!
+
2. MR HACDONALD GAVE AS HIS STRONG PERSONAL ALYICE THAT TO CHEN." SHOULD
GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF TIG ACRESKELT SO MAR REW.
YOULD HAVE. SKYTRAL
PAT
1
DE IN THE GOLF
NOT
i
F
L
·
■ PROGRESS. THE SVITCD OF THE VOTE AND WITHDRAWAL OF OUR GILATE MILE THE
ASSØKLY WAS 14 SESSION WOULD HAVE A POWERFUL EFFECT ON OPINION WITHIN
THE UN WHICH COULD ONLY WORK TO CHERA'S ADVANTAGE, IT WOULD REPACSEK
IT WOULD REPACSCHT A SERIOUS BLOW TO TAIWAN ́S CLAIM TO APRESENT THE
VHOLE OF CHINA AND AGATO SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE DID ROT THINK THAT
HAVING REMOVED THE CONSULATE THE BRITISH, GOVERNMENT WOULDEVER THINK
OFGENDING IT BACK AGAH.
H
J.. I THINK THE LINE MR MACDONALD TOOK WAS MOST HELPFUL, LET US HOPE IT
WILL DO THE TRICK. IT IS NOW UP TO THE CHIKESE TO SUMION ME AGAIN AND I
SEE RO-ADVANTAGE IN OUR MAKING ANY MOVE BEFORE THEN. IF AT THE NEXT
MEETING THEY MAKE ANOTHER, 'ATTEMPT TO GET US TO CHANGE
·CUR POSITION OR TO GIVE THE SORT OF PRIVATE ASSURANCE WHICH IT WILL NOT
BE IN OUR POWER TO HONOUR, E.0. THAT WE WILL SAY NOTHING OUT PUBLIC
ARCUT OUR LEGAL VIEW, I ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD WISH HE TO TAKE A VEPY
ROBUST LINE, TO DEPLORE WHAT APPEARS TO BE A HARDENING IN THE GUTHESE
POSITION SINCE THE LAST MEETING AND TO URGE SETTLEMENT ON
THE PRESEIT TAMMS. IF THE CAPIESE RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHAT CUR
+
+
ATTITUDE MOULD DE TOVARDS AN INDEPENDANT TAIWAN I COULD REPLY. THAT THIS
IS A PWOTHETICAL QUESTION BUT. I WOULD RAISE THE MATTER WITH YOU. WOULD
WE IN FACT BE PREPARED TO GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT OUR POSITION MIGHT
BIZ THE QUESTION OF MIY INDEPENDENCE IS A HATTER WHICH S CLEARLY VERY
VORRYING TO THE CHINESE. A POINT I COULD MAKE TO THE CHINESE 13 THAT IF
THE TALKS BREAK DOWN, WE SHALL BE OBLIGED TO INFORM PARLIAMENT AND THAT
THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF TAIWAN IS DOUND TO COME UP. THIS DAY RAVE
THE EFFECT OF AIRING THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN EVEN IF IT IS NOT
INTENDED TO, WHICH IS PRECISELY WHAT THE CHINESE WANT TO AVOID.
·
>
+
·
!
I
1
DEN SO!!
k:
1
+
.
|
י
GS UA
15,000-4/71-396483
TS 7/1162/46 IV
J AL Morgan Esq
FED
P CO
CONFIDENTIAL
enter asubmit
(M.
PZ
COLONIAL SEGRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
Dear John
Fal
MALCOLM MACDONALD AND CHOU EN LAT
-
HONG KONG
29 October, 1971 seen by me
Kofori
I met Mr. Malcolm MacDonald at the border on 25 October and took him to
the airport for his flight to Kuala Lumpur. I was particularly
interested to try to find out from him whether Chou En Lai had said any
more to him about Hong Kong than was reported in Peking telegram No.
1076 to the PCO of 19 October.
2.
I
260
Ес
忱
Mr. MacDonald soon got on to this subject. He said that Hong Kong had
come up only once apart from a brief reference at the end of his talk
(see paragraph 5 below). Mr. MacDonald said that Chou En Lai had done no
more than re- affirm what he had said to him in 1962. I said I was not
aware of any record of his conversation of 1962 with Chou En Lai. Mr.
MacDonald expressed some surprise and then said that perhaps he had
reported those remarks only orally. find on returning to the Secretariat
that we do indeed have no record of that conversation which must have
taken place in October 1962 because Mr. MacDonald mentioned that it had
occurred two days before the Chinese launched their attack on the
Indians.
3.
Mr. MacDonald said that Hong Kong had come up (as described in paragraph
1 of Peking telegram No. 1076) because Chou En Lai vas explaining that
HMG had no cause to think that the current discussions about the status
of Taivan had any adverse implications for Hong Kong. Chou En Lai said
that Taiwan and Hong Kong were entirely different cases, When China had
liberated Taiwan it did not follow that she would immediately want to do
something about "Kowloon", There was no hurry so far as Kovloon vas
concerned.
4.
I asked Mr. MacDonald whether this reference to Kowloon meant that China
was thinking of taking back the leased territories in 1997 (Mr.
MacDonald had in fact used "1998" throughout) leaving us with the ceded
territories. Mr. MacDonald replied that in his view China would feel
obliged to take back the New Territories when the lease expired and that
the remainder of the Colony would no longer be able to exist on its own.
/Contd...
CONFIDENTIAL
·
CONFIDENTIAL
10
5.
I asked Mr. MacDonald whether 1997 had been mentioned and if so by which
party. He replied that it had come up towards the end of the
conversation when he said to Chou that he would like to return in 1998
to see how Chou was then getting on with these matters. Chou replied
that he
must come back before then because he could not guarantee to be Prime
Minister in 1998; he could guarantee he would be Prime Minister only for
the next five years. I am not positive that this was the only reference
to 1997 in the conversation but I was left with the impression that it
was and that the date had been mentioned originally not by Chou En Lai
but by Mr. MacDonald.
6.
I have had a discussion on the conversation with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker
who knew Mr. MacDonald in Africa whilst I met him on October 25 for the
first time. It has been Sir Hugh's experience that Mr. MacDonald at
least in his African days approached interviews with certain
expectations of what the other party might say and occasionally reported
the views he expected to hear rather than those which were in fact
expressed.
7.
There seems no doubt that Chou did make two important remarks relating
to Hong Kong:-
(a)
(b)
that China was in no hurry to do anything about Hong Kong; and
that after the return of Taivan to China it would not necessarily follow
that China would want to do anything about Hong Kong.
Unless Mr. MacDonald can be pinned down more specifically than I managed
to do on October 25 it seems probable that Chou En Lai did not say
anything definite about 1997. It seems more likely that Mr. MacDonald,
who himself believes 1997 is the date when the whole Colony will in fact
have to be returned to China, interpreted Chou's other remarks as
confirmation of his view.
8.
Mr. MacDonald will be writing up his conversation from notes which I
fear are rather scrappy. When he eventually returns to London after his
brief stops at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Djakarta you might be able to
put to him the two questions which, it seems to me, might clarify Chou's
remarks:-
(a)
(b)
Did Chou En Lai actually say anything about 1997 or was it mentioned
only in your own closing remarks?
What exactly was the significance of the use by Chou En Lai of the word
"Kowloon" instead of Hong Kong? Was there any implication that the
return of the leased territories in 1997 would not be accompanied by the
demand for the return of the ceded territories?
ever
Your
Arthur.
cc J B Denson Esq OBE (Peking)
(A F Maddocks)
CONFIDENTIAL
r
H
י
I
H
Mr Morgan
UNCLASSIFIED
Reference
125
@
SIH YI's REMARKS ABOUT HONG KONG
1. I have had a copy of the passage put on our files and copied to
Research Department. I was not previously aze of whe booklet or of Ch'en
Yi's remarks about
+
Arterioчn use of Hong Kong. You may wish to send the
·
attached copy to Sir Icehose to complete the picture.
28 October 1971
II 1 Davies
UNCLASSIFIED
DD 737719 557664 500M 2/7) GH 360372
+
I
+
I
L
F
I
-2-
Khrushchov said that, instead of liberating Hong Kong and зcao herself,
China was acting other Asians and Africans fight inyerialism and
colonialism and pull chestnuts out of the fire for China. This is a
malicious "rovocation. Khrushchov wanted to lictate China's policy. Our
reply ia: China's policy must be decided by China herself and not by the
Khrushchov revisionists.
+
+
Extract from For igu Languages "ress Booklet printed in
19
kin
titled "V - reuior Ch'en Yi Answer questions put by Corr ispunilantos 19
Daptube 1. 10/15)
On the w
L
+
of Hong Kong no a base for its Aggressiva Jur in
1
Vienam.
pargo 21-23
+
·
+
L
·
11
Ans:pring .41;ion put by the correspondents of the loué Kon; "Chong
Hong Ju 20", "T: Tồng Kông Evening Newn"" and "The Global Digest" about
the use of ing Kông by the United States in its war of aggression
against Viet an, Vie Iremier Chen Yi ogid:-
+
+
The facht Britain and the Hong Kong authoriting nllo the Unised 3tité :
1o use Hong Kong na a hoe for agresion againes Vietnam han vauged the
anxiety of the local inhabitants. The Chinese Government.c mig the
question not only one of using long long an base for aggre ion against
Vietnam but also of rearin; to use it in future anal for reunion against
China.
bus
The Chi 100€ Government 1: firmly opponeil to this. This etion of the
Briti: a Government 1: nous chujid. We hope that it will chose a viner
course in tao. 1 ilere sta. Other ise, China 111 bake na mures when
necessary a
I
To
-
-
The US ilful ex ausion of its war of aggression in Vigt iam and
Britain's 'co ir ẻ of notion in regard to "lalnyoin" all this lo·
curțini, no: verily directed against Vietitvi or Inioneula bat against
Chines melli US imperialism had never concealed it: global atrategy, wh
claim it the domination of the whole worll. Ja troops ar: coing to Tong
Kong not simply for vacation.
Mr Wilson, the British rime Minister, has declare that Britain is not
:iving up ay of it: strongholde and military boons enst of Sues. 1he US
and British' ku erialists are not in full agreement on soue co icrcte
measures in hệ Vietnam war, but they have no fundamental dif 'ercnce
when it come to the question of consolidating the world colo dial
oyota.: It i posible that the United States pay extoul th: war to
China'am i là d. In that event, what grounds are there for thining tha
the "ritish and other in orialista will not ret rn to thei: förber
coloni in Asia and Africa? That is why the nzuggles of the peopl of the
world against imperialion and colonialis, and particularly at US
imporialis ani its followers, ford a
+
interal ho 2. The people of the worl·l, should maintain clar: vigilance
and (upport ach other in those strugglen.
i
The hard
L
rule of the Vietnamese people is not ro y their own ffair, ut
n'coilribution to the orlaide struggle agai.at impeciali: 1 ni
colonidlion. If war should spread to Ching, he vill put ip staun h
resistance and will be determined to defeat ÚS inpe-iali:.
با
Chinn er not just the question of Taiwan, the uention of long Kong and
the mention of non, ench on its om; what we see is the global straty of
U imperialism. One must be prepared to uge a worldwide at uggla before
US imperialian can be ðasantai. "11 the impe 1alita allo the socialist
countries in hutera urope nd the Soviet & ion to live in necurity? The
Khrushchov rovioi niots place implic t trust in what US imperialism
onya, and they will sooner or later com o rif for it.
/...
+
I
÷
-F
L
I
1
1
-2-
·
Khrushchov avid that, instead of liberating Hong Kong and Tacao herself,
hina wag aking other isiana and Africans fight in erialian and
colonialism and pull chestnuts out of the fire for China. This is a
malicious provocation. Khrushchov wanted to lictate China's policy. Our
reply ia: China's policy must be lecided by Chin: "herself and not by
tile Khrushchov revisionists.
+
4
+
Ꮀ
L
:
·
|
:
י
!
L
+
+
+
L
A
3A
exter op. 425
8
RESTRICTED RC.
ایک
7
27.10
Siru faclebose Hakym
4. 26/10.
270017971
FEHǝ/2
CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HONG KONG
1. four minute of 19 October to Crowson, who is now on leave.
2.
You may be interested in the attached minute by Research Department
vaich sets out the most recent Chinese references to Hong Kong. You will
see that the attitude to which you refer was made public in 1963. It has
not, to our knowledge, been reiterated since then.
3.
You have already seen what Chou En-lai said to Hr Malcolm MacDonald. He
said that "China had no intention of seeking to get Hong Kong back until
the expiry of the New Territories lease".
SALMaçon
J A L Morgan
Far Eastern Department
25 October 1971
Copied, with enclosures, to:
Sir 3 Tomlinson
Mr Wilford
RESTRICTED
·
I
I
I
I
+
Sir M MacLehose
+
RESTRICTAD
30
8
A
+
CHINA'S ATRITUDS POWARDS HONG KONG
1.
2.
Your minute of 15 October to ir Croneo, who is no. on leave.
You may be Lnterested in She attached ainute by Viran201 De artent which
sets out the most recent Chiese refe • ..30. Hong Kong. You :11 see that
the attitude to which von va?. vao made public in 1963. It has not, to
our knowledge, been reiterated since then.
3.
+
You have almaly biel. has Chou h-lai cald to ir Haleo? ilacDo..ald. Je
sail th. "Jina kad no intention of using jet liong Kong back until the
expiry of the w 'ertitor. Ian
+
பு
25 October 1971
Copied, with enclosures,
Sir 3 Tomlinson
Mr Wilford/
נד
SAL Magen
to:
J AL Morgan
Far astoru Depart ent
The 1967
1967 statement
won m
mate
(inocent) the big the fire The sacking of our March)
The CR / Surely the
out the height of
bot Official statement was by
RESNRIS膏
"Then Y, aut his press conference
Y.
whre von
-Sept/Oct 1966
Mesonem attented Прегле
See
قلعه
The Rebing aclebrating:
attacks Book (Plreton)
P.22
ли
27/x
1
+
Sir M MacLehose
ان
UNCLASSIFIED
B
FRANK ROWERTSON'S ARTICLE ON HONG KONG : DAILY TELEGRAPH
14 OCTOBER 1971
1.
We have consulted Research Department about your question. They do not
have full records of all NONA pronouncements on Hong Kong but are
reasonably certain that no such sentiments have teen published in CA
since 1969. Mr Davies who studied NONA daily in Peking since the
beginning of 1969 confirms this.
2. From the tone of the passage quoted it seems likely to dato from 1967
or 1968. Recently NOWA hus even taken to wentioning "the Hong Kong
British authorities" in straight- forward news items from Hong Kon; The
most recent example of this was a report of attendance at National Day
celerations in Hong Kong. The passage quoted by Frank Robertson is
therefore far from being typical at present.
18 October 1971
Mi Gravom.
R.b. horson.
R Crowson
Far Eastern Department
This is
but Mi Rutertom
reassuring.
refering
t
A
definition of th C. P. G's attituck tweaks H.K...
+
itat
Hay Kay
• Macan
which will th sitthal
forblems haft
of mystiation when the tim
I thought this
NEA
int until the the status quo. will to mantamil.
for the part
night when wo auch in statant work with mady?
UNCLASSIFIED Ú
* * Jan
Min The
19/10.
+
1
:
r
PUER
DAILY TELEGRAPH
:14 OCT 1971
Colony in the dragon's mouth
FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the Treaties that
that created
STR
it
OR DAVID TRENCH'S rẻ- he forced to live in an impos--
tirement next week as "sibly restricted area. Governor of Hongkong marks
the end of an cra, for he was the last official ap pointed to this post
by the former Colonial Office. Sir Murray Maclchose, his suc cessor, is
a career Foreign Office man with China service,
At this tursing-point, how does the future of Britain's last important
colony look? While vast new long-range investment projects, boll public
and private, are being avidly under- i written, Hongkong's money men
know well that they can enjoy i their remarkable prosperity only
so long as China wills it.
For Peking. fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the
British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to
the homeland, "Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Hong
kong gamble.
AS
I The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, a
all regarded by Peking "uisequal" and therefore not binding. The first
of these, signed under the mouth of British guns at Nanking by Manchu
otlicials in 1842, states:
10.J
It being obviously necessary and desirable that British gubi "a jects"
should have some Port wherent they may curren and reft their Ships,
when quired, and keen Stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor
of China cedex to Her L Majesty the Queen of Great
Hritain, etc., the island of Ilong kang, to be possessed in per petuity
by Her Britannic Majesty, Her Heirs and Suc
J
+
cessors
L
This dealt only with long kong Island. In 1860 the Con- vention of
Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow- Joon Peninsula on
the facing *mainland-nceded to ensure the flow of supplies from China,
and to control pirates operating
· from that side of the port.
On June 9, 1898, ■ second convention was signed in Peking (it came into
force on July 1, 1898) extending British territory on the mainland, and
to nullving
• inlands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New Territories,
which should revert la China on June 30, 1997.
Without these added lands longkong's four million (a figure that
presumably will be increased greatly by 1897) would
More than that, the colony would lose much of its reservoir water
supply, most of the northern side of the narrow harbour would be in
potentially national airport might well be hostile hands, and even the
inter- claimed by China.
Clearly China can strangle Ilongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997.
But will Peking | act before then? Every couple of years the Chinese
restale their attitude towards liongkong,
In the last auch reference the Peking People's Daily territory since
"Hongkong has been Chinese ancient times. This is a fact known to every-
body in the world, old and young. More than a century ago British
imperialism caine to China in pirate ships and pro voked the criminal
"opium war!" massacred numerous Chinese prople and occupied the Chinese
territory of Hongkong... This is an enorminus blood debt British
imperialism owes to the Chinese prople. Sooner or later The Chinese
people with make a thorough-going liquidation of this debt."
th
Declining role
Dow
Certainly Peking is still mak- Ing a lot of money from long- kong, bul,
that China is being rapidly opened up to direct foreign trade, this i
brcoining less import 'nt to the Mainland.
"Since the Chinese Commun. its always seek pretexis to justify, for
their party history books, the political correct. ness" of any major
politicat clian, in Hongkong's case they would certainly claim mistreat
ment of the colony's Chinese subjects.
Not that Peking really needs to justify action against The colony, for
the Chiness know that neither Britain not the United States would try to
defend Hongkong.
kang's prospects by the Hoover An American study of Hong- Institution of
Stanford Univer sity has predicted that China could move against the
colony predicated on the basis of A as early as 1974, but this is
vinirnt power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao.
kong are disturbed by such pre- If the money men of long- dictions of
disaster they are careful not to show it.
EE.D
Is this recant or
ty
Inferences
C. Mitha
16/1
+
RESTRICTED
سأ
L
Reference.
-
·
Mr Davics, Far Eastern Department.
1)
CHINA/HONKONG
As you are aware, the Chinese regard liong Kong as part of China, and
refer to the "compatriots" of Hong Kong. Specific references to the
status of Hong Kong are, however, few.
2) On 8 March 1963, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled
"Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A." Although
nominally directed at the American Communist Party, this was in fact a
reply to Khruschev's attacks on the Chinese position over the Cuban
crisis. Khruschev, in the course of his attacks, had made somewhat
disparaging references to China's failure to end the colonial status of
Hong Kong and Kacao. The Chinese in reply, stated that: "With regard to
the outstanding issuco, which are a legacy from the past, wo have always
held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully
through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo
should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong
Kong, Kowloon and Macao..
-
3) Although Soviet propaganda occasionally returned to the subject of
Hong Kong and Macao in subsequent years, the Chinese do not appear to
have paid much attention to such references. However, the Chinese
delegation to the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in September 1964 did
protest strongly at a resolution which called for the independence of
various Asian colonial territories, and included Hong Kong and Macao in
the list of such territories. The Chinese insisted that Hong Kong and I
acao were different from the other colonies because they were Chinese
territory, taken by unequal treaties.
4) During the disturbances in Hong Kong in the summer of 1967, there
were several Chinese references to the position of the colony. While
those were often delivered in somewhat militant language, they acomod to
indicate, at least obliquly, that the 1963 atatement in the People's
Daily still hold good. Thus a Teonle's Daily editorial of 3 June 1967
called upon the
וד
patriotic compatriots" of Hong Kong to unite against "British
imperialism". It went on "The fate of Hong Kong will be decided by the
patriotic compatriots there, by the 700 million Chinose people,
absolutely not by decadent British imperialism." Šimilar sentiments wore
expressed by Chi Pea-yu, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group
under the Central Committee, at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers
'Bureau on 5 June, He also said, as a warning to British imperialism,
"The old debt you owe us for launching the dirty Opium War and forcibly
occupying Hong Kong by taking advantage of the corruption in the Ching
court is not yet repaid.'
נו
that
RESTRICTED
/ 5)
-
+
+
+
·
5)
RESTRICTED
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.