1968
HICKI/IS
CONFIDENTIAL
4
2.
Mr. Sykes (Defence Policy Department November.
Thank you for your" minūte
The present arrangements for circulating Inward telegrams dealing with
troubles in the dependent territories are as follows:-
1)
2)
3)
Advance copies are sent as quickly as possible to:
Defence Opera:ions Centre, .O.D.
Duty Intelligence Staff, .O.D.
Duty Intelligence officer, Cabinet Office No. 10 Downing Street.
Any other outside recipient would be sent copica at the request of the
department concerned or the Resident Clerk.
The telegram is given Departmental or FCO/WH Distribution as
appropriate, FCO/TH being given to important telegrams of wide interest.
For these telegrams these distributions always include the Overseas
Police Adviser, the Overscas Labour Adviser, the Emergency Unit,
Consular Depart- ment, IRD, and D.1.5. H.O.D. in addition to their
noranl recipients.
In addition the telegram is given the "J.I.C.) Additional Distribution.
This additional distribution (copy attached) covers the non-> F.C.O.
recipients of the old Colonial Office: Disturbancea Distribution the
recipients within the Office being covered by Department al or FCO/WH.
Ao an exception to the use of the J.I.C. additional distribution, we
are, at the request of the geographical departments concerned sending
telegramo about troubles in Fiji and the Bahamas respectively to the
recipients on the attached separate sheets. As you will see, these
additional distributione are more limited than the J.I.C. additional
distribution
3.
In the case of Outward telegrams we follow the instructions of
originators as given on the drafta but endeavour to ensure that the same
broad lines of policy are followed.
4.
It seems to me that this matter is best dealt with by means of
additional distributions but we should be happy to make any changes in
the detailed arrangements which you or the other recipients of your
minute, to whom I an co; ying this, think would be appropriate. If
changes are thought necessary it would be helpful if either your
department or one of the dependent territory departments could
co-ordinate views and let us have an agreed request.
RECEIVED INV
ARCHIVES No.31 -ODL1968
c.c. Mr. MacKintosh
n. Fairclough
(1.B. Eaden)
Communications Department
her, 1968
+
FOREIGH OFFICE
CABINET OFFICE
C
J.1.C. DISTRIBUTION
:
from E12,
Mr. F.T. Copeland, Information Research Dept.
Riverwalk House.
Secretary J.I.C. (1 copy)
Duty Intelligence Officer, J.I.R.
COUNCIL
PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE(WHITEHALL) Lord President of the Council.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
1.
BOX 500, c/o Room 27 903
Forefice, D.St. (East) I games office
Poom Std
(1_cers).
Message Control, Rm.039, D.C.C., Whitehall
Gardens, S.3.1.
(27 copies - DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ONLY -
indicate for "J.I.C. Distribution")
Miss A. Roberts (2 copies)
Director General, c/o Miss A. Roberts
اعتماد
(2 copies)
Ei Ault - (4 copies)
14/6.
c/o Room S, Foreign Office,
Freig
+
हूँ
D.St. (ful
• (Est)
Director G.C.H.. for the attention of 2(50)
(2 copies)
G.C.O. (London), c/o G.C.H.Q.
:
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
UNHAGE IN FIJI
:
Head of D.1.2., Main Bldg.
CABINET OFFICE
D.I.O.
tc
(Miss Heard, P.1.0.Dept.-12/40/57)
+
:)
ļ
P.
BAHAMAS:
DISTURBANCES
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
Main Bldg.
D.I.S.
Mr. D.A.J. West, D.S.11, Rm.7353. Mr. T.F. Ronayne, D.S.5, Rm.8386.
Assistant Chief of Defence Stafe ( } Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (1
olier)
(Mr. Tansey, W.Indian Dept.)
Tanse
12.11.68
1
(
W(B)L 51-7433
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry
No. HKK 1/18
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
DRAFT
To:-
Top Secret.
N.A.S
Secret.
Major J.A.Harrison
Confidential, 9/12
Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
Colonial Secretariat
Hong Kong
In Confidence
Type 1 +
From
A.W. Gaminara
NxAxi
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Hong Kong
Mr. Gaminara
Thank you for your letter CR51/3371/67
of 28 November.
Portunately this
arrived before we had made the distribution
mentioned in my letter of the 29th and
we have now distributed copies of the
report as requested in your latest
letter.
Mu Smith
6.1d6
Gammara
i've had better look
at these exchanges
with a views to
Commenting.
co. Hr. Mackintosh
Mr. Eeden
Mr. Jerron Er. Bennett Mr. Bullock
Br. Carter ✓
버스
Sykes
CON
Defence Policy Department
Disturbances in the Dependent Territor;
balegrar Petribution
I have scen Hr. Exden'a minuto af 3 December to you about arrangemanta
for the circulation of telograma concerning disturbances in the
Dependent Cerritories. It seems from what Hr. Laden anys
that, provided that the successive steps noted in his minute to widen
the distribution of telegraSS are taken in good time, the existing
arrangements covor the requirements, But 7 as left very much wondering
why we need to put Communications Department and ourselves through this
"obatnole race". I rezain of the view that the simplest and mout
effective way of dealing with this problem - which as we all recognise
ona be of very vital importance in an sotāve internal security situation
would be for a standard "Disturbances Distribution" to be re-established
covering all the addrazagos noted at (2) to (3) in Mr. Enden's minute.
A6 I indicated at our meeting with Er, Hackintosh a few days ago, I
would have thought that it should be for Refence Policy Department
(whether on ita own initiative or on request from the Dependent
Territorios Administration Departments concerned) to activate the use of
Disturbances Distribution by paosing a request to this effect to
Conxunica- tions Department.
L
RECEIVED V ARCHIVES No.3!
(A. J. Fairclough) West Indian Department 5 December, 1968
¡
Reference.
with 18
!
Mr. Gaminara
As far as Hong Kong is concerned
a "Disturbances Distribution" or something very like it did exist at the
time of the disturbances in Hong Kong last year. I am not sure whether
it was a long-standing distribution or whether it was built up ad hoc
during the course of the disturbances. Communications department no
doubt still have a copy of it and could reactivate it whenever
necessary.
!
!
Norman A. Smith
N.A.SMITH
9 December 1968
·
HKK 1/18
6
5
CONFIDENTIAL
17 December 1968
Your letter No. CR 51/3371/67
of the 28 November arrived before we had taken the action mentioned in
my letter to you of the 29 November.
We have now given the Special
Brench bomb report the distribution for which you ask in your letter of
the 28 November.
(A. W. Gaminara)
Major J. A. Harrison,
Colonial Secretariat,
HONG KONG
CONFIDENTIAL
9
Mr. Carter
HKK 1/18
Reference...
(10)
8
With reference to your note on Mr. Fairclough's minute to Mr. Sykes or 5
December, I have looked at the arrangements for the circulation of
telegrams concerning last year's disturbances in Hong Kong.
2. At the outset of the disturbances, the distribution was relatively
small, but as the disturbances continued the distribution built up until
it reached the following maximum distribution which was maintained until
the end of the disturbances:
-
JIC external distribution (I do not know if this is the same as the JIC
additional distribution referred to in Mr. Eaden's minute of 3 December)
ent, distribution.
Department
In addition, copies were sent to:
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.
Cabinet Office - DIO, JIR.
Foreign Office - individual officers in the
Far Eastern Department.
Overseas Labour Adviser.
Overseas Police Adviser.
Treasury.
Exports Credit Guarantee Department
Ministry of Defence - various individual officers
Board of Trade- various individual officers
Australia House Canada House
These addressees received copies of SITREPS only.
additional distribution can Koe made
3. It is clear that additional distributions must be determined on an
ad-hoc basis, having regard to the particular circumstances of the
territory concerned. It often happens that despite the fact that various
departments are included in the general distribution, the individual
officers in those departments, the often ask if they may be sent
additional Copies of telegrams addressed to them by name. This is
apparently because it sometimes takes a very considerable time indeed
for officers to receive copies of telegrams if they wait for them to
reach them as part of the general distribution.
4. I think there would be a definite advantage in laying down a basic
distribution for times of trouble: which can be added to suit the
circumstances of individual territories. I am not competent to suggest
what the basic distribution should be; can however say that the above
distribution was perfectly adequate for the needs of Hong Kong last
year.
20 December 1968
hea
I
(A. W. Gaminara) Hong Kong Department
}
?
wich (0)
HKK 1/18
Mr. Sykes (Defence Policy Dept.,)
Disturbances in the Dependent Territories:
Telegram Distribution
I attach a copy of a minute by Mr. Gaminara on telegram distribution
during the Hong Kong disturbances of 1967.
2. I agree with Mr. Fairclough (his minute of
5 December) that there is a case for a separate wider basic distribution
covering (1) and (3) in para 1 of Mr. Eaden's minute of the 3 December
and based, so far as (2) is concerned, on the Departmental distribution.
To this basic distribution additions can be made ad hoc, as appropriate,
e.g. by giving a FCO/WH distribution, by adding named dep.rtments or
named individuals.
30 December 1968
Copies to:
Mr. MacKintosh Mr. Eaden
Mr. Jerrom
Mr. Bennett
Mr. Bullock
Mr. Fairclough
(W.S. Carter) Hong Kong Department
7
Mr. Sykos (Defonos lolicy r^partment)
ITG 8/1
||
Pisturbances in Terendant Kerritories: telesnor
mistribution
G.S.A.D. would velcome soɑething in the Laturo of a "Disturbances"
distribution based on the first ¡cragraph of Mr. Toan'a simte of 3
December. This would include tho J.I.C. additional distribution together
with the E.0.D. rooipients shon for Bahamas disturbances, renely,
2.
"IS 09.11 D3.5
/CLS (CFD) LCIS (Folicy)
To this braid "Disturbinoes" distribution could be câlod the appropriate
0. D.M. roopray ionl Dagartmont - co O.D.L. like to to kept inforzod of
dovolo;acnts of this nature - and the other enroʻrieto F.C.0,
Wapartments (0.5. Letir. Ineriean reprtant for the Falkland islands, and
Southern Furopean Depertaent for Gibraltar, and m on).
3. It is cusco:ted also that the bagio "Disturbances" distribution
chauló include the recipients suggested in Mr. Gaminara'a minute of 20
Iovember, the an additional to those at item 2 of jaragrogh i of Er.
Ecden's minute of 3 December.
(R. C. Cax) G. 3. A. D. 9 January, 1969
Copies to
Kr. Fairclough (F.I.D.)
Mr. Jarron (1.1.0.D.).
Hr. Bullock (B.A.C.D.)
Hr. Carter (Hong Kong Department) Mr. Baden (Comunications Deportment)
{{..
Ganfinanci Im
K: 271
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 5 JAN 1969
HKK 1/18
14, 1.69
HONG KONG
DISTURBANCES
1967
1
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG DISTURBANCES
1967
PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER
HONG KONG
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG DISTURBANCES 1967
This report records the history of confrontation in Hong Kong from its
beginnings in May until 31st December, 1967.
This report is being distributed on a restricted basis to Government
departments and other official organizations.
It is NOT being published at the present time and must not be released
to the Press.
iii
65161-6K-12/68
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
HONG KONG July 1968
Chapter
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
HONG KONG DISTURBANCES
1967
INDEX
THE BACKGROUND
THE START OF CONFRONTATION
DISORDERS IN KOWLOON.
DEMONSTRATIONS IN VICTORIA
Chapter 5
STOPPAGES of Work
Chapter 6
THE PORT OF HONG KONG
Chapter 7
THE FOOD SITUATION
Chapter 8
THE NEW TERRITORIES
·
Chapter 9
FURTHER DISORDERS AND GOVERNMENT
COUNTER-MEASURES
Chapter 10
BOMB ATTACKS
Chapter II
THE WATER SHORTAGE
Chapter 12
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
Chapter 13
THE ADMINISTRATION
Chapter 14
CONCLUSION
Paragraph
I
8
18
34
48
74
85
96
116
136
151
160
171
190
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III
Appendix IV
Appendix V
Appendix VI
A list of Associations that expressed their support for
the Government.
Transportation Used and Import Tonnage of all goods
(including Food Supplies) from China for 1967. Import of Foodstuffs from
China.
General Consumer Price Index Figures for each month
from September 1966 to December 1967. Emergency Regulations.
Confrontation Statistics as at 31st December, 1967.
Maps
*
The New Territories.
Hong Kong Island: Northern shore. Kowloon.
V
CHAPTER 1
THE BACKGROUND
THE history of confrontation in Hong Kong begins with the inaugura- tion
by Chairman Mao Tse Tung of the cultural revolution in China. Hong Kong,
because of its geographical position and its history has inevitably been
affected by events in China. More than 95% of its population is Chinese
by race, almost all of whom have some ties with the mainland and, while
there are many who have come to regard the Colony as their permanent
home, there are also many who regard their stay here as a temporary
interlude until they return to their true home in China. The effects of
the cultural revolution therefore, and in partic- ular the intense
patriotism and the devotion to Chairman Mao Tse Tung and his teachings
that it engendered, were bound to spill over into Hong Kong.
2. One of the main doctrines of the cultural revolution is the over-
throw of capitalism; indeed its main target is the 'revisionists' who
have been led away from the true revolutionary spirit to take the
capitalist road". It was therefore in full accordance with the
revolution that action and violent action if necessary-should be taken
against capitalist Hong Kong. There were many examples to show the way:
in China itself the Red Guards had demonstrated the power of revolu-
tionary action; the communists in Macau had at the end of 1966 shown
that the precepts of Chairman Mao Tse Tung, backed with a show of force,
were able to compel a colonial government to accept the demands of the
revolutionary masses; and in Hong Kong itself the same spirit, and the
same tactics, had been successful in a dispute with a major shipping
line.
3. It seems clear in retrospect that the more fanatical communists in
Hong Kong were convinced not only that they should apply the principles
of the cultural revolution to the Colony but also that they were certain
to carry the population with them. Fully indoctrinated themselves and
believing that the "Thoughts of Mao' were invincible, they could not,
they thought, fail to convince their 'compatriots' that it was their
duty to fight for these ideals. Moreover any move against
I
what was described as a repressive colonial Government was bound to
attract wide popular support. There were however other views. There were
many in the Colony who had left or escaped from China because they were
fundamentally opposed to the principles of communism; there were many
others who had little or no interest in ideologies, who were in Hong
Kong to earn a living and who wished only for peace and order to be
maintained. There was a divergence of views among the professed
communists themselves. Hong Kong is of con- siderable economic advantage
to China which draws the better part of its much needed foreign currency
through the Colony, either in the form of remittances from overseas
Chinese or through the sale of produce exported to Hong Kong and
transhipped in its port. The moderate communist view was that, while in
revolutionary theory the Colony was an affront to the Chinese people,
the valuable benefits it provided to China (and no doubt to themselves)
should not in practice be jeopardized.
4. The basic aims of both factions, so far as they have been
formu- lated, are probably similar: to force the Government into a
position of subservience to communist domination. But while the
moderates, dragged unwillingly into the struggle, would wish to see this
achieved by peaceful means that would not affect the continuing
prosperity of Hong Kong, the extremists were prepared to go to any
lengths to achieve this result even if it meant the destruction of the
Colony as such and its integration with China.
5. This dichotomy of views was apparent in the direction of
con- frontation which fluctuated between comparatively peaceful
demonstra- tions and outright violence as the attitude of one or other
of the factions prevailed. It was also apparent that neither the more
moderate communists in Hong Kong nor the Chinese Peoples Government,
dis- tracted as it has been by its own internal disorders, were able, or
willing, to restrain or control the extremist element.
6. Despite their expectations of mass support, those who took
an active part in confrontation remained a tiny minority of the popula-
tion. It was not a popular movement and, after what may be described as
the first flush of enthusiasm, the numbers of those supporting the cause
progressively dwindled. The events described in this report, which may
give the impression of wide-spread disorders, were organized by a
comparative handful of men and women who, by the payment of bribes to
hooligans, by intimidation and by 'strike pay' to workers, created an
2
exaggerated picture of their real strength. The overwhelming majority of
the population was not involved and has, often at considerable in-
convenience, continued to go about its ordinary work.
7. As the record shows, the Government was throughout at pains to use as
little force as necessary in dealing with the disorders. It was not
engaged in a 'war' with the communists. It is not an offence in itself
to be a communist or to study the teaching of Chairman Mao Tse Tung. The
ban on the dissemination of inflammatory literature or posters does not
include quotations from 'Mao's Thoughts' or the display of his portrait.
The Government's sole concern has been the maintenance of law and order
and the prevention and punishment of criminal acts whether they are
committed by communists or by anyone else.
CHAPTER 2
THE START OF CONFRONTATION
8. At the beginning of 1967 there were 57 unions in the Colony with a
paid-up membership of 60,000 under the control of the communist-
dominated Federation of Trade Unions. The influence of these unions
varied but they had considerable strength, though by no means a
majority, in the labour force of many Government departments, essential
services, public transport and shipping companies.
9. These unions were basically political associations. They were little
concerned to safeguard the interests of their workers although they had
gained some success in the improvement of working condi- tions for them.
Their main purpose was the political indoctrination of their members by
means of propaganda and by intensive courses of study of the works of
Chairman Mao. In this they had succeeded to the extent that they had a
comparatively small but dedicated core of adherents to the communist
cause who had come to regard labour disputes primarily as political
issues in which the principles of com- munism and the cultural
revolution should, and must, prevail.
10. In this climate, and with the encouragement of the recent events in
Macau and the successful confrontation of the shipping company in Hong
Kong, it was inevitable that there would be clashes between communist
workers and their employers. In the months preceding con- frontation
there were major disputes affecting seven undertakings: four taxi
companies. a textile factory, a cement works, and a factory pro-
3
ducing artificial flowers. The course of events was similar in each
case. A real or imagined source of grievance, seldom if ever connected
with a genuine cause of industrial dispute, was seized upon and
exaggerated, political issues were introduced and a series of demands
were made that must be accepted 'unconditionally'. Non-communist workers
were intimidated and demonstrations were mounted in which groups of com-
munists, waving banners and chanting slogans, attempted to overawe their
employers by a show of strength.
11. There had been no general deterioration of labour relations at this
time and the unrest that was created in these few undertakings was not
symptomatic of a general malaise. Its effect moreover was magnified by
the noisy demonstrations and the increasingly truculent behaviour of
those taking part. They regarded themselves as above authority. They
declared that the Police had no right to interfere with their
processions; any assistance offered by the Labour Department in settling
the disputes was dismissed as 'unwarranted meddling'; when a press
photographer took a picture of a procession it was demanded. as of
right, that his camera be confiscated.
12. There is no evidence that these outbreaks were co-ordinated or that
they formed part of a concerted plan to challenge the Govern- ment; it
is more probable that they arose spontaneously as a natural result of
the political indoctrination to which the workers concerned had been
subjected. It is also probable that the communist leadership in the
Colony foresaw the violence to which these actions tended to lead but
were unable to exercise sufficient control to prevent them.
13. While all these disputes were potentially explosive, it
was the one at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works that produced the
actual spark. This company has a factory at Belcher Street, in Hong Kong
Island, employing a staff of 421 and another at San Po Kong in Kowloon
with 686 employees. On 13th April 1967 the manage- ment of the company
introduced new conditions concerning discipline and rates of pay which
affected only the injection moulding section. A series of meetings was
arranged between the management and representatives of the employees to
discuss the reason for the changes and their implications. After three
meetings, which were unproductive, a small but influential group of
employees, members of the communist- dominated Hong Kong & Kowloon
Rubber and Plastic Workers Union, issued five demands relating to the
rates for piece work, the allocation of moulds and the rates to be paid
when a worker was idle because of
4
a defective mould. No demand was made for the hours of work to be
altered.
14. Attempts were made to hold a further meeting but these were
unsuccessful. The quality of the work at the factory began to
deteriorate and, according to the management, cases occurred of wilful
damage to the moulds and machines; these led to the dismissal of 23
workers from the Hong Kong factory and 69 from the San Po Kong factory
on 28th April. On the following day, as it considered that the situation
had deteriorated further, the management closed down the moulding
departments of both factories, which resulted in the termination of the
services of a further 241 workers in Hong Kong and 325 in Kowloon. At
this stage, the Labour Department was informed of the dispute but
attempts by officers of the department to assist in its settlement were
curtly rejected by the union. An officer calling in person at the union
premises was refused admittance and enquiries by telephone were answered
by quotations from the works of Chairman Mao Tse Tung.
15. On Saturday 6th May a group of dismissed workers picketing the San
Po Kong factory attempted to prevent the removal of goods from the
factory. They were warned by the Police that, although peaceful
picketing was permissible, it was illegal to offer any physical
obstruction. The warning was disregarded and 21 men who continued to
obstruct the factory entrance were arrested, among them the chair- man
of the union.
16. It was not a serious affair and no one was seriously injured in the
clash. The dispute itself could have been settled peaceably; indeed
successful discussions were held later, with the assistance of the
Labour Department, between the management and employees who were not
members of the communist union resulting in the injection moulding
sections at both factories being re-opened before the end of the month.
17. The evidence suggests that the incident was not planned as a pretext
for confrontation, but it was immediately exploited, possibly against
the wishes of the more moderate communist leaders. Headlines appeared in
the communist press attacking the Government and accus- ing the Police,
in the most violent terms, of brutally attacking unarmed workers.
Meetings were held by all communist organizations in support of the San
Po Kong workers and posters began to appear protesting
5
against Police brutality. On 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers
Union published four demands:
1. the Hong Kong Government must cease its brutality forthwith
and ensure no repetition;
2.
all the arrested persons must be released immediately;
3. compensation must be paid by Government for all injuries and
damage and those responsible must be punished;
4.
there must be no Government interference in labour disputes. The
communist Federation of Trade Unions declared its support and published
its own demands, in substantially the same form as those already made.
Confrontation had begun.
CHAPTER 3
DISORDERS IN KOWLOON
18. Meanwhile demonstrations at San Po Kong continued. The factory was
picketed and groups of communists assembled in the vicinity to sing and
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.