrested must be unconditionally released and action
against the newspapers withdrawn. This protest was also rejected and
retaliatory action was taken, again not against Hong Kong, but against
the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking which was sacked
by a mob on 22nd August. There followed the curious incident in London
in which the staff of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires set upon the Police
on some trivial pretext. This was presumably intended as an 'incident',
complete with feigned injuries, to demonstrate to the people in China
that diplomatic staff in other countries as well were liable to attacks.

168. Communist propaganda reached its peak in May and June. One of its
main objectives had been to enlist the active support of the Peking
Government in the struggle in Hong Kong and the exaggerated reports of
the strength of the support for confrontation as well as of the "brutal
persecution' by the authorities were designed to that end. Any

51

statement or protest from the Peking Government or any article in the
People's Daily that seemed, or could be made to seem, to support this
possibility was given prominent treatment, with banner headlines and
extra editions. By the end of July, the tone of the communist press was
changing. Its shrill abuse of the Government continued and its
exhortations to violence were, if anything, more extreme. But it began
to speak increasingly of a long hard struggle ahead and pronouncements
from Peking were given only routine treatment. While the protest after
the events of 8th July at Sha Tau Kok was followed, at the prompting of
the communist press, by widespread violence in the Colony, the ultimatum
issued by Peking on 20th August and the subsequent attack on the office
of the Chargé d'Affaires passed almost unnoticed in Hong Kong. After the
suspension of the three newspapers, a mosquito newsheet campaign began.
The newsheets were poorly produced but highly inflammatory and
subversive. At first they were distributed widely but the campaign
quickly lost its momentum and had died out completely by the end of the
year, without achieving anything significant.

169. In December the cessation of bomb attacks was reflected
in the tone of the communist press, which changed in its attacks on the
Government from violent abuse to the appearance of reasoned argu- ments,
accompanied by less violent tirades on topics which were likely to
appeal to the public at large. During the last weeks of the year the
communist newspapers devoted considerable space to two topics, the
salinity of the water and the effects on the people of the adjustment of
the Hong Kong dollar that followed the devaluation of sterling by Great
Britain. Both these themes were of popular interest and concern. The
water, though it was harmless, had a strong taste and it was not
difficult to persuade the public that it was the cause of any disease
from which they might be suffering. The arguments for and against
devalua- tion were generally unintelligible to the layman but there were
natural reactions to the communist insinuation that, for its own
nefarious purposes, the Government had reduced the buying power of the
dollar and robbed the poor of their savings.

170. It remains to be seen whether this new trend will be
main- tained. It is however probable that confrontation will continue in
one form or another and that propaganda, whether overt and violent or,
as at the end of the year, more devious and insidious, will continue to
be one of its main weapons.

52

CHAPTER 13

THE ADMINISTRATION

171. The Colonial Secretariat, which works under the direction of the
Colonial Secretary and his Deputy, is responsible for planning and
organization as well as for the co-ordination of the work of other
depart- ments. It is divided into branches: Financial and Economic
(under the direction of the Financial Secretary) Establishment, Land,
Defence, Councils and General.

172. At the outbreak of the riots at San Po Kong on 11th May the
Emergency Control Centre, which is supervised by the Defence Secre-
tary, was manned by Secretariat officers working in shifts throughout
the twenty-four hours. This centre, which is also manned during typhoons
and other emergencies, acts as a clearing-house for all informa- tion
passed to it by departments and it is responsible for keeping the
Governor and other senior officers informed of the progress of events as
well as for conveying orders and instructions to departments.

173. The Emergency Control Centre remained in continuous opera- tion
until 25th May and for a further month thereafter it was manned by
Secretariat officers during the night, the Defence Branch acting as an
information and liaison centre during the day.

174. As confrontation continued it soon became apparent that the Defence
Branch of the Secretariat, which would normally deal with an emergency
of this sort, could not continue to be responsible for co- ordinating
the various measures required in addition to its ordinary work. On 22nd
May therefore an officer was appointed as Personal Assistant to the
Governor with direct responsibility for confrontation matters. On 25th
June the title of this officer was changed to Deputy Colonial Secretary
(Special Duties) and he was given a staff of three officers. This unit
was still in operation at the end of the year and by relieving other
Secretariat officers of much of the work arising from con- frontation it
enabled them to continue their normal-and heavy- schedules of duties.

175. From the start of the disturbances there were frequent meetings at
Government House, attended by senior Government servants and
representatives of the Armed Forces, to pool information and to formu-
late policy. On 27th October the Governor's Committee, as it was called,
was reorganized to meet twice weekly with joint civil and military

53

secretaries working from the Defence Branch: and in that form still in
being at the end of the year.

was

176. On 16th May the Colonial Secretary instituted twice weekly meetings
with the heads of all Government departments to keep them informed of
the course of events, of possible future trends and of the action that
was being taken by the Government. These meetings were supplemented by
written situation reports issued to departments. In November the
incidence of these meetings was reduced to once a month.

177. A publicity committee was also set up on 16th May to co-
ordinate the Government publicity programme, to track down and refute
rumours and to keep the public informed of the Government's actions and
intentions. This committee at first met daily and in August con- tinued
its meetings on a twice weekly basis.

178. A committee was also set up to co-ordinate public relations
overseas. The reports published overseas on the events in Hong Kong were
on the whole fair and accurate but there were some instances of
exaggeration or misinformation which were potentially harmful to the
Colony. The committee received considerable assistance from the
Information Services Department, the Trade Development Council, the
Tourist Association and the Hong Kong Federation of Industries, both in
Hong Kong and overseas, in presenting a more balanced picture.

179. An Emergency Food Control Committee, with the Defence Secretary as
Chairman, was set up on 14th June to be responsible for the maintenance
of an adequate supply of food to the population and to consider measures
that would be necessary in the event of a food shortage.

180. Other committees were set up whose membership included, as well as
Government servants, members of the Executive and Legislative Councils
and leading industrialists and businessmen in the Colony to advise on
various problems as they arose. It is not possible in this report to
give the full details of their activities, but they met frequently,
often at unusual and inconvenient hours, and their work was of the
greatest value to the administration.

181. Confrontation has led to a series of actions which, while
not classifiable as offences in normal times, constituted a threat to
the stability of the Colony in the special circumstances prevailing. It
was also found that the law relating to other offences was
insufficiently

54

precise or too narrow in scope to deal with the types of cases that
emerged.

182. To meet these cases a number of emergency regulations were drafted
by the Legal Department and made by the Governor in Council, to deal
with such matters as the possession and dissemination of inflammatory
posters and literature, intimidation, incitement to violence, planting
and possession of simulated bombs, and the security of premises used in
the provision of essential services. A list of the regula- tions made is
given at Appendix V.

183. Chapter 8 of this paper describes the valuable services given by
the Armed Forces in the border area. In the urban areas, they provided
most of the men engaged in the dangerous task of investigating suspected
bombs and rendering them harmless. They took no direct part in actions
against the communists but they gave firm support to the Police by
cordoning off areas as required and by providing road patrols.

184. The Colony's volunteer units also gave sterling service. 99% of the
Auxiliary Police Force reported for duty when mobilization was ordered
on 11th May. The Auxiliaries remained fully mobilized for 26 days during
which time they worked alongside their Regular Police colleagues and
suffered 25 casualties, some serious. When no longer mobilized about 500
Auxiliaries continued for several months to perform voluntary duty for
eight hours every day in order to relieve the pressure on the Regulars.

185. The Hong Kong Regiment after a period of alert, was, on 12th July,
placed on a state of Limited Call Out and was immediately committed to
cordon duties, assisting Police raids and nightly vehicle patrols on the
Island, the latter continuing until mid October. The Regiment also
deployed rural area patrols in the New Territories in August. Members of