[Codeword-if any]
ILI
Draft Telegram'to:-
Addressed to HONG KONG
No.
(Date)
HONG KONG
103
telegram No.
103
み
.....(date)....
# FEBY
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4/2
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repeated for information to PEKING (Personal for Denson).
And to:-
Saving 10
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Repeat to;
PEKING (Personl
for Denson)
Saving to:-
Your telegram No. 61: Personal for Governor
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS,
Although you do not feel able to
ية وصول)
advance the meeting of the Board of Review/you are
confident that you will be able to take decisions
on their recommendations this month. You know from
paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 82 the sort of
numbers I have in mind and how keen I am to reach
The Prime Minister has very recently told
results
them.
me that he wants to see
s on several
issues affecting Sino-British relations which
include releases of confrontation prisoners.
Distribution:--
Files
RED RKD
Private Secretary
PS to PUB
PS to Mr. Royle
Coplest oc-
Sir L Коnson
Sir Tomlinsor Wr. filford
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EXAMINED AT 09
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Sir S Toml
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1
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS
FE H 14/1
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bakind.
1.
The Governor has sent a reply to the Secretary of State's
two telegrams Nos 82 and 83, which I must admit strikes me as some-
what discourteous in that it makes no attempt to explain why he
cannot call together the Board of Review earlier than 18 February.
The Board's membership consists
(Mrs. Lee and Kr. Fung), and there seems no reason why they should
not start work forthwith as the Secretary of State asked.
However,
the Governor does predict confidently that he will be able to take
decisions on the Board's recommendations this month.
2. The questionmow arises whether we accept the Governor's position
by saying nothing, or whether we seek to keep him up to the mark by
making some reply which shows that we are not wholly satisfied with
what he has said. If we send no reply the danger is that at the end
of February we may find the Board working to rule and the Governor
taking refuge behind them. If we then complain he will say that we
tacitly accepted the proposal in his telegram No 61 and moroever that
he had not promised anything. Against this we do not wish to provoke
On the whole I believe that the
advantage lies in the despatch of a telegram on the lines of the
attached draft. I do not think it can be said to be provocative
in any way and it permits the Secretary of State to have the last
word, as indeed he should.
CONFIDENTIAL
13.
CCFIDENTIAL
3. The draft telegram has been seen by Mr. Royle, who had been
hoping to discuss it with the Secretary of State this morning.
agrees with it.
Km halfin
#Ilford
3 February 1971
- 2
CONFIDENTIAL
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Ref. Hong Kong telegram to London No.33
19/1/71
му
Mr Jatt ford
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
C: WSW Simban
Hong Kong Mihaird
Muzz
Interview given by Mr. Michael Stevenson, Deputy
Director of Information Services Mr. Warren Rooke, Radio H.K.
Friday, 8th January,
to
: - TEA IN
14.
:
1971.
23
ROOKE:
STEVENSON:
ROOKE:
STEVENSON:
ROOKE:
STEVENSON:
To first newspaper reports, said to be from London, that suggested some
people serving prison terms for criminal charges at the time of the 1967
disturbances might be released in some form of an amnesty, a Government
spokessan today flatly denied that the release of convicted criminals,
as some sort of a geature, would even be considered. I talked a short
while ago to Michael Stevenson, the Deputy Director for the Information
Services Department.
Mr. Stevenson, there has been another report speculating that people
being held as a result of the 1967 disturbances may be released in some
form of an amnesty.
There is no truth in this. There is no change at all in the situation. I
think, perhaps, a clue to how these things come to be said, is in the
phrasing of your own question, if I may say so. You used the phrase
"about people being held as a result of the 1967 disturbances". Now
let's make it quite clear we have no one in the prison being held as a
result of the 1967 disturbances. We have people in prison who were
charged with criminal offences, tried and sentenced to terms of
imprisonment, that's all.
Of these people, is there any chance that their sentences might be
reduced?
They have the same chance as other long-term prisoners. There is a
Prisons Board of Review which meets regularly to consider all long-term
prison sentences.
Have any people, where offences did take place in 1967, benefitted from
this type of review?
Yes, in the past, together with other prisoners, their cases have been
reviewed and in one or two cases, they have benefitted.
ROOKE:
STEVENSON:
Tell us how many people are being held as a result of 1967 and how long
some of these prison sentences are likely to go.
At the present moment, about 74 people are still in prison serving
sentences imposed for crimes committed in 1967.
та
2
ROOKE:
STEVENSON:
FOOKE:
What do you think could possibly be the basis for this speculation
suggesting an amnesty that these people could be released?
Well, I think it is significant that the reports I have seen just over
Christmas and repeated again today have all come from abroad, and this
suggests to me that they are based on a complete misunderstanding of the
situation. It may well be that the people who make this sort of
speculation think that we are holding people in some other way than
under the normal operation of the law. One thing I am quite sure of,
that these people who make this kind of speculation would not dream of
making the same kind of speculation in their own country, in Britain,
for example, about people who have committed crimes.
They wouldn't suggest that they should be released as some sort of a
gesture.
I was speaking just now with Michael Stevenson.
Interview ends.
X
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TC PRIORITY F.C.0, TELNO. 61 OF 1 FEBRUARY 1971 PRIORITY INFO PEKING
(PERSONAL FOR DENSON)
YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 82 AND 83.
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS
AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS HOLDING A SPECIAL
MEETING ON FEBRUARY 18TH, WHICH IS AS SOON AS IT CAN BE CONVENED,
BEARING IN MIND THAT
ARE INVOLVED
AND THAT THEY WILL DESIRE TO SEE THE FULL NORMAL DOCUMENTATION.
I CONFIDENTLY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO TAKE DECISIONS ON THEIR
RECOMMENDATIONS THIS MONTH.
2. I BELIEVE THIS IN FACT MEETS THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR
TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE. THE BOARD WILL BE MEETING AGAIN
TO CONSIDER FUTHER CASES IN MARCH.
SIR D.TRENCH
FILES
F.E.D.
[REPEATED TO PEKING]
22
H.K.D.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S. TO P.U.S.
P.S. TO MR ROYLE
SIR L MONSON
SIR S TOMLINSON
MR WILFORD
+
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION U.N.D. (4)
Any further action? Mr. Muyer. Tel sent
SM
اپنی
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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(F3)
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FEH WI Ен
ple
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 83 OF 28 JANUARY
INFO PEKING (PERSONAL FOR DENSON).
MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS
1. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND ON THE ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST PART OF PARAGRAPH
1 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. I HOPE THAT I MAY
HAVE CONVINCED YOU THAT THE ACTION | PROPOSE IS NOT DICTATED BY THE
NARROW INTERESTS OF HMG, BUT IS IN OUR VIEW IN THE LONG- TERM INTEREST
OF HONG KONG ALSO. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HONG KONG IS A CROWN COLONY WHICH HAS
NO STATUS AT ALL VIS-A-VIS CHINA EXCEPT AS A DEPENDENCY OF BRITAIN.
RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA ARE THEREFORE
AN INTEGRAL PART OF BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND IT IS FOR THIS
REASON THAT I BELIEVE THAT WE CANNOT SEPARATE THE QUESTION OF
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS FROM THE BROADER FRAMEWORK. I THINK THAT YOU
RECOGNISE THIS IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 36, AND, AS YOU SAY,
THE MORE THOUGHTFUL RESIDENTS OF THE COLONY SEE IT TOO.
2. SECONDLY, I AM CONCERNED AT WHAT YOU DESCRIBE AS THE VIRTUALLY
UNANIMOUS VIEW OF ALL STRATA OF PUBLIC OPINION WHICH SEEMS TO REFLECT A
NARROWER VIEW OF THE HONG KONG INTEREST, WHICH I BELIEVE
CARRIES GREAT DANGER FOR THE COLONY, HOW CAN THE WIDER VIEW BE! PUT
ACROSS? AS GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG YOU HAVE FAITHFULLY REFLECTED
TO ME THE VIEWS OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME AS THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF HER MAJESTY YOU MUST BE THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THE
VIEWS CF HMG ARE REPRESENTED HOT ONLY TO YOUR OFFICIAL ADVISERS, BUT TO
HONG KONG OPINION AS A WHOLE, THE PROBLEM, IF WE ARE TO RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF CONFRONTATION PRISONERS IN THE WAY I SUGGEST, IS THEREFORE TO
PUT ACROSS OUR POINT OF VIEW TO THOSE WHO HELP TO FORM PUBLIC OPINION.
OUR TASK IS TO DO THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE ACTION
WHICH WE ARE TAKING IS IN HONG KONG'S AS WELL AS IN BRITAIN'S BEST
INTEREST. WE MUST
CONFIDENTIAL
/EXPECT
COMFIDENTIAL
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I
EXPECT THAT SOME PEOPLE IN HONG KONG AND PERHAPS EVEN THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO REPRESENT OUR ACTION AS SOME SORT OF CAPITULATION
TO CHINESE PRESSURE. HOWEVER, WE KNOW THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE AND WHAT
WE MUST SEEK TO PROCLAIM PUBLICLY, AND TO CONVINCE THE RESIDENTS OF THE
COLONY OF, IS THE PLAIN FACT THAT HMG HAVE MADE HO DEAL, WHETHER
EXPLICIT OR IMPLIED, WITH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON THE MATTER OF
PRISONERS.
3. IF YOU ARE ABLE TO FALL IN WITH THE PROPOSALS MADE IN MY IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING TELEGRAM I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY IDEAS YOU MAY HAVE FOR
DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION.
I SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE READY TO GIVE YOU ANY HELP WHICH I CAN.
DOUGLAS-HOME
+
FILES
FED
C. KONG Đ
PRIVATE SECRETARY SIR L MONISON
SIR S TOMLINSON
ER WILJORD
PS TO IR ROYLE
PS TO PUS
- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
xx
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
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In Confidence
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(Date)
Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
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ייי
CONFIDENTIAL
Дазу
2811002
·
Qode Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
Hong Kong
No
(Date)
Addressed to..
[Codeword-if any]
HONG KONG (IMMEDIATE)
-FI-ים.
telegram No...
....
(date)
ו.י
83
And to
28/1
repeated for information to
PEKING(PERSONAL FOR DENSON)
Hıdı
▬▬▬▬▬▬‒‒‒‒‒-- --4-4-AnnaL
wot
And to:-
Saving to
ויי. דיני י
..
Repeat to: Paking
(Personal for
Denson)
Saving to:-
1.
My immediately preceding telegram.
Personal for Governor.
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS
I would like to expand on the argument in the
first part of paragraph 1 of my telegram under
reference. I hope that I may have convinced you that
the action I propose is not dictated by the narrow
interests of HMG, but is in our view in the long-term
interest of Hong Kong also. We must not forget that
Distribution-
Files
FED
HKD
Sir L Monson Sir S Tomlinson
Copies to:-
Mr Wilford
PS
PS to Mr Royle PS to PUS
み
$47220718
which has no status at all vis-à-vis China except as
in. Relations between Hong
Kong and China are therefore an integral part of
Britain's relations with China and it is for this
reason that I believe that we cannot separate the
framework. I think that you recognise this in
- 1
рата
1.171
paragraph 2 of your telegram No 36, and, as you say,
the more thoughtful residents of the Coony see it
too.
2.
Secondly, I am concerned at what you describe
as the virtually unanimous view of all strata of
public opinion which seens
Fest, which I believe
carries great danger for the Colony. How can the
wider view be put across? As Governor of Hong Kong
you have faithfully reflected to me the views of the
local people, but at the same time as the representa-
tive of Her Majesty you must be the channel through which the views of
HMG are represented not only to
your official advisers, but to Hong Kong opinion as
a whole. The problem, if we are to resolve the
issue of confrontation prisoners in the way I
suggest, is therefore to put across out-padn
on.
task is to do this in such a way 98 to convince
them that the action which we are taking is in
Hong Kong's
Our
We must expect that some people in Hong Kong and
perhaps even the Chinese Government pay wish to
represent our action as some sort of capitulation to
Chinese pressure,
However, we know that this is
not the case and what we must seek to proclaim
publicly, and to convince the residents of the
Colony of, is the plain fact that HMG have made no
deal, whether explicit or implied, with the Chinese
Government on the matter of prisoners.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
#10382) D.3920
"154m (77 sortud 1/4/C W.B.LM. Ox14
3.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WIBIL S1-740E
CONFIDENTIAL
3. If you are able to fall in with the
proposals made in my immediately preceding
telegram I should be grateful for any ideas
you may have for dealing with this problem
of communication. I should, of course, be
ready to give you any help which I can.
3 CONFIDENTIAL
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Kuma
CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 82 OF 28 JANUARY
INFO PEKING (PERSONAL FOR DENSON).
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
р
1. ON MY RETURN FROM SINGAPORE I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RE-CONSIDER THIS
QUESTION ON THE BASIS OF THE VALUABLE ADVICE CONTAINED IN YOUR
TELEGRAMS NOS. 13, 17 AND 36 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 42,
MS
SHOULD
LIKE YOU TO BE IN NO DOUBT THAT I DO NOT SEE SINO-BRITISH
RELATIONS IN ISOLATION FROM THE INTERESTS OF HONG KONG AND THAT
IT WAS PRIMARILY MY ESTIMATE OF THE LONG-TERM INTEREST OF HONG
KONG WHICH PROMPTED MY TELEGRAM NO. 24. I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO
ASSURE YOU THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION WHATEVER OF OUR BEING UNDER
SOME SORT OF AN OBLIGATION TO THE CHINESE TO DO A DEAL ABOUT THE
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS. THE CHINESE HAVE PERSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO
CONNECT THIS ISSUE WITH THE RELEASE OF BRITISH SUBJECTS DETAINED
IN CHINA, WE, HAVE, HOWEVER, RETAINED AND STILL DO RETAIN COMPLETE
FREEDOM OF ACTION.
2. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
IS BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES AND IS REINFORCED
BY MR. DENSON'S TELEGRAM NO. 42. THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY IN THESE
MATTERS, BUT THERE IS A REAL RISK THAT IF THERE IS NO SIGN OF
MOVEMENT IN REGARD TO THE CONFRONTATION PRISONERS THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT WILL SOONER OR LATER (AND PROBABLY SOONER) BEGIN TO
CAUSE TROUBLE AND IN THIS CONTEXT TROUBLE MEANS IN THE FIRST
PLACE TROUBLE FOR HONG KONG. AT THE SAME TIME, THE INDICATIONS
ARE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WANT TO LIQUIDATE THIS ISSUE
COKET PEALE AL
/RATHER
CONFIDENTI AL
RATHER THAN TO MAKE PUBLIC CAPITAL OUT OF IT AND ARE THEREFORE
UNLIKELY TO CROW UNDULY ABOUT IT AND PERHAPS EVEN TO DISCOURAGE
THEIR ADHERENTS IN HONG KONG FROM DOING SO IF WE DO DECIDE THAT
IT IS IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST TO GO SOME WAY TO MEET THEM. THIS
IS BORNE OUT BY THE UNOBTRUSIVE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE MADE THEIR
REPRESENTATIONS IN HONG KONG, COUPLED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH
THEY HAVE SPOKEN TO US BOTH HERE AND IN PEKING,
3. I AM, OF COURSE, GIVING THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE
VIEWS WHICH YOU HAVE URGED UPON ME ABOUT THE DANGER TO THE SECURITY
OF THE COLONY AND THE STRENGTH OF FEELING OF QUOTE ALL STRATA OF
PUBLIC OPINION UNQUOTE IF YOU WERE TO PURSUE THE COURSE SET OUT
IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 24.
4. AT THE SAME TIME I CANNOT BUT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE THREAT
WHICH THE CHINESE COULD, AND IN MY VIEW MIGHT WELL, POSE TO THE
COLONY IF WE SHOW THAT WE ARE UNWILLING TO MOVE OTHER THAN AT A
VERY SLOW PACE. YOU SAY IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 17
THAT QUOTE OUR ONLY REAL DEFENCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO SHOW CLEARLY
THAT THE COMMUNISTS CANNOT USURP OUR ESSENTIAL AUTHORITY EXCEPT BY
THE USE OF A DEGREE OF VIOLENCE WHICH WILL RUIN HONG KONG'S
USEFULNESS TO THEM UNQUOTE, BUT MUST WE NOT RECOGNISE THAT THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT COULD PUT HONG KONG TO A VERY CONSIDERABLE DEGREE
OF INCONVENIENCE WITHOUT NECESSARILY TAKING MATTERS TO EXTREMES?
WE MUST ALSO REMEMBER THAT IN 1967/68 THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
BENEFITTED FROM THE FACT THAT THE TROUBLE-MAKERS ENJOYED LITTLE
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