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E
SECRET 265
COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE
DEP
1926
AN O
ITLE: HONG KONG : INFORMATION AND!
PROPAGANDA ASPECTS:
DISTURBANCE 1967
REFER TO
REFER TO
DEPT.
DATE DEPT.
NAME
DATE
DEPT.
la
NAME
918
Me Sammara Fr 1/2
1918 28
My Raminan 20/12
<p> <span></span></p><!--more--><p></p>
Mr Carter.
......
In Eflguiran 15/08
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Nr Laminara 22/1
a Zaman In laminaa Fis
20/
X
ILLIN
J
REFER TO
NAME
OPENED
1467
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FOLIO NUMBERS OF TOP SECRET AND SECRET DOCUMENTS IN THIS JACKET
FORMER FILES PART A.
RELATED FILES
HWA 1/17 - Nong Kong Wistic lance. 1467
HWA 5/16 Economic & Financial Consequences of
Wisturbances
ances 1967)
ས་
No. Gaghinare
I suggest we
reply, that
No. Shaphand gals in touch with
Dear Cafter,
404 4
in Tammany.
یسا
Nom
ARMY INFORMATION
TEAM
Colonial Secretariat,
Lower Albert Road,
Hong Kong.
23rd November, 1967
28/11
live $139
C
Tony Shephard, who is one of our more senior administrative officers and
who, up till recently, has been Commissioner for Transport here, is
about to take home leave in England. We wish him to give a series of
talks in Britain as part of our Overseas Publicity Effort.
A programme is being drawn up for him.
2.
I should be very grateful if Hr. Shephard could call upon you sometime
in January to discuss these proposed talks, and also if he could have
access to up-to-date reports on happenings in the Colony so that he
might be kept abreast of events.
I
LAET
KEE
NEXT
REF.
I Mocking
(J.R. Locking)
for Colonial Secretary
4.3. Carter, Esq., C.V.o.,
Commonwealth Office, LONDON, .#.1.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVI No. 63
28 NOV 1967
HWA 13/22
We had been have
new vohund.
a
R. 318
R&R pe.
24.
1467
R. 3rd · Pl. esame letter offe
Bu one couch for
we
ARG
7 (2
67.
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(54) 9 (45)
56
*** First fold bere
1
ON HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE
| BY AIR-MAIL
PAR AVION
AIR LETTER
AEROGRAMME
3. Carter, "sq.,
Commonwealth Office,
LONDON, 3.4.1.
Sander's name and addensET.
Second fold bare
Colonial Secretariat,
Lover Albert Road, Hong fong.
AN AIR LETTER SHOULD NOT CONTAIN ANY ENCLOSURE; IF IS DOES IT WILL BE
SURCHARGED OR SENT BY ORDINARY MAIL
Hong Kong Government
HIIL 196
G.F. 106 (0001060)
Baby inɔ wɔdo of
57
Commonwealth Office
S.5.1.
Our rof: KB 13/22
December 1967
Carter has asked me to reply to your letter to him of 23 ilovember.
We shall be glad to see Shephard here in January and to give him
any assistance that he may need. Perhaps you would ask him to get in
touch with me on his arrival here. (Telephone
Trafalgar 7010, ixt. 127).
J.K. Locking Laq., Colonial Secretariat,
Hong Kong,
(A.M. GAMINARA)
1.
Ed. (3746)
Registry HWB 13/11
No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret Secret.
Confidential,
Restricted,
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
DRAFT S/o keltes.
To:-
J.R. Locking FZSER,
Colonial Secretarist,
Hang nóng.
Carter has asked me
Type 1 + $5
From
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
57
101 December 196
to reply
ما
letter to him of 23th Novetes.
протир
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
127
We shall be
glad to see
Shephard here in
January
to give
him and
assistance that he many
need.
Perhaps you
him
would att
Lis
65
get
in touch wit
mc
Cong to
17° Sedgwich with copy (56
Кору сосік сору
56
anival here. (Telephone - Trafalgar 7010, Ext
127)
Sal 1/12
to :- (1) M°C. Wilson (IRD (2) this Stowy-JIPGD (3) IT Sedgwich,
thing Mong Crow. Difce, 54 Pall Mall.
ре
fair μl. Ano
30
11.47.
GAMINARA
ANGARINARA.
に
:
R.318.
ANG
4/12
2/58
CONFIDENTIAL
58
Reference....
All 4/12/64 Batu
p. Lewis
Mr. Gaminara, (Hong Kong Dept.)
Overseas Confidences in Hong Kong
I have discussed this paper with Colin Wilson of I.R.D. and we have
agreed to submit our comments separately as they touch on different
aspects.
2. My main comment is that in theory this paper is fine and I agree
whole-heartedly with the need to identify themes and targets and treat
them individually, but what it does not say is how this is to be done.
For instance, the paper indentifies the main features of activity and
the agents for channelling material but nowhere is there any indication
as to who is to produce it. It is also all very well to provide a list
of literature distributed but there is no indication where it has gone
or whether the outlets available through the U.K. network of Information
Officers are being fully exploited. I would suggest therefore that we
need to go back to GIS Hong Kong (from whom I have also received copies
of this document) and ask them just how it is intended to work out all
these theories in practice and what role, if any, they expect us to play
in future since the co-ordination and cooperation of the U.K.
information effort is not touched upon at all.
Iftimes
(J. Stowe/Miss) 1 December 1967
I think it would be a mistake to under-estimate the efforts that have
been made and are being intensified by the Hong Kong Government Services
to ensure that overseas confidence in Hong Kong is maintained. However,
I agree with the point made by Miss Stowe in regard to co-operation with
the U.K. Organisation: we have the machinery at this end (and the
outlets abroad) to give any support that the Hong Kong Government might
require and the only problem is co-ordinating our programmes. No doubt
when Nr. Rivett-Carnąc comes back to London sometime this month many of
these details can be settled by discussion on the spot.
10.3 Pemes
(E. G. L-WIS
4 Dece ber, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL.
HWB 13/22
Hr. C. Wilson (Information Resoarch Dopertaent)
Hiss J.A. Stovo
(J.I.P.G.D.)
I enclose a copy of a confidential paper which has been sont to us by
the Hong Kong Govornmont Office in London. Tho
out
paper sots the views of the Ovorso: Public Relations
Co-Ordination Committee in Hong Kong on stops to neintain
overseas confidence in long: Kong.
is not intended for publication:
It in a working paror and it is for the use of members
of the Committos in Hong Kong and their counterparts oversors.
2.
I should be grateful if you would let no know by tolophono or otherwise
whether you have any comments on anything in the
paper.
ARE.
(A. H. Gaminara)
22 November, 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION SERVICES
6/38
4 PALL MALL
ONDON S.W. 1
Phone: 01-930-7951
OVERSEAS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG
This p per sets out the views of the Overseas Public Relations
Co-ordination Committco on how the 1967 Disturbances have affected
over-sons confidence in Hong Kong and how efforts can be made to retain
and foster overseas confidence. There is also an account of the steps
taken so far to achieve this objective.
1.
New Factors Influencing Overseas Confidence in Hong Kong
(a)
(b)
Up to 1966 Hong Kong was able to conduct its economic and social life
relatively detached from the political consider tions of China; China
had a strong but passive influence over the colony's affairs. The start
of the Cultural Revolution attracted even greater overseas attention
towards China, It was when the revolutionary fervour caused disturbances
in Macau that Hong Kong begun to be associated with events occurring in
China. There was apprehension that Hong Kong might be similarly
affected.
When street disturbances started in Hong Kong in May, 1967, many people,
both in Hong Kong and overseas, were shocked into thinking that China
might soon take over Hong Kong. People assumed that this was likely
either because of a policy decision in Foking or by an invasion from
Kvantung Frovince without the blessing of Poking, or by subversion from
within the colony which would be effective enough to destroy the British
control of Hong Kong. Even if people did not assume that China would
take over Hong Kong, they were at loast reminded that China could take
Hong Kong, and prompted to think that it was likely sooner or later
because of the anti- imperialist posture taken by China.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(A11).....
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
-
(b)
(c)
(a)
(e)
(f)
All publicity which drew attention to Hong Kong's close proximity to
China in convulsion, especially nows bout the disturbances along the
border, cro: ted doubts where before people had tended to ignore such
dangers.
Unbalanced and sensational reports, as well as even re son bly ccur. tu
reports of violunt incidents during the disturbances, reinforced
Assumptions which people had already made about a gonor a lack of
safety; ul.ck of anfety both for individual persons within the Colony,
and a lck of safety guinst subversion,
There w's some evidence of a lack of confidence locally which, when
observed, reported upon, or merely allogod, gave depth to convictions
bout the insecurity of ilong Kong, 0.g. the number of people who made
arrangements for themselves or especially their children to le vo the
colony increased, representing a drin of butter educ ted persons,
withdrawl of funds from banks, enquiries about factory sites in Tiwm or
Singapore, nd the postponement of business ventures and expansion plans.
The disturbances not only focussed world-wide attention on Hong Kong,
but also in many instancou dr. ttention to the soci 1 conditions of the
Colony which, to the more advanced outside world, apnuured to them to be
conducive to discontent and thus by iplication to revolt, c.g. labour
conditions, a shortage of opportunities for youth and crowded and
squalid housing conditions. Less sympathetic commert tors highlighted
these con- ditions by contrast with the signs of great wealth in the
colony; other comment.tors were not slow to advance allegations of the
constitutional anachronism of Hong Kong as a Colony.
Competitor countries in the 3.. Asia arca, such as Japan, Taiven, Thail
nd and the Philippines, though bically concerned th t ong Kong should
not disappear as a buffer between tium and China were not slow to take
any advant e they could from the withdrawl of buyers, investors or
tourists from Hong Kong. hoy later realised that, as far as tourists pro
concerned, their prospects vor、 inter- linked with those of Hong Kong.
/ (2).....
CONFIDA!TIAL
2.
CONFIORITI AL
(3)
Evidence of Decline of (v.rseas confidence in Hong Kong
Buyero
(a)
(b)
(c)
(a)
Some
As an initi.1 assessment the buyers for whom d. livery periods are
short, and those who would nood time to look elsewhere and are therefore
committed, he not pl:cod fower orders: buyers whose orders require
longer to deliver and are able to look: clsewhere are known to bu
hesitant, and in some inct nces not placing orders. Some buy.rs for mail
order companius or chain stores are t king stups to reduce dɩ- pendence
on Hong Kong products. In the long term there is a threat to the
hitherto sustin_d growth of exports.
Investors
Although inv. stment which has already been committed has continued,
these investments have been predominantly in service industrics, rather
than in m nufacturing. There has been very little new investment by
local or overseas capital. Re-investment also appe rs to have slowed
down.
Tourists
There has been a slow-down in the growth of the tourist industry, both
in the number of arrivals, inv.strert in ne facilitis and the actual
business transacted. Group tour operators re
lrc.dy Apprehensive about cust.ining or increas- ing their operations.
Some tourist carriers are cutting doim on their visits to Hong Kong,
either in duration or number of visits.
General public opinion overseas has been more critical of social
conditions in Hong Kong by making corparisons with those in more
adv.nccd countries, Fart of this critical comment his been nelicious or
part of ill-d、duced assessments of the causes of the Cisturb nous, some
has been an inability to appreciate why British rule in Hong Kong is not
able to advance more quickly to the standards by which people in Brit in
live.
/(3).....
COLFIDENTIAL
CC.FIL / NIAL
(4)
:
The conti ucû ct rate of x colony's imporů
L
J.
nos which h v been used to rutin confidence
(a)
(b)
(c)
(a)
(c)
(1)
(c)
(h)
(i)
n loster (vorsenNS
nsion of the
Jourist f. cilities uniap ired 20 incr...buď numbers of tom isto blu to
njoy their st y in 3 luty.
large pr. cts continu i to progress c.fi. cpansion of the Hor: Kong
-1.ctricity Comp ny's Generation c acity, the rucl vation off enchi, the
Peninsul.lectric Power Company dev lognent, and vt now 1w-cost housing
ttes.
Che continuir nor lit, of life in schools, chops ad f.clries; industri 1
production con- tinued to ine ne so fund the port work fluentiy
nd officiuntly.
cool-ho. dedness of the dr ristrution on the offici mey
restr int of th. Holic. Forc.
I very mus r.ssions of support for the Gov. micnt by representative
organic tions and quiet rejection of the communists by the popul tion
whole.
China e rus large proportion of her foreign chuge cmnings in and through
Hong Kong.
Foking did not initi.t. the disturbances in long Kong, in fact the
1.L.A. often restrains demonstrators
t the bordor.
The xtremely all number of local conanista
nd their dividedness.
Guidc-linus for Tutur. Action
די
(a) The use of a contr 1 co-ordinating committee to
dvise on the ublic relations fforts in the
n rts of the world most important for Hong Kong And to net as forum for
new ideas.
བ་ས་
COTIDIATAL
/(b).....
(b)
(0)
(a)
CONFIDLITIAL
(5)
The m in the tros of one: tion to be the U.3.A.
Cn.l. U.K., Surope, Japan, B.1. Acia, Australiá and parts of Africa.
Bach theatre presents different problews; though the targāts may be
broadly sinilor in each the try the t ctics to be used and th. crh cis
on v rious thenes will be qiff、runt.
The 2 ran to for the cnfidence-building offerts
re buyers, investors, tourists, sellers, foreign governments, overes
Chinese in S.J. "sin and, indirectly, oversens public opinion.
Phones,
Different targets require different enphases. The three main trg ts at
which speci.l efforts nocd to be made are buyers, investors and
tourists. It in lso thought that sont effort should bo m do towards
those who sell goods to Hong Kong.
In the blue-print which fellows, under unch tar et is given (4) the
composition of the image and (3) the in factual detail which lies behind
the in, mə It is anticipated that any public relations offerts directed
try rds ..ch target group will deronstr. to the facts Liven in (3) in
order to create the i pression given under (A).
Target : BUY AS
(A)
Inagu
1. Good profits.
2. Goods ansy to sell.
3. Value for money. 4. quick delivery.
5. English widely used.
(B)
Themes underlying In PL
(:) People work, h rd,
quickly, and offici.ntly
(b) Lively, intelligent, enterprising nd dynamic n nagenents.
(c) Chinese verkers h vo
vory high degree of nnual skills, dexterity
also ingenious.
-
(a) Production highly
flexible in volum und product design.
() Sophisticated d
perienced corcinl infra-structure.
/(f).....
CONFIDENTIAL
COLFIÐLITIAL
(6)
(B)
(f) Sound b.nking facilities
(g) Minimum and cusy
docwa ntation procedures,
(h) ficient c rgo-handling
both sea anì air.
(i) Frequent air and sva
: rvices in and out of Hong Kong, which is
contrally located for 2 st asian routes.
Targets : INVIDICAS
(A) Image
1. Rapid returns 2. High growth ratu
from high base.
3. 36. bl. government.
4. 3t ble economy
5. Dedicat.d to frue
enterprice
6. Low tax tion.
7. Loading world
tr ding unit.
8. English widely used.
(B) Themes underlying Image
(1) Free port status, (b) sophisticated and ox-
perinced commerci l infr-structure.
(c) Good nir and sea communi-
cations.
(d) Convenient and efficient
cargo handling godown facilities.
(c) Consumer preferenc. for
import、d goods.
(1) Leu 1 accuss for 11
suppliers.
(g) Vell orcablished tr do
links throughout S.L.Asia
(0) The treatment of such thone will be to present in a
manner most likely to appeal forcefully to the target
group t which it is being aimed.
L
COMNI DIITIAL
/(1).......
5.
CONFIDENTIAL
(f)
(7)
Tactics. It will b. necessary to decide which medi./ nudium is best
suited for particular targets, in
particular regions at certain times. The media possible
aro:-
(1) DIRECT
neusp.pers, newsletters, panphlets. Personal and individual contacts.
Trade Delegations.
(ii)INDIRECT-advertising, influencing newspapers
correspondents, agency representatives rdio commentators. Use of radio
or T.V. progr mnus, Us of films. 'Aside' tele- grans. Influencing a
third party who in turn will influence the target.
(B) Tools. The org nisations through which the effort
will b、 de ar listed in para.4. The employment of Public Rolations
consultants will be made on carefully selected and defined projects,
(h)
(i)
Timing can be as important as the message itself and vill se kupt in
mind.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.